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such as those by den Hertog (2016), D’Alfonso 
(2014a and 2018) and Darvas et al. (2018), have 
discussed other financial aspects of the EU’s 
migration policy, focusing on the budgetary im-
plications of its common asylum and border 
management policies.
The book starts by looking, in Chapter 2, at the 
conditions under which aid can actually affect 
migration, reviewing the academic debate on 
the matter, including the most recent empirical 
literature. Indeed, while many politicians have 
been calling for an increase in official assistance 
to developing countries to stem migration and 
refugee flows, the empirical evidence on the link 
between aid and migration is mixed. Chapter 3 
then examines to what extent the EU’s develop-
ment and humanitarian assistance (and that of 
the international donor community as a whole) 
has actually been reacting to the migration 
challenge. It also discusses the implications for 
external migration policy of the Commission’s 
recent proposals for the EU’s next Multi-Annual 
Financial Framework, covering the period 2021-
2027. 
The following two chapters examine a number of 
EU external financial instruments that are of par-
ticular relevance for migration and refugee policy. 
Thus, Chapter 4 assesses four sui generis instru-
ments recently created by the EU that are explic-
itly designed to deal with refugee and migration 
pressures, namely three EU Trust Funds (for the 
Central African Republic, for Africa as a whole 
and for the countries directly impacted by the 
Syrian refugee crisis) and the Facility for Refugees 
in Turkey. Chapter 5 reviews other relevant EU in-
struments that rely on loans or on a blend of loans, 
grants and, in some cases, guarantees, namely: 
the external activities of the European Investment 
Bank (EIB), notably its Economic Resilience In-
itiative, which is aimed at the Southern Medi-
terranean and Western Balkans countries most 
involved in the migration crisis; the European 
External Investment Plan (EEIP); and Macro-Fi-
nancial Assistance. Chapter 6, for its part, looks at 
certain multilateral financial facilities established 
in recent years to help countries experiencing 
acute refugee situations. These chapters not only 
provide a stock-taking of these instruments but 
also put forward specific recommendations to 
improve them.
1. Introduction
The EU has been experiencing since 2014 what is 
often referred to as a refugee and migration crisis. 
Between 2014 and 2017, new asylum applica-
tions reached, according to Eurostat, 3.7 million 
(the highest in any four-year period since World 
War II).1 During the same period, total irregular 
arrivals by the Mediterranean sea, including 
migrants whose main motivation was economic, 
reached an estimated 2.8 million, with the related 
death toll rising dramatically.2 Driven by the surge 
in asylum seekers, total migration inflows into the 
EU, including regular economic migration, also 
rose markedly, averaging 4.5 million per year in 
2015-2016, a new historical peak.3 Although there 
has been a marked reduction in the numbers 
of both asylum applications and total irregular 
arrivals since mid-2016, the political and social 
debate on how to respond to migration is far from 
over.
The crisis has underlined the urgency of re-
thinking and reinforcing the EU’s migration and 
asylum policies. In order to promote a coordinated 
response to these challenges, the European Com-
mission proposed in May 2015 a new European 
Agenda on Migration, combining both internal 
and external policies and bringing together all 
relevant actors.4 Since then, a significant number 
of actions have been taken by the EU to reinforce 
and update its migration policy.5 
A key dimension of the EU’s new migration 
strategy is the financial one and, within this, the 
potential use of external financial assistance to 
address the root causes of migration and refugee 
flows. The objective of this book is to look at the 
extent to which the EU’s external financial instru-
ments can be redesigned or used more effective-
ly to alleviate underlying migration and refugee 
pressures, thus supporting the external dimension 
of the EU’s migration policy. Other recent papers, 
1 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database, series 
migr_asyappctza.
2 According to data on irregular crossings compiled by 
the European Border and Coast Guard Agence. For the trends in 
irregular crossings through the Mediterranean and in fatalities at 
sea, see Fargues (2017).
3 See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database, series 
migr_imm3ctb.
4 European Commission (2015a).
5 See European Commission (2017a, 2018a and 2018b). 
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With climate change and natural disasters 
induced by it increasingly contributing to forced 
displacement, climate finance to developing 
countries is becoming of growing relevance 
for refugee and migration policy. Chapter 7 
discusses what the EU is doing in this area and 
ways to improve its approach. Chapter 8 then 
looks at the role of migrant remittances. While 
not an official financial flow, remittances are of 
extreme importance for both economic develop-
ment and migration flows and they have become 
much larger than official development assistance. 
Moreover, they can be facilitated or discouraged 
by public policies. A discussion of the financial 
aspects of external migration policy would, 
therefore, not be complete without looking at the 
role of remittances. 
Chapter 9 looks at the scope for enhancing the 
effectiveness of aid in the context of bilateral 
migration or refugee “compacts” agreed between 
donors and migration-relevant countries. This is 
what the EU is trying to do through the EU-Jordan 
Compact, the EU-Turkey Statement and its new 
Partnership Framework with Third Countries on 
Migration. The compact approach is also being 
advocated by the recent academic literature 
on refugee protection and has been enshrined 
in the new Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework adopted by the United Nations (UN) 
in 2016. This new approach emphasizes not only 
the advantages of bilateral cooperation but also 
the importance of shifting towards a developmen-
tal aid strategy aimed at promoting the economic 
self-reliance of refugees and their integration in 
countries of first asylum. Chapter 9 assesses the 
EU’s recent bilateral migration and refugee agree-
ments also in that light. 
Finally, Chapter 10 draws the main conclusions 
and policy recommendations of the book.
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influence refugee pressures at their origin to the 
extent that refugees flows are so-called mixed 
migration flows, which are partly motivated 
by a difficult economic situation and a lack of 
economic opportunities. Aid and other economic 
policy instruments (notably trade preferenc-
es) can, however, be highly relevant for tackling 
refugee pressures in countries of first asylum. 
This chapter focuses on the relevance of aid for 
economic migration, which is also the link that 
has been examined by most empirical studies.
2.1 Development and 
migration
The argument that aid can reduce migration 
is normally based on one of the following two 
hypothesis; the first one is that aid stimulates 
economic development in the beneficiary country 
and that this, by improving economic opportuni-
ties at home, makes it less necessary or less attrac-
tive to migrate. The second hypothesis is that aid 
programmes can directly reduce the motivation 
to migrate by raising the disposable incomes of 
potential migrants and, therefore, the opportuni-
ty cost of migrating (income channel). 
The first hypothesis leads directly to the conten-
tious and non-conclusive academic debate on the 
relationship between aid and GDP growth.6 But 
even assuming that aid does impact economic de-
velopment positively, the link between the latter 
and migration is complex. In fact, there is rather 
broad empirical support for the existence of an 
inverted U curve or hump-shaped relationship 
between economic development (as measured by 
the level of per capita GDP) and migration.7 This 
is illustrated by Figure 2.1, borrowed from Lanati 
and Thiele (2017), which plots both variables for 
a sample of 136 developing countries over the 
period 1995-2013. It suggests that, to the extent 
that aid does promote economic development, it 
6 For the aid and development debate, see Easterly (2001), 
Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004), and Clemens, Radelet, 
Bhavnani and Bazzi (2012). Rajan and Subramanian (2008) 
provide a good survey. 
7 See Clemens (2014) for a comprehensive survey of both 
macro and micro studies. While cross-sectional macro studies 
tend to find either an inverted U curve or a positive relationship 
between per capita income and migration, the results of time-
series studies are mixed. According to Clemens, however, the 
inconclusive resuts of time-series studies reflect the fact that many 
cover only a short period of the “mobility transition”, i.e. only a 
segment of the inverted U curve. 
2. Can aid work? 
A fresh look at 
the academic 
debate 
For years, European politicians and EU institu-
tions have been advocating an increase in official 
aid towards the countries of origin, transit or first 
asylum of migration and refugee flows, in the 
hope that this will help moderate such flows. Thus, 
for example, French Foreign Minister, Bernard 
Kouchner, on his first official trip to Africa in 2007, 
called for more development aid to the region 
to help curb migration (Reuters, 2007). Most 
recently, the President of the European Parlia-
ment suggested that the EU should adopt a sort of 
Marshall Plan for Africa in order to reduce future 
migration from this continent (Tajani, 2018). The 
strategy of the EU institutions has also reflected 
the assumption that aid can mitigate migration 
pressures. Thus, already in 1994, the EU’s de-
velopment cooperation ministers requested the 
European Commission to explore the use of de-
velopment assistance to reduce migration flows 
(De Haas, 2007; p. 827). The supporting role of 
development aid in migration strategies was 
subsequently highlighted by the Commission in 
the “Global Approach to Migration” adopted in 
2005 (European Commission, 2008), the 2015 
European Agenda on Migration (European Com-
mission, 2015a, op. cit.) and the 2016 Commu-
nication establishing a Partnership Framework 
with Third Countries on Migration (European 
Commission, 2016a). However, despite the wide-
spread assumption among policy-makers that aid 
can reduce migration flows, the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the impact of foreign as-
sistance on migration is far from conclusive. 
When looking at the possible impact of aid on 
migration flows one has to distinguish from 
the outset between refugee flows and economic 
migration. Refugee flows are normally caused by 
situations of military conflict, political instability 
or persecution, for which financial and economic 
instruments are obviously less relevant. Address-
ing refugee flows at their root (that is, in the 
countries that generate them) requires political 
rather than economic solutions. Aid can only 
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ment, by raising the income of potential migrants, 
eases their credit or budget constraints and that 
this helps them fi nance the cost of international 
mobility. Economic development also tends to go 
hand-in-hand with fi nancial development, which 
may help potential migrants overcome their 
credit constraints through borrowing. But this 
credit or budget constraint channel (sometimes 
also known as the poverty constraint factor) is 
only binding up to a threshold level. Beyond that, 
the discouraging eff ect related to economic devel-
opment (the income channel) tends to dominate, 
producing a downward slope in the develop-
ment-migration curve. Vanderkamp (1971), Faini 
and Venturini (1993) and Hatton and Williamson 
(1994) were among the fi rst authors to explain 
the observed inverted U relationship between per 
capita income and migration by the credit con-
straint hypothesis. 
A second central explanation is the so-called 
demographic transition: in the early stages of 
economic development, rising incomes tend to 
be associated with rapidly declining mortality, 
and this precedes the fall in fertility rates. Th is 
produces a rapid rise in the population and tends 
to also result in a “youth bulge”. Part of this larger 
and younger population may not fi nd jobs at 
home and may, therefore, decide to migrate, es-
pecially since young people are normally much 
more willing and capable to migrate. All this 
tends to increase migration just as incomes are 
rising. But as economic development continues, 
birth rates decline and death rates stabilise at a 
lower level, leading to a deceleration of demo-
graphic growth and, then, to a stabilisation in the 
size of the population (and, for some very mature 
populations, even a decline at some point) as 
well as to an ageing process, all of which reduces 
migration pressures. Figure 2.2 summarises the 
demographic transition process. Th ese demo-
graphic factors tend to accentuate the “mobility 
transition” caused by the credit constraint factor.9
9 For the link between of the demographic and mobility 
transitions, see Zelinsky (1971) and Hatton and Willamson (1994).
might actually encourage migration for as long 
as the recipient country fi nds itself in the upward 
slopped part of the inverted U curve, that is, 
for relatively poor countries. Beyond a certain 
income threshold, however, further economic 
development reduces migration and, therefore, 
aid might moderate migration fl ows, provided 
that it helps the benefi ciary country develop. 
Unfortunately, empirical studies suggest that the 
income threshold beyond which the income-mi-
gration relationship turns negative is relative-
ly high.8 All this has led to a rather widespread 
pessimism among scholars over the last 15 years 
about the capacity of economic development (and 
aid) to stem the tide of migrants from low- and 
lower middle-income countries. Examples of this 
pessimism are provided by Nyberg-Sørensen, 
Hear and Engberg-Pedersen (2002) and De Haas 
(2007).
Figure 2.1:  Th e Migration - Development 
Relationship: An Inverted U Shape 
Source: Lanati and Th iele (2017). 
Note: Th e fi gure plots on the horizontal axis the log of GDP per 
capita of the countries of origin of migration and on the verti-
cal axis the log of their emigration outfl ows over total population. 
Th e sample is composed of 3,529 observations covering the period 
1995-2013.
Several explanations have been put forward by the 
academic literature for the inverted U curve rela-
tionship between development and migration, a 
pattern that is sometimes known as the “mobility 
transition” (see Clemens, 2014 for an overview). 
One important theory is that economic develop-
8 Clemens and Postel (2018) estimate the threshold to be 
somewhere between USD 8,000 and USD 10,000, using per capita 
income data calculated at 2005 purchasing power parities (PPP). 
Th is is consistent with what Figure 2.1 suggests.
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Whatever the explanation, there seems to be an 
inverted U curve relationship between devel-
opment and migration. Policy-makers should, 
therefore, be aware that the eff ectiveness of aid as a 
migration-mitigating policy will depend on where 
exactly on that curve the recipient country fi nds 
itself. A lot of the disagreement among academic 
experts over whether economic development 
will generate more or less migration refl ects a 
disagreement not on the existence of the hunch-
shaped pattern but on the exact position of a de-
veloping country or a region on the curve. Most 
researchers, however, seem to agree that predom-
inantly low-income regions such as Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) lie in the upward slopped part of the 
cycle whereas others such as Northern Africa and 
parts of Latin America and Asia are either on the 
plateau or moving into the downward slopping 
segment of the curve.10
2.2 Aid and migration: 
the direct link
As noted above, the second hypothesis is that aid 
might aff ect migration directly (rather than via its 
impact on economic development). Th e direct 
link between aid and migration has been less ex-
tensively explored empirically. But most studies 
suggest that the relationship between both is 
positive, although it might turn negative beyond 
certain levels of per capita income, refl ecting the 
hump-shaped pattern observed between develop-
ment and migration. Th us, using a macro model 
of joint determination of aid and migration, 
which takes into account the possible response of 
aid to migration, and running it on a cross-sec-
tion sample of 22 OECD migrant-receiving 
countries and 187 sending countries, Berthéle-
my, Beuran and Maurel (2009) found a positive 
relationship between aid and migration up to a 
threshold of USD 7.348 at PPP 2000 prices and a 
negative one beyond it. Belloc (2015), for his part, 
found a positive linear relationship between aid 
and migration for a cross-section sample of SSA 
countries. In general, the literature on the direct 
connection between aid and migration fi nds or 
argues that, up to an income threshold, the direct 
impact of aid programmes on household income 
(the income channel), which as noted tends to 
discourage migration, is more than compensated 
by the loosening of the credit constraint channel, 
which makes migration more aff ordable. 
10  See, for example, Hatton and Williamson (2011).
Figure 2.2: Th e demographic transition in four 
stages
Economic development, and in particular the 
mechanisation of the agricultural sector and in-
dustralisation, is also associated with structural 
changes that can shake loose workers from the 
country side, leading them fi rst to migrate to 
the cities but later (or simultaneously) abroad 
(Zelinsky, op. cit.; Massey, 1988). Again, this 
process tends to happen in the early stages of 
economic development and fades away aft er-
wards. 
Another key factor behind the inverted U curve 
is the so-called “diaspora or family and friends 
eff ect”: as the diaspora of migrants increases, it 
tends to facilitate the migration of others through 
the sharing information about the destination 
country (on job search, housing, immigration reg-
ulations, etc.) and by providing logistical support 
and a sort of insurance against risk (Martin and 
Taylor, 1996). Indeed, previous migrants may 
even help fi nance the costs of migration. In so 
doing and by reducing the information cost of 
migrating, they help other (oft en poorer or less 
skilled) migrants overcome their credit constraint. 
Growing diasporas also tend to feed back into 
migration through family reunifi cation because 
many diaspora members get married to people 
from their countries or regions of origin. All this 
tends to accelerate migration even as incomes in 
the country of origin rise. On the other hand, as 
diasporas expand, host countries oft en tighten 
immigration policies, discouraging migration at 
the time the country of origin may be moving 
into higher levels of development.
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holds that wanted to migrate but could not aff ord 
it. Th ese additional migrants not only tended to 
be poorer than other inhabitants from the same 
villages that had already migrated but also tended 
to have relatively lower skills. Th is suggests that 
providing more fi nancial assistance to relative-
ly poor countries or communities may not only 
encourage migration but may have a negative 
selection eff ect, that is, it may worsen the skill mix 
of the migration fl ow. 
Angelucci’s results, and the budget constraint 
argument more generally, are consistent with 
other studies that show that the poorer and less 
skilled potential migrants tend to migrate at a 
later stage, once their incomes rise or aft er other 
(more skilled) relatives or friends have migrated 
and provide them with information, logistical 
or fi nancial support to cover their migration 
costs (Erickson, 1990; Wegge, 1998; Liebig and 
Sousa-Poza, 2004; Belot and Hatton, 2012). By 
helping to fi nance the costs of migration, aid can 
perform the same role as the family and friends 
eff ect, making it easier for emigrants with weaker 
skills and fi nancial endowments to migrate.
Th e importance of the budget constraint is also 
highlighted by qualitative studies describing the 
migration journeys irregular migrants from SSA 
go through. Th us, for example, Kuschminder 
(2017), in a fi eld study examining how Eritrean 
and Nigerian migrants navigate through the 
Central Mediterranean route to try to reach Italy 
via Libya, shows how the success and even survival 
of these clandestine journeys crucially depends 
on the migrants having saved suffi  cient capital 
to pay for smugglers and other transport, to pay 
ransoms to free them when they are kidnapped, 
Some authors argue that this credit constraint 
eff ect is reinforced by the fact that the implemen-
tation of offi  cial assistance projects, by helping 
to spread information on the donor country and 
to develop personal and institutional links with 
it, reduces the transaction costs of migrating. 
Berthélemy et al., op. cit., called this the network 
or attraction eff ect, and it acts in a similar way 
to the “diaspora” or “friends and family” eff ect 
mentioned above.11 Th ey found that this eff ect 
was more signifi cant for skilled migrants. 
Th e potential importance of this network eff ect 
was already underlined by Morrison (1982) in 
a study focusing on the Dominican Republic, 
where he argued that “the social, commercial and 
political ties” engendered by aid can encourage 
migration fl ows by reducing information costs. 
Figure 2.3 summarises the diff erent channels 
through which aid can impact migration fl ows.
Some microeconomic studies focusing on the 
direct impact of specifi c aid programmes on 
migration found strong support for the operation 
of the credit constraint channel. Th us, Angelucci 
(2015) shows that Mexico’s fl agship anti-pover-
ty programme (“Oportunidades”), a condition-
al cash transfer programme, tends to increase 
Mexican migration to the United States because 
households use this income stream as collateral 
to fi nance migration.12  She shows that the new 
migrants encouraged by this programme mostly 
come from previously credit-constrained house-
11 In fact, the migration literature oft en uses the term 
“network eff ect” to refer to the “family and friends eff ect”.
12 According to this study, many households actually 
used their entitlement to the cash transfer as collateral to borrow 
money (oft en from informal moneylenders, shopkeepers, families 
or friends) so as to pay for their journeys to the United States. 
Figure 2.3: Aid and migration: a Complex Relationship
Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo
7
(in Lanati and Thiele, 2018a and 2018b) that, 
within development aid, aid aimed at strengthen-
ing the quality of, and access to, public services 
and social infrastructure such as education and 
health can be particularly effective in stemming 
migration flows. In fact, their estimates suggest 
that the part of aid targeting public services (what 
they call the public services channel) explains 
much of the negative relationship between aid 
and migration flows found in their studies, more 
than compensating for the credit constraint and 
network channels. This additional finding is 
fully consistent with the results of other recent 
empirical studies that suggest that dissatisfaction 
with local public services and amenities is key for 
migration intentions (Dustmann and Okatenko, 
2014) and that comprehensive measures of life 
satisfaction can be more powerful than income 
levels in explaining migration intentions (Cai, 
Esipova, Oppenheimer and Feng, 2014).14 
Lanati and Thiele (2018b) adopt, in fact, the 
distinction proposed by Clemens et al. (2012) 
between early-impact aid and late-impact aid. 
Early-impact aid encompasses flows such aid 
for industrial development and income-support 
programmes, which are likely to affect income 
growth rapidly and, therefore, provoke new 
migration by helping potential migrants finance 
the cost of migration. By contrast, late-impact 
aid, such as aid for health care, education infra-
structure or governance, can take many years to 
impact positively income growth (which tends to 
limit the migration-inducing effects related to the 
easing of credit constraints) but can improve the 
non-monetary dimensions of well-being that are 
key for migration intentions. Their results suggest 
that a focus on late-impact aid, notably aid for 
public services, can dampen migration flows.
14 Dustmann and Okatenko find that the impact of various 
measures of contentment with local amenities, in particular public 
services but also air quality, security, confidence in the country’s 
institutions and satisfaction with living standards, is nearly as large 
as the impact of the credit constraint channel (what the authors 
call “wealth”), and even larger for Latin America, where the credit 
constraint is estimated to be non-binding. The strength of the 
local amenities channel as a determinant of migration intentions 
is particularly important for SSA. As an indicator of migration 
intentions, the authors use data from the Gallup World Poll. In a 
more recent study also based on Gallup World Poll data, the EBRD 
(2018) also finds that people who intend to migrate tend to report 
lower levels of satisfaction with local amenities than people who 
intend to stay, with the correlation being particularly high for air 
quality, water and education.
and to avoid being subject to abuse and torture.13 
Many of the migrants covered by this study had to 
work and save funds for months to pay for their 
migration. 
2.3 The recent literature 
on aid and migration: a more 
encouraging view 
Recent empirical studies provide, however, a more 
optimistic view about the potential effect of aid 
on migration. Indeed, they suggest that aid might 
work even for countries that are still situated in 
the upward slopped part of the hump-shaped 
curve, provided that aid is of the right kind, has 
the right mix, is complemented by other policies 
and is well coordinated among donors. 
Thus, Lanati and Thiele (2017), applying a gravity 
model of international migration to a sample of 28 
donor countries and 136 aid recipient countries 
for the period 1995-2013, find evidence of a 
negative relationship between aid and migration 
even for the poorer countries in the sample. They 
read this as evidence that the income channels 
tends to dominate the budget constraint channel 
even for poor countries. In a revised and expanded 
version of their paper (see Lanati and Thiele, 
2018a), they also test for one of the countries in 
their sample (Nepal, a relatively poor country) 
whether within-country regional differences in 
the allocation of aid influence within-country 
patterns of migration. They find a negative rela-
tionship between the amount of aid received by a 
region and its level of emigration, corroborating 
at a disaggregated level their main finding.
Another important result of Lanati and Thiele is 
that the negative relationship between aggregate 
aid and migration that they detect is predomi-
nantly driven by non-humanitarian aid, that is, by 
development-related assistance. Humanitarian, 
emergency assistance actually tends to increase 
migration, according to this study, probably 
because it helps finance the cost of migration 
for people experiencing difficult personal and 
economic circumstances. Perhaps more important 
from an operational point of view is their finding 
13 The necessary payments are often made through 
Western Union or similar money transfer organisations by the 
migrant’s family members or friends, either from the country 
of origin or from the European countries to which they have 
migrated.
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An obvious policy implication of these recent 
findings is the advisability of increasing the share 
of development aid in the total financial assis-
tance directed to migration-relevant countries 
and to increase the share of development aid 
that focuses on improving public services and 
social infrastructure and governance. This new 
evidence also suggest that donors should increase 
the weight of rural development aid in their assis-
tance strategies, notably for countries undergoing 
rapid processes of urbanization and migration 
from rural areas. Another important implication 
for the EU is that it should endeavor to reduce the 
share of humanitarian aid in its assistance to mi-
gration-relevant countries, a share that has been 
increasing markedly in recent times, as discussed 
in Chapter 3. Although, in the short-term, donors 
facing multiple emergencies have normally little 
room to reduce humanitarian assistance, over the 
medium term the aim should be to move towards 
an assistance mix that is increasingly based on de-
velopment as opposed to humanitarian aid. 
The importance of the aid mix goes, in fact, 
beyond the breakdown of aid between develop-
ment and humanitarian aid and the share of the 
former that is channeled to public services, gov-
ernance and rural development. Most available 
empirical studies of the link between aid and 
migration are based on Overseas Development 
Assistance (ODA) data that do not include 
certain types of aid because they are not conces-
sional. In particular, they do not include macro-
economic stabilization assistance and non-con-
cessional investment project loans (e.g. for 
infrastructure). Yet macroeconomic stability can, 
in certain situations, be paramount for moderat-
ing both economic migration and refugee flows. 
In those cases, macroeconomic assistance, such 
as IMF loans, EU Macro-Financial Assistance 
and other forms of policy-based macro support, 
can increase the overall effectiveness of financial 
assistance, both through its impact on macroeco-
nomic and political stability and by encouraging 
the adoption of appropriate policy frameworks. 16 
This is not picked up by the available empirical 
studies on the effect of aid on migration. A good 
balance between the different types of assis-
tance (development, humanitarian, non-conces-
sional investment loans and macroeconomic) 
is essential for making aid effective in reducing 
migration and refugee pressures.
16 Chapter 5 discusses the potential role of Macro-
Financial Assistance in the EU’s external migration policy.
Other recent empirical studies provide additional 
evidence that the type of aid matters for its impact 
on migration. Thus, Gamso and Yuldashev (2018a) 
compare the effects of aid directed towards urban 
and rural development and find that rural aid 
tends to be associated with lower migration rates. 
By contrast, they detect no significant effect of 
urban aid on migration rates. They test two al-
ternative explanations for this result. One is that 
rural dwellers are less interested in migrating 
abroad than urban residents, reflecting the fact 
that the latter have more developed networks, 
skills and information regarding work opportuni-
ties and life styles abroad. When foreign aid helps 
urban dwellers finance the cost of migration, they 
are therefore more likely to decide to emigrate. 
The second hypothesis is that while rural aid 
bolsters agricultural sector production and jobs, 
reducing the incentives of rural dwellers to 
migrate, aid to urban areas spurs urban develop-
ment and disrupts rural markets, pushing rural 
workers to move either to the cities or abroad.15 
The internal migration of large rural population 
to the cities, in turn, creates a labour surplus in 
urban areas that depresses wages, produces con-
gestion, pushes up the cost of living in the cities 
and encourages people in urban areas to migrate 
abroad. Gamos and Yudashev find that it is this 
second mechanism that explains the different 
impact of rural and urban aid, detecting no sig-
nificant difference between the attitudes of urban 
and rural dwellers regarding emigration.
In another recent paper, the same authors 
(Gamso and Yuldashev, 2018b) find that aid 
aimed at improving governance (“political de-
velopment assistance”) reduces migration by 
promoting better institutions, less corruption and 
more political stability. By contrast, they find no 
evidence that aid for economic and social devel-
opment affects migration rates, either positively 
or negatively. These results can also be explained 
with reference to the above-mentioned work on 
migration intentions by Dustman and Okatenko 
(2014) and by Cai et al. (2014). Indeed, gover-
nance and confidence in a country’s institutions 
is a significant component of the measures of the 
quality of local amenities and life satisfaction that 
recent research suggests play a key role in driving 
migration intentions. 
15  Hamilton and Villareal (2011) illustrate this process for 
rural Mexican migrants. On the positive link between urbanisation 




Aid effectiveness may also be enhanced by 
complementing financial assistance with other 
policy instruments (such as trade incentives and 
regulatory and other structural reform com-
mitments), possibly in the context of bilateral 
migration compacts with the recipient countries, 
as discussed in Chapter 9. 
Finally, the effectiveness of aid in addressing the 
root causes of migration can be increased through 
coordination among key donors. Indeed, Lanati 
and Thiele (2017) provide some support for this. 
Thus, the authors find that aid from an individual 
donor country to a specific country tends to have 
a negligible effect on migration flows from the 
latter to the former, suggesting that the network 
channel stressed by Berthélemy et al. (2009) fully 
offsets the income channel. However, an increase 
in aid flows from other donor countries tends to 
reduce migration flows towards the donor country 
in question because of the external spillovers of 
aid. The reason is that the income channel effects 
of other donors’ aid programmes tend to reduce 
migration towards all donor countries, including 
the one in question, while the related network 
effects increase migration only towards the other 
donors. This suggests that donor coordination is 
especially important when it comes to addressing 
migration pressures, an implication of particu-
lar relevance for the EU as it strives to develop 
a common approach to migration and asylum. 
The EU has been making some progress in this 
direction in recent years, including through the 
Joint Financial Programming of the aid provided 
by its institutions and member countries to 
certain countries (e.g. Palestine).
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aid allocation than variables reflecting the recipi-
ent’s needs (such as per capita income and popu-
lation), the quality of its economic policies or the 
soundness of its governance and political institu-
tions (see, for example, McKinley and Little, 1977 
and 1978; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998; and 
Alesina and Dollar, 2000). One could therefore 
expect that self-protection against migration 
inflows, possibly in combination with altruistic 
(humanitarian) motives, could make migration a 
significant variable in explaining donors’ aid allo-
cation decisions. 
One of the first significant empirical studies 
that tried to measure the responsiveness of aid 
to migration flows is the one by Czaika and 
Mayer (2011), which focused on forced dis-
placement flows, including internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). Using DAC data for the period 
1992-2003 for 18 donor countries (including 12 
EU countries) and 148 recipient countries, and 
controlling for other variables that may also 
affect the allocation of aid, these authors found 
that while humanitarian assistance was clearly 
reactive to displacement flows, the response of 
long-term development assistance was much 
weaker, especially in the case of internal displace-
ments and displacements of refugees towards 
countries of first asylum. Indeed, they found that 
donors tended to react more strongly to forced 
displacement when they were directly affected by 
it, consistent with the importance of self-interest 
motives in aid allocation decisions. Thus, donors’ 
response was strongest to the inflow of asylum 
seekers into their own territory and weakest to 
the flow of IDPs. In the case of development aid, 
they found that it was only adjusted significantly 
by donors in response to an increase in inflows 
of asylum seekers into their territory and only by 
increasing assistance to the countries of origin, 
rather than to the countries of first asylum. This 
is despite the fact that countries of first asylum, 
which normally neighbour those of origin, host 
the bulk of the global refugee stock.
In recent years, however, there has been an in-
creasing emphasis by major donors, including 
the EU, in supporting countries of first asylum 
and in relying more on development as opposed 
to humanitarian assistance, consistent with the 
new approaches to refugee protection that will 
be discussed in Chapter 9. One should, therefore, 
expect this to be reflected in more recent empirical 




While the empirical evidence on the link between 
aid and migration is mixed, both European policy 
makers and the EU’s programmatic aid documents 
have been, as noted, advocating channeling more 
aid towards migration-relevant countries. But 
have they actually been doing so? This chapter 
first looks at the empirical evidence provided by 
the academic literature on the responsiveness of 
development aid to migration priorities, which 
typically uses data for donor country groups 
going beyond the EU, and then analyses recent 
data for the EU. Most academic studies as well as 
our own analysis of EU aid allocations are based 
on ODA data compiled by the OECD’s Develop-
ment Assistance Committee (DAC). These data 
include both development aid and humanitarian 
assistance but exclude, as noted, non-concession-
al assistance such as loans and guarantees that do 
not meet the grant element requirement.17
3.1 General evidence from 
the academic literature
With some exceptions, migration has largely been 
ignored by the standard academic literature on the 
determinants of aid allocation.18 This is somewhat 
surprising given that one key finding of this lit-
erature is that donors’ self-interest or strategic 
considerations tend to dominate the recipients’ 
needs as explanatory variable for their aid allo-
cation decisions. Thus, most studies have found 
that donor self-interest variables such as trade 
relations, political similarity or colonial ties are 
much more important determinants of bilateral 
17 The DAC defines ODA as those flows to countries 
and territories on the DAC’s List of ODA Recipients and to 
multilateral institutions which are provided by official agencies, 
have the promotion of economic development as their main 
objective and are concessional in character, in the sense that they 
convey a grant element of at least 25% (calculated at a rate of 
discount of 10%). See OECD, “Official Development Assistance: 
Definition and Coverage” (http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/
officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm).
18 This literature is rather broad. Examples of it, containing 
also useful surveys of the literature, include Alesina and Dollar 
(2000) and Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009). 
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forced displacement flows. Using a large sample of 
22 OECD donors (including 11 EU countries) and 
more than 150 beneficiary countries, covering the 
period 1993 to 2008, these authors found robust 
evidence that “donors use foreign aid to achieve 
their broader immigration goals, targeting mi-
grant-sending areas to increase development 
and decrease the demand for entry into the 
donor country” (p. 627). After controlling (like 
the previous two studies mentioned) for other 
potential determinants of aid allocation, such a 
bilateral trade, former colonial status and the level 
of economic development, they find an important 
and statistically significant positive link between 
aid and the number of migrants from a recipient 
country living in a donor country.19 They also 
find that donors increasingly target aid towards 
potential sources of future migration as their 
attitudes and policies towards migration become 
more restrictive. Moreover, consistent with other 
empirical studies (Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller, 
2000; Berthélemy et al., op. cit.), they find that 
lobbying by migrant populations in the donor 
country on behalf of their homelands tends to 
increase aid allocation towards their countries 
of origin, adding a link between migration and 
foreign aid responsiveness. 
On the other hand, Bermeo and Leblang detect a 
negative link between the stock of refugees from a 
recipient country living in a given donor country 
and aid flows from the latter to the former. This 
partly compensates the positive impact refugees 
have on aid through the explanatory variable 
measuring the total bilateral migrant stock. This 
negative interaction between refugees hosted 
by the donor country and foreign aid might be 
explained by the fact that donors normally do not 
support the political regimes of the countries the 
refugees come from and partly divert aid away 
from those countries and towards other countries 
hosting the refugees (as it is currently happening 
with aid to Syria, which is being partly reorient-
ed towards Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey).20 
19 Their results also show a positive and significant link 
between total migration from a given country to OECD countries 
(measured by the stock of migrants living in them) and total aid 
flows from OECD countries to the country in question, suggesting 
that, on average, increased aid from a donor country to a country 
where its immigrants come from does not simply crowd out foreign 
aid from other OECD countries to the country of emigration in 
question (ibid.; pp. 641-642).
20 This negative interaction between refugee stocks and 
aid to their country of origin seems to contradict the findings of 
Czaika and Mayer (2011) but is consistent with those of Lanati 
estimates that use data going beyond 2005. And, 
indeed, this is the case. Thus, in a recent study that 
also focuses on forced displacement but covers 
the period 2001-2015, Lanati and Thiele (2018c) 
find that both humanitarian and development aid 
are responsive to forced displacement pressures, 
although they still find a weaker response for 
development aid. Similar to Czaika and Mayer 
(2011), these authors use as key explanatory 
variables four categories of forced displacement, 
namely: i) refugees from the recipient country; 
ii) IDPs within the recipient country; ii) refugees 
hosted by the recipient country; and iv) asylum 
applicants from the recipient country in the 
OECD donor country. They then run regressions 
with these four main variables, as well as with 
some control variables to take into account other 
factors that may also contribute to shape donors’ 
aid allocation decisions, for a sample of 34 donor 
countries (including 21 EU countries) and 137 
recipient countries. They find that a doubling of 
the number of hosted refugees and IDPs increases 
the allocated amount of bilateral humanitarian 
assistance by 9% and 6%, respectively. The impact 
on development assistance is, as noted, somewhat 
smaller (it increases by about 2% for both hosted 
refugees and IDPs) but still significant. Their 
findings suggest that the discrimination, which 
Czaika and Mayer had detected, against countries 
of first asylum and against the countries experi-
encing internal displacement, and in favour of the 
countries of origin of asylum applicants going to 
the donor countries, has been eliminated.
Lanati and Thiele find that there is a structur-
al break around 2005, after which humanitarian 
and, to a lesser extent, development aid become 
more responsive to forced displacement devel-
opments. This is consistent with their descriptive 
analysis of trends in average aid flows to the top 
ten countries hosting refugees and IDPs, which 
shows a growing positive divergence since the 
mid-2000s (very marked in the case of human-
itarian aid, although less clear for development 
aid) from the average aid provided to all DAC re-
cipients. They observe a similar pattern when they 
focus their analysis on EU aid flows to Lebanon, 
Jordan and Turkey, the three main hosts of Syrian 
refugees.
Another recent econometric study, by Bermeo 
and Leblang (2015), looked at the response of aid 
to migration more generally, rather than only to 
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It might also be partly explained by the fact that 
refugees, for obvious political reasons, might not 
lobby in favour of an increase in aid to their home 
countries. Indeed, in their revised equations 
including a refugee stock variable, Bermeo and 
Leblang fi nd no evidence that refugees mobilise 
to increase aid to their country of origin, contrary 
to what they fi nd for migrants as a whole (op. cit.; 
pp. 650-651).21
3.2 The actual response of 
EU aid: an updated analysis 
of ODA data
Th e EU (including its member states and the EU 
institutions) is the world’s main provider of both 
development and humanitarian assistance, ac-
counting for 42% of the total ODA committed by 
bilateral and multilateral donors in 1995-2016, 
according to OECD-DAC data. Th is section 
discusses the most recently updated histori-
cal data series supplied by the OECD’s Creditor 
Reporting System (CRS) in order to see whether 
EU aid (more precisely, the ODA it provided 
to the 146 countries that are in the DAC’s List 
of ODA Recipients) has been responsive to the 
migration challenge. It looks at trends in both hu-
manitarian and development assistance. Th e fi rst 
subsection examines the response of EU aid to 
forced displacement while the second one looks 
at its sensitivity to the geographical origin of total 
migration fl ows.
3.2.1 ODA ﬂows and forced 
displacement
In order to gauge the responsiveness of EU ODA 
to forced displacement, aid fl ows to two represen-
tative groups of countries are used. First, Annex 
1 provides a list of the 20 top refugee-hosting 
countries among the low- and middle-income 
countries. Th ese countries together accounted in 
2016 for 88% of the refugees living in countries 
in those two income categories and for 78% of 
and Th iele (2018c). Indeed, Lanati and Th iele’s estimates imply a 
negative (in the case of humanitarian aid) or very weak (in the 
case of development aid) response of aid to a country of origin 
when the donor country experiences an increase in the number of 
asylum seekers from it. 
21 In some cases, as in the case of the Cubans residing 
in the United States, refugees might actually lobby for their host 
country to enact measures against their home country, including 
the interruption of aid fl ows.
the world’s refugee population, including the 5.3 
million Palestinian refugees under the mandate 
of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
(UNRWA). Annex 2, for its part, lists the 20 
countries that most generate forcibly displaced 
people (counting both refugees and IDPs). 
Together, these 20 countries accounted for over 
90% of the world’s forcibly displaced population. 
Th ese two groups of countries, which, as can 
be seen from the annexes, partly overlap (nine 
countries are in both groups), can therefore be 
used as a very representative sample to assess how 
well the EU is targeting its assistance to address 
the refugee and internal displacement challenge. 
Th is is done in the following charts, which show 
trends in the ODA directed by the EU to these 
two country groups since the 1990s.
As illustrated by Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the EU has 
been providing since 2003 signifi cantly more 
ODA per country on average to those two groups 
of countries than to the rest of the DAC recipi-
ents, suggesting an improved targeting of aid 
on countries of forced displacement. Th e gap 
between the two peaked in the period 2005-2008, 
coinciding approximately with the structur-
al break detected by Lanati and Th iele (2018c). 
Since then, however, the gap has again shrunk 
somewhat and the share of total EU aid going to 
those two country groups has actually declined 
signifi cantly (Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.1: Total ODA from the EU to top 
displacement countries
(Average annual ODA per country; in million U.S. dollars)
Sources: Own calculations based on data from OECD’s CRS, 
UNHRC and IDMC. 
Note: EU includes EU countries and EU institutions. Forced 
displacement includes refugees and IDPs.
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the top refugee hosts and from a peak of USD 
887 million in 2006 to USD 625 on average in 
2015-2016 for the top displacement sources; see 
Figure 3.2, fi rst panel). And the decline would 
be more pronounced if measured in real (infl a-
tion-adjusted) terms. As a result, the share of 
development aid in the total EU aid going to the 
top displacement countries has declined sharply 
since the mid- to late-2000s (from about 90% 
to about 73% for both groups). Moreover, these 
disappointing trends have happened at the same 
time as the EU continued to gradually increase 
average long-term aid per country for other de-
Th e interruption since the mid- to late-2000s of 
the encouraging targeting trend that had been 
observed since the beginning of that decade is 
more than explained by development aid because, 
in fact, the EU has been making a tremendous 
eff ort to respond to the recent refugee crisis, es-
pecially since 2013, by increasing its humanitari-
an aid to the most aff ected countries. Indeed, the 
average development aid per country provided 
by the EU to the top displacement countries has 
declined quite markedly in dollar terms (from a 
peak of USD 821 million in 2008 to an annual 
average of USD 617 million in 2015-2016 for 
Figure 3.2: EU ODA to displacement countries: humanitarian vs. development aid
(Average annual ODA per country; in million U.S. dollars)
Sources: Own calculations based on data from the OECD’s CRS, the UNHRC and the IDMC.
Note: EU includes EU countries and EU institutions. Forced displacement includes refugees and IDPs.
Figure 3.3: Share of EU aid going to displacement countries (in percent)
Sources: Own calculations based on data from the OECD’s CRS, the UNHRC and the IDMC.
Note: EU includes EU countries and EU institutions. Forced displacement includes refugees and IDPs.
Development aid
Top 20 refugee-hosting countries
Humanitarian aid
              Top 20 sources of forced displacement
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namely its excessive focus on short-term 
emergency support as opposed to the develop-
mental assistance that is essential to address the 
root causes of displacement and to facilitate the 
integration of refugees in countries of fi rst asylum. 
As highlighted by the advocates of a developmen-
tal approach to refugee protection, tackling this 
problem is essential to increase the eff ectiveness 
of the refugee assistance system.
3.2.2 Regional breakdown of ODA 
and overall migration ﬂows
Th e analysis has concentrated so far on the 
response of aid to forced displacement. But is the 
regional allocation of EU ODA consistent with 
migration pressures more generally, including 
also economic and other forms of migration? 
To try to answer this question, Table 3.1 displays 
data on the geographical origin of the stock of 
foreign-born population residing in the EU, 
obtained from Eurostat’s Census Hub HC 28, 
which combines the results of the latest national 
censuses conducted by the EU countries. Th is is 
the most comprehensive and reliable statistical 
source for analyzing the geographical origin of the 
EU’s stock of migrants. Unfortunately, censuses 
are undertaken only every ten years and the latest 
Census Hub was done in 2011, not capturing, 
therefore, the more recent surge in migration to 
the EU. Since the focus here is on the possible use 
of ODA to moderate migration pressures from 
veloping countries, which has contributed to a 
downward trend since the mid-2000s in the share 
of EU development aid going to the top countries 
involved in forced displacement (Figure 3.3). Th is 
suggests that the EU has been paying for part of 
the increase in its humanitarian aid to the main 
displacement countries with its development as-
sistance budget for those countries.
By contrast, and as shown in the second panel of 
Figure 3.2, humanitarian aid to the top displace-
ment countries has continued to grow much faster 
than humanitarian aid to all DAC recipients, 
particularly since 2013, prolonging a trend seen 
since the early 2000s. As a result, the share of EU 
humanitarian assistance going to those countries 
has continued to rise (Figure 3.3). By 2016, the 31 
countries included in one or both groups of top 
displacement countries were receiving 81% of the 
EU’s humanitarian aid. 22 Th e EU has, therefore, 
been increasingly targeting its humanitarian aid 
on the countries that either host or originate most 
of the world’s forcibly displaced people.
While the increasing focus of EU humanitari-
an assistance on countries experiencing refugee 
or internal displacement problems is a welcome 
development from the point of view of refugee 
policy, the trends in long-term EU ODA are not. 
Overall, these trends illustrate a basic problem 
with the fi nancial assistance that the EU, and the 
international donor community more generally, 
are channeling to forced displacement countries, 
22 Much of this exceptional humanitarian aid eff ort has 
been concentrated in the countries most aff ected by the Syrian 
refugee crisis (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey), which 
received three quarters of the increase in EU humanitarian aid 
during 2011-2016 and about one quarter of the total humanitarian 
aid the EU provided in that period.
Table 3.1: Stocks of foreign-born migrants residing in the EU, by country of birth, 2011
Source: Eurostat (Census Hub HC15) and own calculations.
Note:  SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; MENAT = Middle East, North Africa and  Turkey;  Asia excludes the Middle East countries. Developing 
countries include all the countries that are in the DAC List of ODA recipients.
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cantly behind, with 4.3 and 4 million migrants, 
respectively. Once the high-income countries 
are excluded, Oceania is of little signifi cance as a 
source of migrants for the EU. Th e importance of 
MENAT as a source of migration fl ows to the EU 
is in fact likely to be underestimated by the use of 
2011 data, given that much of the surge in asylum 
seekers witnessed by the EU since then has come 
from a few countries in that region (notably 
Syria, Iraq and Iran).24 Th e use of 2011 data might 
also underestimate the current weight of SSA in 
migration stocks, given that irregular arrivals 
from this region through the Mediterranean have 
increased markedly since 2013 (European Com-
mission, 2018c). 
Figure 3.4 compares the regional shares in 
migration stocks with the regional allocation of
EU ODA in 2011-2016. It shows that SSA has a 
dominant role in EU ODA. Th is is explained by 
both long-term ODA and humanitarian assis-
tance. It is what one would expect given that this 
is the poorest region in the world, which should 
drive up long-term development assistance, and 
is also one of the main sources of forced displace-
ment and other humanitarian challenges, refl ect-
ing a combination of confl ict and political insta-
24 According to Eurostat data, these three countries alone 
accounted for 1.4 million of the fi rst time asylum applications 
received by EU countries from non-EU citizens since 2012, or 33% 
of the total. 
outside the EU, the second line in the table reports 
only data on the stock of migrants coming from 
developing countries that are in the DAC List of 
ODA Recipients.
Th e bottom part of Table 3.1 shows that the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region 
including Turkey (a group sometimes referred 
to as MENAT) is the most important source of 
migrants from developing countries residing in 
the EU, accounting in 2011 for over 7.7 million 
of the 29 million of migrants born in DAC-ODA 
recipient countries.23 Closely behind MENAT in 
importance are Asia (excluding the Middle East) 
and non-EU European countries (encompassing 
migrants from the Western Balkans and Eastern 
Europe), which account for 6.8 million and 6.2 
million migrants, respectively. Latin America 
and the Caribbean (LAC) and SSA lie signifi -
23 Th ere is not a widely accepted defi nition of what 
constitutes the MENA region. Table 3.1 and Figure 3.4 below 
use the World Bank defi nition, which includes 19 countries and 
territories, and adds Turkey, given its geographical and cultural 
proximity with other MENA countries as well as its direct 
involvement in some of the main recent fl ows of refugees to the 
EU coming from the Middle East and in the related EU’s policy 
response. Islam is by far the dominant religion of the MENAT 
region, with over 90% of their combined population being 
Muslim. Also, many countries in this region face similar economic 
and social challenges (for example, fast population growth, high 
rates of unemployment, low rates of participation of women in 
the labour force and a widespread reliance on energy and food 
subsidies). Grouping them together, therefore, makes analytical 
sense, notably when studying migration trends. 
Figure 3.4: Migrant stocks from developing countries and allocation of EU ODA (in percent)
Source: Eurostat, Census Hub HC 28 and OECD Creditor Reporting System data base.
Note: Migrant stocks refer to 2011 and exclude stocks from high-income countries unless they were still in the DAC list of 
benefi ciaries in 2017. For ODA , shares in total EU ODA for 2011-2016. SSA = Sub- Saharan Africa; MENAT = Middle East and North 
Africa + Turkey; Asia excludes the Middle East countries.
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their very young populations) is also expected to 
encourage future migration to Europe (Benček 
and Schneiderheinze, 2018; European Commis-
sion, 2018c).27 And the region is among the most 
vulnerable to climate change (ibid; pp. 28-30; see 
also Chapter 7 of this book). 
Recent surveys of migration intentions also 
underline the strong potential of future migration 
from SSA. Indeed, a survey conducted by Gallup 
World Poll based on pooled data from 2010 to 
2015 found that SSA, notably West Africa, was 
the region with the highest number of adults (21.7 
million) planning to migrate in the following 12 
months.28 In fact, 60% of adults from outside the 
European Economic Area planning to migrate 
to the EU were from Africa, according to this 
survey. While migration intentions tend to ex-
aggerate subsequent actual migration (actually 
recorded migration flows are, on average, three 
times smaller than the number of those making 
preparations to move and seven times smaller 
than the number planning to migrate during the 
period in question), a significant correlation has 
been found across the world between the number 
of potential migrants and the number of actual 
migrants (ibid.; pp. 10-11).
Moreover, while indiscriminate aid to SSA is likely 
to simply encourage more migration by easing 
credit constraints, a careful mix of assistance may 
help improve the migration-effectiveness of aid. 
This will be the case if the aid is well targeted to 
addressing some of the main drivers of migration, 
such as dissatisfaction with public services and 
governance (which, as noted in Chapter 2, is more 
important in explaining migration intentions in 
SSA than in other developing regions), rural de-
velopment, climate change adaptation and mac-
roeconomic and political instability. This should 
go hand-in-hand with a reduction in the share of 
humanitarian assistance in EU aid to the region, 
27 In its most recent projections, the UN Population 
Division estimates that Africa’s population will approximately 
double from 1.2 billion inhabitants in 2017 to 2.5 billion by 2050, 
and most of this increase will happen in SSA (UNDESA, 2017). 
In addition, the share of the SSA population in the 20-35 year age 
group (the age range in which people are most mobile) will remain 
very large (European Commission, 2018c; p.25). 
28 SSA scores particularly strongly when migration 
intentions are expressed relative to the local adult population. For 
example, 6% of the adult population of Central Africa and 5.6% 
of that of West Africa declared to be preparing or planning to 
migrate in the subsequent 12 months, among the highest rates of 
all world regions. See IOM (2017a).
bility, lack of economic opportunities and a high 
incidence of natural disasters, all of which should 
drive up humanitarian assistance. SSA received 
nearly 41% of the overall ODA provided collec-
tively by the EU between 1995 and 2016. In 2016 
alone, it received EUR 21 billion of the EU’s EUR 
57 billion total ODA. As Federica Mogherini, 
High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy and Vice President of the 
European Commission, declared recently, the EU 
has de facto already put in place a sort of Marshall 
Plan for Africa.25
When compared to its current weight in migration 
stocks, SSA would seem in fact to be overrepre-
sented as a destination of EU ODA. Moreover, 
given that most SSA countries are likely to be 
still on the upward slopping part of the inverted 
U curve linking GDP per capita and migration, 
one could argue that providing such a large share 
of EU aid to this region is unadvisable and could 
even be counter-productive from the point of 
view of stemming migration flows to the EU.
Nonetheless, a more careful reflection suggests 
that it might be broadly appropriate for the EU to 
channel a dominant part of its aid to SSA. First, 
current stocks probably underestimate future 
migration pressures from Africa. Indeed, most 
academic analyses and predictions suggest that 
economic considerations, demographic factors, 
geographical proximity and vulnerability to 
climate change are likely to make this region one 
of growing importance in future migration flows 
to the EU.26 The fact that most SSA countries 
are probably in the upward-slopped part of the 
inverted U curve means that as their economies 
continue to develop, migration from them will 
probably increase, and this is expected to be 
amplified by network effects related to the rising 
diaspora of Sub-Saharan Africans living in the 
EU (Hatton and Williamson, 2011). Their laggard 
position in the demographic transition (including 
25 Mrs. Mogherini made this comment in the same 
conference in which European Parliament’s President Tajiani had 
called, as noted above, for a Marshall Plan for Africa to address the 
root causes of migration. See Mogherini (2018).
26 Although so far about two thirds of SSA migration has 
been intra-regional migration (World Bank, 2016a), the share 
of it going overseas is growing and the EU is by far the main 
destination outside the region (European Commission, 2018c; 
pp. 10-12). The attractiveness of the EU in terms of per capita 
income, political stability and a well-developed welfare state are 
likely to preserve, and possibly strengthen, its position as the main 
overseas destination of SSA migrants.
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While the bulk of the post-2009 increase in 
MENAT’s share in EU ODA has been fi nanced by 
the budget for SSA, a smaller but signifi cant part 
(about four percentage points) has been funded 
by cutting down the share of Asia (excluding 
the Middle East and Turkey). Despite this, Asia’s 
share is still, at 18% in 2016, broadly in line with 
its share in total migration stocks (Figures 3.4 
and 3.6). Moreover, the country allocation of 
ODA to Asia is appropriately sensitive to refugee 
policy considerations, since about one fourth of 
it goes to three countries (Afghanistan, Bangla-
desh and Pakistan) that play a prominent role in 
refugee fl ows to the EU. Th e shares of China and 
India in EU aid are approximately in line with the 
important role these populous Asian countries 
play in economic migration to the EU, but that of 
the Philippines, which also supplies many labour 
migrants to the EU, is signifi cantly below its share 
in migration stocks. 
By contrast, the share of Eastern Europe and 
the Balkans in EU ODA remains way below 
their share in migration stocks (Figure 3.4), re-
fl ecting the marked underrepresentation of 
Russia, which is an important source of economic 
migrants residing in the EU, but also of some 
Western Balkan countries, notably Albania and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, that have provided 
large numbers of both economic immigrants and 
refugees in the past. Since 2010, this region’s share 
and source of refugees, refl ecting foreign policy considerations.
which has risen very signifi cantly since 2010 and 
is now well above the average (Figure 3.5; fi rst 
panel). It is equally important to strengthen coor-
dination among donors, possibly in the context of 
migration compacts (see Chapter 9).
It should also be noted that the share of SSA in 
EU aid has already been adjusted downwards 
markedly since the mid-2000s, falling by an im-
pressive 15 percentage points since 2006 (Figure 
3.6). Th e main benefi ciary of this change has been 
the MENAT region, which is also, as noted, of 
critical importance as a source of migration and 
refugee fl ows to the EU. Th is region increased by 
more than 11 percentage points its share in EU 
aid between 2009 and 2016 and has become the 
second main destination of EU aid, receiving 26% 
of it in 2016. As shown in Figure 3.4, this is ap-
proximately in line with its share in migration 
stocks. Th e increase in MENAT’s share witnessed 
during that period was largely driven by the 
Syrian refugee crisis, with Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Syria and Turkey receiving 97% of it. As hinted 
above, much this increase (nearly 40% of it) took 
the form of humanitarian aid, refl ecting the hu-
manitarian challenge created by the Syrian war. 
As a result, the share of humanitarian assistance 
in EU aid to this region has increased sharply, 
moving even above the share of SSA (Figure 3.5; 
fi rst panel).29
29 Also within this region, but in contrast with the 
countries just mentioned, Iran remains very underrepresented in 
the allocation of EU aid compared to its important role as a host 
Figure 3.5: EU humanitarian aid: rising in weight, driven by MENAT and SS
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System data base.
Note: EU includes both EU countries and EU institutions. SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; MENAT = Middle East, North Africa and 
Turkey. Asia excludes the Middle East countries.
In percent of total EU ODA to the region  In percent of total EU humanitarian aid
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In sum, the geographical allocation of EU ODA 
seems to attach a clear priority to the SSA and 
MENAT regions, which together received over 
60% of the ODA the EU provided in 2011-2016. 
Th e focus on these two regions is particular-
ly strong when it comes to humanitarian assis-
tance. While the share of MENAT in EU aid is 
in line with its weight in migration stocks, that 
of SSA is disproportionally high. SSA’s share has 
undergone, however, a substantial downward cor-
rection since the mid-2000s. LAC is also signifi -
cantly overrepresented. Th is strategic orientation 
of EU aid has been essentially to the detriment of 
Eastern Europe (with the exception of Ukraine) 
and the Western Balkans, both of which are clearly 
underrepresented compared to their weight in 
economic migration to the EU. Given the strong 
future migration potential of SSA, its important 
development and climate change fi nancing needs 
and the limited capacity of EU aid to mitigate 
economic migration pressures coming from large 
emerging Asian economies, it seems appropri-
ate to provide substantially more aid to SSA and 
substantially less aid to those Asian economies 
than their shares in migration stocks would 
suggest. At the same time, there seems to be a 
case, on migration policy grounds, for increasing 
the ODA eff ort directed to Eastern Europe and, 
possibly, for some downward correction in the 
share of Latin America. Also, there is substantial 
scope for improving the mix of development and 
humanitarian aid, notably in the MENAT and 
SSA regions.
3.3 The role of EU 
institutions and the MFF for 
2021-2027
In assessing the EU’s external fi nancial response 
to the migration and refugee challenge, it is also 
worth focusing on the activities of the EU insti-
tutions alone. Th ese institutions, which include 
the instruments funded by the EU budget and 
administered by the European Commission, the 
European Development Fund (EDF) and the EIB, 
accounted for 26% of the total ODA and 38% of 
the humanitarian aid provided by the EU to the 
DAC benefi ciaries in 1995-2016 and have con-
tributed to the trends in ODA discussed above. In 
particular, and as Figure 3.7 shows, the EU insti-
tutions have increased the targeting of their ODA, 
especially their humanitarian aid, on the countries 
has been going down from already low levels and 
this despite a signifi cant increase in assistance to 
Ukraine, notably since the 2014 revolution and 
the onset of the war in the East of the country 
(Figure 3.6).30 Finally, the share of LAC is signifi -
cantly above its share in migrant stocks while that 
of Oceania is roughly in line with its very minor 
role as a source of developing country migrants 
residing in the EU.
Figure 3.6: Trends in the regional allocation of 
EU ODA, 1995-2016
(Shares in total EU ODA)
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System data base. 
Note: EU includes both EU countries and EU institutions. MENAT 
= Middle East, North Africa and Turkey; SSA = Sub-Saharan 
Africa; Asia excludes the Middle East.
Th e second panel of Figure 3.5 shows the trends 
in the regional allocation of EU humanitarian 
assistance since 2005. Consistent with the trends 
already mentioned, it shows a sharp increase in 
the share of MENAT in total EU humanitarian aid 
since 2010, while the share of SSA remains very 
high although it declines somewhat. Together, 
these two regions received 81% of the EU’s hu-
manitarian assistance during 2011-2016. Th e 
shares of Asia, LAC and non-EU Europe have 
declined since 2010, helping to fi nance the excep-
tional humanitarian eff ort in the MENAT region. 
30 Th e EU’s fi nancial assistance response to the Ukraine 
crisis is actually much larger than what ODA data suggests, as most 
of it has consisted in the provision of Macro-Financial Assistance 
(see Chapter 5.3) and lending by the EIB and the EBRD, which 
are not captured by the DAC statistics. Indeed, 86% of the EUR 11 
billion package for Ukraine announced by the EU in March 2014 




Th e geographical allocation of the aid provided 
by the EU institutions is also similar to that of 
the EU’s total ODA: a clear priority is being 
given to SSA (which receives a share of the EU 
institutions’ ODA that is well above its share in 
migration stocks) and, to a lesser extent, to the 
MENAT region; and there is a distinct trend 
towards a decline in the share of ODA received by 
SSA, largely to the benefi t of the MENAT region 
(see Figure 3.8, which resembles Figure 3.6). But 
in the case of the EU institutions’ aid, the reorien-
tation towards the MENAT region is even more 
abrupt, leading this region to overtake SSA as the 
fi rst recipient of aid between 2011 and 2015.
Th e external fi nancial power of the EU institu-
tions comprises not only their traditional devel-
opment and humanitarian assistance but also 
their support through other instruments that are 
not suffi  ciently concessional to be included in 
ODA, such as much of the EIB’s external lending, 
the EU’s Macro-Financial Assistance and the 
blending and guarantee operations fi nanced by 
the EEIP (all of which are discussed in Chapter 5). 
It can be approximated by the size of the external 
action heading of the EU budget (currently known 
as Heading 4 or “Global Europe”) plus that of the 
EDF, a very important instrument that, although 
managed by the European Commission, is fully 
fi nanced by contributions from EU countries and 
has until now remained outside the EU budget. 
most aff ected by the forced displacement crisis. 
Moreover, in contrast with the pattern observed 
for the EU countries and for the EU as a whole, 
this trend was not interrupted and partially 
reversed since the late-2000s. Th e reason is that 
the EU institutions did not partially fi nance the 
increased humanitarian eff ort devoted to forced 
displacement countries by reducing the share of 
their development aid provided to them. On the 
contrary, they continued to increase the share of 
their long-term aid channeled to those countries 
(see red bars in Figure 3.7), although more mod-
erately than they did for humanitarian aid (green 
bars). Th is is a welcome development, consistent 
with the recommendations of the literature on the 
migration-eff ectiveness of aid.
Figure 3.8: Regional allocation of ODA 
provided by the EU institutions
(Shares in total ODA)
Source: OECD Creditor Reporting System data base. 
Note: MENAT = Middle East, North Africa and Turkey. SSA = 
Sub-Saharan Africa; Asia excludes the Middle East.
Figure 3.7: Targeting of EU institutions’ aid on top displacement countries
(In percent of their total ODA, development or humanitarian aid)
Sources: Own calculations based on data from the OECD’s CRS, the UNHRC and the IDMC.
Note: Forced displacement includes both refugees and IDPs
Top 20 refugee-hosting countries            Top 20 sources of forced displacement
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lizing around 2½ percent of total expenditure.32
Adding up the external action heading and the 
EDF, however, the total share of resource spent by 
EU institutions in external fi nancial support has 
been rising over time, peaking at nearly 9% in the 
last three years (second panel of Figure 3.10). Th is 
means that the EU has been attaching an increas-
ing priority to development assistance through 
the funds managed by its common institutions. 
Th is development assistance eff ort made by the 
EU institutions complements those of the EU 
member states, which have been increasing their 
ODA-over-GNI ratios, consistent with the target 
defi ned in Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 
17 of the UN’s 2030 Agenda to reach a ratio of 
at least 0.7% by 2030. Figure 3.11 shows that the 
EU countries that report to the DAC have been 
making substantial progress towards meeting 
collectively the SDG 17 target, which compares 
with the much weaker progress or even backslid-
ing of other key DAC donors. In fact, some EU 
countries have already attained the SDG 17 goal 
for 2030 (Figure 3.12).33
From the point of view of external migration 
policy, these developments are encourag-
ing because they mean that the EU has been 
endowing itself with an increasingly powerful 
pool of external fi nancial resources, part of which 
can be directed to addressing the root causes of 
migration and refugee fl ows. Moreover, these 
eff orts are expected to be continued under the 
new MFF proposed by the Commission for 2021-
2027. Let us examine in more detail the implica-
tions of the proposal for the next MFF.
32 Given the dominant weight of SSA in the EDF’s 
portfolio, the gradual decline in the weight of the EDF in the 
external fi nancial support managed by the EU institutions implies 
a reduction in the importance of SSA as a recipient of EU aid. 
Th is corroborates, based on EU budget and EDF data, what the 
previous section showed using OECD’s CRS data.
33 ODA ratios are much lower, though, for the 13 countries 
last to join the EU. Most of them remained in 2017 even below 
the 0.33% intermediate target that they set for themselves for 2015 
(Eurostat, 2018 and Figure 3.12). In addition to the collective 
target of providing at least 0.7% of its GNI to developing countries 
by 2030, the EU is committed to providing collectively at least 
0.2% of its GNI to the least developed countries by that same year, 
consistent also with SDG 17.
Created when the European Economic 
Community was established and aimed at 
fi nancing the EU’s policy towards the African, 
Caribbean and Pacifi c (ACP) countries, the EDF 
is very large: until the early 1970s, it considera-
bly exceeded the budget’s entire external action 
heading and in the last decade it has represented 
about 40% of it. Th e EDF is replenished regularly 
by the EU countries. Th e last replenishment 
amounted to EUR 30.5 billion and coincided with 
the EU’s Multi-Annual Financial Framework 
(MFF) for 2014-2020. Th e bulk of the EDF budget 
is normally spent in SSA (see Figure 3.9), making 
it the main instrument of the EU’s concessional 
assistance to this region.31
Figure 3.9: Regional allocation of the EDF
(Total appropriations from the 8th, 9th, 10th and 11th EDFs)
Source:  European Commission.
(1) Overseas Countries and Territories (British, Dutch and 
French).
(2) Including administrative and fi nancial expenditure.
Figure 3.10 (fi rst panel) displays historical series 
for the external action heading of the budget and 
the EDF since the mid-1960, as a percentage of 
total budgetary and EDF expenditure. It shows 
that the share of the external action heading has 
progressively risen, although with some fl uctua-
tions, since the mid-1960s, averaging about 6½ 
percent of total expenditure in the last few years. At 
the same time, the share of the EDF has declined, 
as noted, from the high levels of the 1960s, stabi-
31 South Africa, which has until now been covered by the 
Development Cooperation Instrument of the EU, is the only SSA 
country that is not covered by the EDF. North African countries 
are covered by the European Neighbourhood Instrument. For a 
good description of the EDF, see D’Alfonso (2014b).
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Figure 3.11: Long-term trends in ODA
(In percent of GNI)
Source:  Eurostat and OECD data bases. 
Note: EU-13 = countries having joined the EU aft er 2002. For Bulgaria, data for 2010 instead of 2005. For Croatia, data for 2012 
instead of 2005. For Cyprus, data for 2015 instead of 2017. For Malta, data for 2008 instead of 2005. For Romania, data for 2008 and 
2015, instead of 2005 and 2017. For Slovakia, data for 2006 instead of 2005.
Figure 3.10: Th e EU’s external action eff ort: a long-term perspective
(In percent of EU budget + EDF)
Source:  European Commission.





Figure 3.12: ODA and SDGs for 2030
(In percent of GNI)
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of cooperation assistance in the EU budget. In 
fact, Table 3.2 and Figure 3.13 underestimate this 
effort for two reasons: first, because the UK was 
an important contributor to the EDF, providing, 
like other countries whose former colonies are 
among the main beneficiaries of the EDF, a sig-
nificantly larger share to it than to the EU budget. 
And second, because the African Peace Facility, 
which was a non-negligible part of the EDF 
(amounting to EUR 2.3 billion) will remain, as 
noted, outside the budget and become part of the 
future European Peace Facility. 
While this effort is commendable from the point 
of view of development and migration policy, 
the proposed new MFF attaches an even higher 
priority to border management and internal 
asylum, as well as to certain other headings such 
as security and defense or innovation and the 
digital economy (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.13). 
Indeed, total spending on migration and boarder 
management (now classified as Heading 4) would 
increase by 161% in nominal terms and by 127% 
in real terms excluding the unallocated margin 
(by 252% and 207%, respectively, including it). 
This implies an approximate doubling of its share 
in the budget. Nearly two thirds of the EUR 
34.9 billion allocated to this heading would go 
to finance the Asylum and Migration Fund and 
the Integrated Border Management Fund.36 The 
pronounced increase in this heading would take 
place from very low levels and is understanda-
ble politically, reflecting the need to respond to 
the concerns among many Europeans regarding 
immigration, security and the porosity of the 
borders and to support the development of a 
new common asylum system. At the same time, 
however, they reflect a fundamental feature of 
the EU’s migration strategy, which is that border 
control, domestic asylum and domestic integra-
tion issues carry a priority when compared to the 
external dimension. 
A positive aspect of the proposed MFF from a 
migration policy viewpoint is the priority that will 
continue to be attached to climate action. This is 
reflected not only in the rather marked increase 
in the environment and climate heading (46% 
in real terms) but also in the fact that climate 
mainstreaming, which includes all expenditure 
estimated to contribute to climate objectives, 
36 For an in-depth discussion of the implications of the 
Commission’s new MFF proposal for the asylum and border 
Consistent with what the Commission already 
announced in its Reflection Paper on the Future 
of EU Finances, issued in June 2017,34 its formal 
proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF foresees to 
continue strengthening the external financial 
assistance effort made by the EU institutions.35 
Under the proposal, the EDF, except the African 
Peace Facility, would be fully integrated into the 
EU budget. The proposal to “budgetise” the EDF, 
which had been under consideration for a long 
time, will put an end to the anomaly of having 
the largest chunk of the EU’s common develop-
ment assistance outside of the EU budget. The 
EDF would be integrated into the external action 
heading, which would become Heading 6 and be 
called “Neighbourhood and the World.” 
The Commission’s proposal implies that the share 
of external action expenditure over total expend-
iture (including, in both cases, the EDF) would 
increase further, particularly in the final years 
of the new MFF, when it is estimated to average 
about 10% of total expenditure (see Figure 3.10). 
In order to compare the increase in the external 
action heading between the current MFF 
(covering 2014-2020) and the new MFF with 
those of the budget as a whole and of other 
headings, Table 3.2 uses European Commis-
sion-adjusted data that add the EDF 11 to the 
current MFF (column (a)). In addition, and in 
order to take Brexit into account, column (b) 
deducts from the current MFF the expenditures 
allocated to the U.K., as estimated by the Com-
mission. It shows that, under the Commission’s 
proposal, the external action heading (excluding 
the unallocated margin within the heading) would 
increase by 24% in nominal terms relative to the 
current MFF (adding the EDF but deducting 
expenditure allocated to the U.K). If the unallo-
cated margin is included, the rate of increase in 
the external action heading is close to 30%. This 
compares with an increase of 20% in the overall 
budget. In real terms, the increase in the external 
action heading would be 8% excluding the unal-
located margin and 13% including it, compared 
to 5% for the budget as a whole (Figure 3.13). This 
confirms that the Commission’s MFF proposal 
implies an effort to continue raising the weight 
34 See European Commission (2017b). Except scenario 2 
(“Doing less together”), all the scenarios presented in this paper 
proposed an increase in the share of the external action budget in 
total expenditure (ibid.; Annex, p. 38).
35 See European Commission (2018d).
Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo
23
eration Instrument (NDICI).37 Th e NDICI would 
merge the EU’s three main external cooperation 
instruments, namely the European Neighbour-
hood Instrument (ENI)38, the Development Co-
operation Instrument (DCI)39 and most of the 
EDF, which together accounted for nearly 70% 
of the assistance provided through the external 
action heading and the EDF in 2014-2020, as 
37 See European Commission (2018e).
38 Th e ENI covered the ten Southern Mediterranean 
countries and the six Eastern European and Southern Caucasus 
countries that are part of the European Neighbourhood Policy.
39 Th e DCI was essentially targeted to the Asian countries 
(including some in the Middle East) not covered by either by the 
ENI or the EDF, as well as Latin America and South Africa.
would increase markedly (by 60% in nominal 
terms). At EUR 320 billion, it would represent 
25% of the new MFF, up from EUR 203 billion in 
the 2014-2020 MFF, or 20% of it (European Com-
mission, 2018d; p. 22).
Another important change introduced by the 
Commission’s MFF proposal, with potential im-
plications for the EU’s capacity to direct devel-
opment aid towards migration- or refugee-relat-
ed emergencies, is the creation of a new, broad 
external fi nancial instrument, called the Neigh-
bourhood, Development and International Coop-
management heading, see D’Alfonso (2018). 
Table 3.2: External Action vs Migration and Border Management in the 2021-2027 MFF
(In billion euros; at current prices; commitment appropriations)
Sources: European Commission (2018d) and European Commission estimates. 
Note: Excludes the unallocated margin. Scenarios (a) and (b) add the EDF to the 2014-2020 MFF to allow a comparison with the new 
MFF. In addition, scenario (b) deducts expenditure allocated to the U.K. from the 2014-2020 MFF. 
Figure 3.13: Rate of change of selected expenditure categories in the 2021-2027 MFF
(Percentage change compared to 2014-2020 MFF; 2018 prices; commitment appropriations)
Source: European Commission estimates.
Note: For the 2014-2020 MFF, includes the EDF and excludes expenditure allocated to the UK.
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ceilings within the geographical pillar for each of 
the four main regions (see Annex 3). Although the 
final regional breakdown will obviously depend 
on the actual allocation of the non-geographi-
cal pillars of the NDICI, the proposed ceilings 
for the geographic pillar would further reinforce 
the priority being given to SSA, which would 
increase by 51% its ex-ante allocation (assuming 
that about three quarters of the current EDF 
go to SSA), compared to a 24% increase in the 
external action heading including the EDF. The 
priority that the Commission intends to attach to 
Africa (and, in particular SSA) in the next MFF 
was confirmed by the Communication it adopted 
in September 2018 proposing a new Alliance 
for Sustainable Investment and Jobs between 
the EU and Africa. Indeed, the Communication 
proposes to allocate a very substantial portion of 
the NDICI (EUR 32 billion) to SSA (and EUR 7.7 
billion to North Africa), as well as new efforts to 
promote private investment in Africa through the 
blending and guarantee instruments of the EEIP 
and by improving the investment climate. It also 
suggests to strengthen cooperation on migration 
and measures to boost trade flows, both by sup-
porting the negotiations on the African Conti-
nental Free Trade Area launched in March 2018 
and by offering the (medium-term) prospect of 
a continent-to-continent free trade agreement 
between the EU and Africa (European Com-
mission, 2018f). While the initiative contains 
a number of welcome elements, including an 
attempt to combine in a single package different 
policy instruments, a further increase in the share 
of SSA in the EU’s total ODA would not seem con-
sistent with the recommendations in the previous 
section regarding an optimal regional allocation 
of EU aid on migration policy grounds, given the 
already significant overrepresentation of SSA. 
Finally, an interesting feature of the NDICI is that 
it would include some precise horizontal spending 
targets for certain cross-cutting priorities. In 
particular, the Commission proposes to adopt a 
spending target of 10% of the funds of the NDICI 
to tackle the root causes of migration and another 
target of 25% to support developing countries’ 
efforts in the area of climate mitigation and ad-
aptation, which is, as noted, also of relevance for 
forced displacement. 
well as the political and nuclear safety instru-
ments. The budget line for the new instrument 
will also support the EEIP and will finance most 
of the new External Action Guarantee, which will 
provide guarantees, inter alia, for the external 
lending mandate of the EIB, the EU’s Macro-Fi-
nancial Assistance and the operations covered 
by the EEIP guarantee. Annex 3 summarises the 
structure of the external action heading under the 
current MFF and the future proposed MFF. 
The NDICI, which would account for the bulk 
of the new external action heading, would be a 
huge fund, with a budget of about EUR 89 billion 
for 2021-2027. It would contain a geographi-
cal pillar (EUR 68 billion) made up of several 
regional compartments, as well as a three pillars 
not allocated ex-ante to specific regions, namely: 
a thematic pillar (EUR 7 billion), which would 
be used, inter alia, to address “global challeng-
es” such as migration and forced displacement 
(EUR 3 billion); a rapid-response pillar (EUR 4 
billion) to allow the EU to respond expeditious-
ly and effectively to situations of crisis or insta-
bility; and a large, so-called emerging challeng-
es and priorities cushion (EUR 10.2 billion). All 
this is meant to increase operational flexibili-
ty (as well as coherence) and it is, obviously, of 
extreme relevance for the capacity of Heading 6 
to respond to unforeseen emergencies such as 
those producing large displacement flows. The 
experience with the Syrian refugee crisis, which 
obliged the Commission to undertake signifi-
cant transfers within the external action heading 
and to rely extensively on its unallocated margin, 
underlines how important this budgetary flexi-
bility can be to ensure a timely and appropriate 
response to migration-related emergencies. 
Outside this broad instrument, but within the new 
external action heading, will remain, as self-stand-
ing instruments, the Instrument for Pre-Acces-
sion (or IPA), which is another quantitatively 
very important external instrument covering the 
Western Balkan countries and Turkey, Humani-
tarian Aid, a reinforced Common Foreign and 
Security Policy and the part of the EDF that was 
directed to the Overseas Countries and Territo-
ries (OCT).
While flexibility is, as noted, the name of the 
game for the external assistance heading of the 
new MFF, the regulation on the NDICI proposed 
by the European Commission would maintain 
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of irregular migration flows from SSA, the EU 
created two similar EUTFs as well as a sui generis 
facility for Turkey, all of them focusing on address-
ing refugee and internal displacement challeng-
es. These are, in chronological order of creation: 
the EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the 
Syrian Crisis (also known as “the Madad Fund”, 
broadly meaning “helping together” in Arabic), 
which was set up in December 2014; the EU 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTFA), 
launched at the EU-Africa Valletta Summit of 
November 2015; and the Facility for Refugees 
in Turkey (FRT), which was also established in 
November 2015 and became a key component of 
the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016 rein-
forcing cooperation between the EU and Turkey 
on the management of refugee and irregular 
migration flows. 
At the time of writing, the total funding pledged 
for these four facilities amounted to EUR 8.6 
billion, to be committed over five years (three 
years, in the case of the FRT). Moreover, the 
EU-Turkey Statement foresees the mobilization 
of a new EUR 3 billion tranche under the FRT 
by the end of 2018, provided that Turkey meets 
the commitments made in the Statement (EU 
Council, 2016a). 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of these four 
financial instruments while Figure 4.1 summaris-
es their main funding sources. As can be seen from 
Figure 4.1, the bulk (about 80%) of their funding 
has been provided by the EU budget (from 
existing geographic or thematic external financial 
instruments) and the EDF, with only about 20% 
having been contributed by bilateral donors. The 
exception to this rule is the first tranche of the 
FRT, where the EU budget contributed EUR 1 
billion and EU countries EUR 2 billion. The dis-
cussions on the renewal of the FRT have not been 
easy, however. An initial proposal made by the 
Commission in March 2018 to repeat the burden 
sharing of the first tranche was rejected by the EU 
Council, which reached a political agreement in 
June to swap the contributions to a EUR 2 billion 
by the EU budget and a EUR 1 billion by EU 
member states.40
40 See EU Council (2018a). In July 2018, the European 
Parliament adopted an amendment to the 2018 EU budget 
releasing EUR 500 million of the EUR 2 billion contribution of the 
EU budget to the second tranche. The remainder is to be paid from 
the 2019 EU budget.
4. The EU’s new 
trust funds and 
facilities for 
refugees
The EU is responding to the migration and 
refugee crisis not only by increasing and partly re-
orienting the geographical allocation of its ODA, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, but also by 
adapting its toolkit of external financial instru-
ments. This includes both the creation of new 
instruments and the modification of some of the 
existing ones. This chapter discusses the experi-
ence with four new, grant-based facilities targeted 
to deal with refugee and irregular migration 
pressures in certain regions.
4.1 Basic features and 
rationale of the new 
facilities
The Financial Regulation adopted by the EU in 
2012, in its Article 187, allowed the creation of 
EU trust funds (EUTFs) for external action that 
are managed directly by the European Commis-
sion and may include contributions not only 
from the EU budget but also from other bilateral 
donors. And this possibility has been maintained 
by the new Financial Regulation adopted in 2018 
(European Parliament and EU Council, 2018a; 
Article 234). The first such fund was launched in 
July 2014 and was aimed at the Central African 
Republic, which is among the top 15 sources 
of forced displacement in the world, with over 
410,000 IDPs and about 490,000 refugees living 
in other countries at the end of 2016 (see Annex 
2). It is formally called the EU Trust Fund for the 
Central African Republic but it is also known 
as the “Bêkou Trust Fund” (meaning “hope” in 
Sango). While the purpose of the fund is more 
general, being aimed at supporting the recovery 
and increasing the resilience of an extremely 
fragile country following its political and security 
crisis of 2013, quite a few of its projects are bene-
fitting IDPs and potential refugees.
Within a year and half from the establishment 
of the “Bêkou Trust Fund,” and in reaction to 
the Syrian refugee crisis and the intensification 
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Table 4.1: Main features of EU Trust Funds and the Facility for Refugees in Turkey
Source: European Commission.
(1) As of 31 October 2018.
(2) As of 1 May 2018.
(3) As of 9 August 2018.
(4) As of 15 August 2018. Refers to the fi rst tranche of the facility. In the EU-Turkey Statement of 18 March 2016, the EU pledged a 
second tranche of also EUR 3,000 million provided certain conditions are met.
Figure 4.1: Financial contributions to EU Trust Funds and Facility for Turkey
(In EUR million)
Source: European Commission.
Note: Data as of the dates mentioned in Table 4.1.
Th e EUTFs are established through the conclu-
sion of a constitutive agreement between the 
Commission, on behalf of the EU, and other 
donors.41 From a strictly legal point of view, the 
FRT is not a fi nancial instrument but, rather, a co-
ordination mechanism as EU member states con-
tribute directly to the EU’s Budget, which then 
assigns these revenues to the IPA and Humani-
41 For an example of these constitutive agreements, see the 
one concluded for the EUTFA (https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/
regdoc/rep/3/2015/EN/3-2015-7293-EN-F1-1-ANNEX-2.PDF). 
tarian Aid budget lines. Th e relevant fi nancial in-
struments continue to operate as usual although 
under the coordination mechanism provided by a 
Steering Committee, which oversees the activities 
of the Facility. Th e legal basis of the FRT is also 
diff erent, deriving not from Article 234 of the EU’s 
Financial Regulation but from a Decision adopted 
by the European Commission on 24 November 
2015,42 as amended on 10 February 2016,43 and 
42 European Commission (2015b).
43 European Commission (2015c).
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from the EU-Turkey Statement, which is not a 
fully-fledged international agreement and has a 
somewhat unclear legal status (see Carrera et al., 
2018).
These three trust funds (and the FRT) must be 
distinguished from the plethora of multi-do-
nor trust funds (MDTFs) that are not managed 
directly by the EU but by international organ-
isations and to which the EU makes financial 
contributions. While these contributions are 
perhaps less conspicuous and do not normally 
make the headlines, they are, taken together, very 
sizeable, and some of these trust funds are aimed 
at countries that are key sources of refugee and 
migration flows (see Box 1). While discussing 
these funds is beyond the scope of this book, Box 
1 provides an overview of them and suggests that 
there is scope for rationalising and streamlining 
them. 
Although most of the funds allocated to these 
four instruments come from already existing co-
operation budgets and can, therefore, hardly be 
considered “new money”, a total envelope of EUR 
10.6 billion for a period of five years (including 
the first two years of the second tranche of the 
FRT), or more than EUR 2.1 billion per year, 
represents a substantial effort by the EU to 
redirect part of its aid towards migration and 
forced displacement priorities. By comparison, 
for the entire 2014-2020 MFF, the EU budget 
has allocated EUR 19.9 billion, or about EUR 
2.8 billion per year, to the cooperation assistance 
with the 16 countries covered by the ENI and 
EUR 16.9 billion, or about 2.4 billion per year, to 
the much larger number of countries that benefit 
from the DCI (see Annex 3).
But the creation of these facilities is not only 
motivated by the need to channel EU budgetary 
resources directly to the sources of forced dis-
placement and irregular migration. It also reflects 
other considerations. One is the need to create 
instruments that can act in a swifter and more 
Box 1: The proliferation of EU contributions to Multi-Donor Trust Funds
Between 2003 and 2016, the EU channeled develop-
ment aid in the amount of EUR 11.7 billion through 
international organisations, of which EUR 6.6 billion 
were managed by UN agencies and EUR 2.9 billion by 
the World Bank. Out of these, EUR 4.7 billion were 
contributions to Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), 
of which 53% were managed by the World Bank Group, 
34% by UN agencies and the remaining 11% by other 
donors (European Commission, 2017c). The bulk of 
the funds allocated by the EU budget to MDTFs have 
been channeled via the DCI to 74 MDTFs. Another 
38 MDTFs were supported through thematic budget 
lines of the EU budget. Out of the funds channeled 
through the DCI, 76% were concentrated in three 
priorities: Afghanistan (44%), Iraq (25%) and natural 
disasters (7%), all of which are extremely relevant as 
causes of forced displacement and other migration. 
Other challenges that account for significant shares of 
EU funding for MDTFs include major pandemics such 
as the avian and human influenza, aids, tuberculosis 
and malaria, and the Chernobyl Shelter Fund (ibid.). 
In some cases, e.g. that of the Regional Programme in 
Support of Afghan Refugees in Iran and Pakistan and 
of Returnees in Afghanistan, trust funds have been ex-
plicitly targeted to refugee or migration issues. 
The European Commission justifies this signifi-
cant reliance on trust funds and other programmes 
managed by international organisations by the fact 
that many of them deal with natural or human crises 
or post-crisis situations where the expertise of inter-
national organizations is key and where there is an 
urgent need to pool and coordinate large resources 
from different donors. Indeed, international organiza-
tions often have superior logistical and management 
capacities due to their presence in the countries or 
regions in question, their political neutrality (which 
facilitates the collaboration of the concerned govern-
ments) and other security considerations. 
The amounts of EU aid channeled through this myriad 
of MDTFs and other programmes managed by inter-
national organisations are, however, so large and so 
dispersed that some rationalization, simplification 
and prioritization seems to be in order. In some cases 
the resources allocated to them could be redirected to 
existing instruments or EU-managed trust funds con-
sidered of higher priority for the EU, including some 
of relevance for refugee and migration policy.
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observers, and the European Parliament has 
also been invited to participate as observer in 
the meetings of the Boards. In contrast with the 
programming of the regular cooperation instru-
ments, the Strategy of the Fund, which is jointly 
prepared by the Commission and the EEAS, 
can be revised and adjusted at any time by the 
Board, and both the Board and the Operation-
al Committee can meet as often as necessary. 
Moreover, actions below EUR 10 million may be 
approved by the management of the fund (by the 
Commission) alone.45 
Another advantage of these new facilities is 
that they allow in principle the mobilization of 
financial resources from other donors, both EU 
countries and other potentially interested donors. 
This not only makes it possible to pool resources 
across donors but also to better coordinate their 
actions in the area of migration and refugees, 
thus bringing greater coherence and reducing the 
risk of fragmentation of aid. But, as noted, while 
the first tranche of the FRT has succeeded in gal-
vanizing substantial support from EU member 
states, the participation of EU countries and other 
donors in the three trust funds has so far been 
disappointing, as highlighted by the President of 
the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, 
referring to the EUTFA, in his 2017 State of the 
Union Address to the European Parliament.46 
Indeed, some EU countries believe that the EU 
budget already has the resources necessary to 
fund these initiatives and are reluctant to con-
tribute substantially to them. This contrasts with 
an initial hope that the contributions from EU 
countries would match the funding from the EU 
budget. Ensuring a more active participation of 
EU and other donors, therefore, remains a key 
challenge for these trust funds.
Finally, another motivation behind the creation 
of these facilities is the EU’s desire to give more 
political visibility to its actions in response to the 
migration and refugee crisis, as acknowledged by 
the Commission, for example, in its decision on 
the establishment of the EUTFA.47
45 For an in-depth analysis of the governance arrangements 
and legal basis of the EUTFs and the FRT, see Carrera et al., op. cit.
46 See Juncker (2017).
47 In this Decision, the Commission notes that the creation 
of the EUTFA should “provide the EU with a platform for stronger 
political visibility and reinforced engagement with countries of 
origin and transit, showing the EU’s capacity to develop a solid 
collective response to those challenges” (European Commission, 
2015d; p. 4). 
flexible manner in situations characterized by 
their emergency, their rapidly changing nature 
and the fact that the same crisis often affects 
countries covered by different regional financial 
instruments. This applies in particular to the 
regional trust funds for Africa and for the Syrian 
refugee crisis. Indeed, these new facilities can react 
to new crises and displacements without being 
bound by fixed country programmes and alloca-
tions. For example, the scope of the Madad Fund 
was subsequently expanded to allow it to support 
Iraqi IDPs fleeing from Da’esh in the interlinked 
Syria-Iraq conflict, as well as the Western Balkan 
countries most involved in the Eastern Mediter-
ranean migration route. The new EUTFs operate 
under much more flexible, less bureaucratic de-
cision-making rules than those applicable to 
the management of traditional EU instruments 
such as the ENI, the IPA or the EDF. Coopera-
tion projects approved under the regular assis-
tance instruments are subject to a long program-
ming cycle based on the approval by the relevant 
Council committees (for example, for the ENI, 
the so-called ENI Committee), which normally 
meet only a few times per year, of indicative pro-
grammes defined for each country, although a 
portion of their funds is allocated to regional pro-
grammes. These indicative programmes specify 
assistance priorities in terms of reform areas and, 
once approved, are difficult to change. 
By contrast, EUTFs have a much more agile deci-
sion-making structure, which is foreseen in their 
constitutive agreements, based on two governing 
bodies: one at strategic level, called Trust Fund 
Board, which adopts and can revise at any time 
the Strategy of the Fund, and one at operational 
level, known as Operational Committee, which 
is in charge of selecting the particular actions 
to be financed by the Trust Fund.44 The Com-
mission ensures the management of the funds 
and provides the chairs and secretariat of these 
governing bodies. The Boards and the Operation-
al Committees are composed of representatives of 
the donors, the Commission and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). Decisions can be 
taken by simple majority, although consensus is 
preferred and normally practiced. Non-contrib-
uting EU countries and certain other countries 
and international organisations can attend as 
44 In the case of the EUTFA, the Operational Committee is 
divided in three Regional Operational Committees, one for North 




in the implementation of the EU’s Partnership 
Framework with Third Countries on Migration 
(see Chapter 9) on defensive measures (returns, 
fight against irregular migration). On the other 
hand, its analysis confirms that the EUTFA is 
focusing on migration-related projects. Indeed, 
22% of the fund’s project portfolio (in value terms) 
fell into the migration management category while 
the majority of what Oxfam classifies as develop-
ment projects (representing 63% of the EUTFA’s 
portfolio) are directed to people with migratory 
status (refugees, returnees, irregular migrants) or 
to areas of origin or transit of migrants. Moreover, 
some of the projects related to returns policy aim 
at developing new livelihoods for the beneficiar-
ies.
Another criticism against these three trust 
funds concerns the possible conflict of interests 
stemming from the fact that EU donor countries 
seat at their Operational Committees. Thus, 
according to the already mentioned report by 
Carrera et al. (p.8), which was commissioned 
by the European Parliament, there has been a 
“recurrent tendency to select member states’ 
projects, lobbied for and not rarely involving their 
own implementing agencies”. This raises questions, 
according to these authors, over the impartiality 
of the selection process. Similar concerns were 
expressed by the European Court of Auditors, 
which conducted in 2016-2017 a report on the 
Bêkou Trust Fund and warned that the project 
selection procedure and excessive reliance on 
“delegated ccoperation” with EU member states 
could in some cases entail a conflict of interests.49 
The creation and operational flexibility of the 
trust funds has also been criticized for escaping 
the democratic scrutiny of the European Par-
liament.50 Neither the constitutive agreements 
setting up the trust funds nor the EU-Turkey 
Statement are international agreements and, 
therefore, the formal consent of the Parlia-
ment was not required for their adoption. The 
Commission’s implementing decisions author-
izing the signing of such agreements must be 
formally endorsed by a committee of EU member 
states and the European Parliament has a “right 
of scrutiny” under the so-called examination 
49 The report of the ECA was, however, rather positive 
both on the justification for setting up the Bêkou Trust Fund and 
on its design and results achieved so far. See ECA (2017).
50 See, in particular, Carrera et al., op. cit. Oxfam, op. cit., 
also makes this point.
4.2 Performance of the new 
facilities: achievements and 
criticism
But are these new financial facilities working? 
Their speed of implementation seems to be 
good, with the four facilities having approved 
280 projects by August 2018, for a total contract-
ed valued of EUR 5.8 billion.48 And in terms of 
the nature and quality of the projects, they are 
helping to bridge the gap between humanitar-
ian and development assistance, as intended. 
Indeed, many of the projects funded have gone 
beyond the provision of basic humanitarian 
support for refugees, IDPs and other vulnerable 
people and have tried to support their training, 
labour market integration and economic develop-
ment, thus contributing to address the root causes 
of migration. The projects financed by these fa-
cilities have also stressed the modernization of, 
and improved access to, public services such as 
health and education, another welcome develop-
ment that is in line with the empirical findings 
and recommendations in Chapter 2 regarding 
aid effectiveness. And the fact that these facilities 
help coordinate donors assistance, thus creating 
positive spillovers among donors, is also consist-
ent with those findings and recommendations, 
which underline the importance for donors to act 
together when dealing with migration challenges. 
On the other hand, there has been some criticism 
that many of the projects financed by these fa-
cilities respond to a European political sense 
of urgency to stop irregular migration and 
support returns. This criticism has been focused 
on the EUTFA. Oxfam (2017), for example, argues, 
after analysing the project portfolio of this trust 
fund, that its long-term development projects 
have mainly focused on the countries of origin 
of migration and far less on those of transit. In 
particular, Oxfam notes that many projects in the 
transit countries covered by the Sahel and North 
African windows of the fund were designed to 
discourage and contain irregular migration, 
support returns and improve the identification 
of countries’ nationals. It also complained that 
few projects were aimed at developing safe legal 
routes for migration. Oxfam does seem to have a 
point, which reflects the general bias seen so far 
48 For the latest annual reports on the implementation of 
these facilities, see European Commission (2018g, 2018h, 2018i 
and 2018j). 
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agile and flexible operation that the challenging 
refugee and migration situation requires. 
A final issue to consider is whether these facili-
ties really add value, as actually required by the 
EU’s Financial Regulation. Indeed, some experts 
contend that their actions could be equally accom-
plished by relying on the existing instruments, 
particularly given that, in the end, they did not 
trigger as many contributions from EU countries 
and other donors as initially hoped for. They 
criticize the ongoing trend to set up trust funds 
that fall outside the normal EU budgetary instru-
ments and framework. Moreover, as discussed 
in Chapter 3, the Commission’s proposal for the 
2021-2027 MFF already entails a lot of flexibili-
ty and potential speed, including through the 
thematic, rapid response and emerging challenges 
pillars of the NDICI. One could, therefore, argue 
that for simplicity, transparency as well as demo-
cratic accountability reasons, it might be prefera-
ble to try to achieve the objectives of these funds 
through the standard instruments, particularly 
now that the EDF is expected to be integrated 
into the EU budget as part of the NDICI. Indeed, 
while the creation of these facilities as emergency 
tools might have been justified by the human-
itarian challenges the EU faced in 2014-2016, 
there might be a case now for returning back to 
normality and the ordinary procedures as soon 
as possible. The new MFF provides an opportuni-
ty to do so.51 A related problem with these facili-
ties is their temporary nature and the uncertainty 
about their renewal. This is underlined by the dif-
ficulties encountered to renew the FRT in terms 
of ensuring contributions to it from EU member 
states. Against this view, and in favour of renewing 
these facilities are the arguments that they have 
already acquired experience and developed an in-
frastructure for addressing refugee and migration 
issues in priority regions, that their creation has 
managed to earmark effectively substantial funds 
to those activities and that, if properly played out, 
their renewal could attract additional funds from 
other donors.
51 This suggestion is made, for example, by Carrera et al., 
op. cit.
procedure. But the Parliament can only adopt a 
non-binding resolution against those decisions 
and only if it can argue that the Commission has 
overstepped its implementing powers. According 
to the above-mentioned report, this does not 
guarantee a sufficient oversight and control by the 
Parliament, particularly in light of the large size, 
regional scope and political importance of most 
of these facilities. Possible counter-arguments 
are the fact that these facilities are funded mostly 
by financial instruments of the EU budget, the 
volume of which has already been endorsed by the 
Parliament in the context of the MFF and the EU’s 
annual budgets, and the rest comes from either 
the EDF (until now an extra-budgetary fund fully 
financed by EU countries) or direct contributions 
from EU countries, for which EU national parlia-
ments have the budgetary authority. Also, the new 
Financial Regulation of the EU adopted in 2018 
has strengthened the oversight of the European 
Parliament by subjecting the creation of EUTFs to 
either the approval of the Parliament (in the case 
of thematic funds) or its prior consultation (in the 
case of emergency or post-emergency funds). 
The report commissioned by the Parliament also 
underlines the insufficient involvement of the 
Parliament in the monitoring of the activities of 
the fund, noting also that its observer role in the 
Board remains informal, not having been recog-
nized in the constitutive agreements. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that getting involved into 
the operational activities of financial facilities falls 
within the implementation realm of an executive 
agency and is, therefore, beyond the (legisla-
tive) role of a parliament. Also, the EU Financial 
Regulation requires the Commission to submit 
annually a detailed report to the Parliament and 
the Council on the activities of each EUTF and 
foresees that the Parliament and/or the Council 
may, where appropriate, request the Commis-
sion to cease allocating funds to the EUTF and to 
revise the constitutive agreement with a view to 
unwinding the trust fund. Similarly, the decision 
establishing the FRT requires the Commission to 
submit an annual report to the Parliament and 
the Council on its implementation and to keep 
the co-legislators informed regularly of ongoing 
developments regarding the facility. All these 
provisions provide certain guarantees of demo-
cratic control and scrutiny, as well as of proper 
utilization of the funds, while ensuring the more 
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mittances) in any strategy aimed at encouraging 
economic development in the countries of origin, 
transit and first asylum of migration and forced 
displacement. Macro-financial stabilization in-
struments can also play a catalytic role for private 
investment by reassuring investors about the sus-
tainability of the macroeconomic framework and 
reducing transfer risk. This is in addition to their 
already noted moderating role on migration and 
refugee flows through their contribution to mac-
roeconomic and political stability.
5.1 The EIB’s External 
Lending and its Economic 
Resilience Initiative
While the EIB was set up in 1957 by the Treaty 
of Rome as the main lending institution of the 
EU with the objective of promoting economic 
integration within the EU, it also lends to third 
countries. Its external lending currently represents 
about 10% of its total lending activity. Given the 
EIB’s huge total size, its annual operations outside 
the EU have averaged about EUR 8.3 billion in 
the last five years, not far from the average total 
annual investments of the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development (EBRD) during 
the same period (EUR 9.2 billion). Through its 
external operations, the EIB promotes economic 
development and stability in third countries and 
their economic integration with the EU, thus sup-
porting the EU’s foreign policy.
The main part (about 60%) of the EIB’s lending 
outside the EU takes place with the protection of 
guarantees from the EU budget under the so-called 
External Lending Mandate (ELM), which covers 
the sovereign and political risk associated with 
that lending. The ELM encompasses the lending 
operations in the pre-accession countries, the 
EU’s Mediterranean and Eastern neighbours, 
Russia, Asia, Latin America and South Africa. 
The total ceiling for operations under the ELM 
is determined in the context of the EU’s MFF 
and the related Decision on the EIB’s ELM. For 
the period 2014-2020, the ELM implied, taking 
into account the EUR 5.3 billion increase agreed 
at its mid-term review, a total lending capacity 
of EUR 32.3 billion (European Parliament and 
EU Council, 2014 and 2018b). A second part of 
the EIB’s external lending takes places under the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) and 




The discussion in the previous two chapters has 
focused on development and humanitarian aid 
instruments that are counted as part of ODA. 
They are also, as noted, the type of instruments 
on which most empirical studies on the relation 
between aid and migration are based. This chapter 
looks at three other EU financial instruments that 
are also of potential relevance for migration and 
refugee policy, namely the EIB’s external lending 
operations (and in particular its recently launched 
Economic Resilience Initiative), the EEIP and 
Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA). These in-
struments are relevant not only because of their 
potential impact on development and macroeco-
nomic and political stability but also because they 
can be directly targeted on migration- and refu-
gee-related projects or reforms. In fact, both the 
EIB’s Resilience Initiative and the EEIP have been 
partly justified by their possible direct impact on 
the root causes of migration and refugee flows.
Through these three instruments, the EU can 
leverage its constrained budgetary resources by 
moving beyond the traditional development aid 
based on grants and using, instead, loans and in-
novative financial products such as risk-sharing 
guarantees and the blending of grants and loans, 
which help involve other development banks and 
the private sector. Similar to the multilateral fa-
cilities discussed in the next chapter, these in-
struments stretch donors’ budgets and multiply 
their developmental impact by bringing in other 
official financiers and galvanizing potentially 
powerful private investment. 
The argument for promoting private investment 
in the countries that are at the source of migration 
and forced displacement is partly based on fact 
that foreign direct investment (FDI) and other 
private flows to developing countries are, like 
migrant remittances, much larger than ODA 
flows (see Figure 8.1 in Chapter 8). In combi-
nation with the mixed evidence on the develop-
mental impact of traditional aid, this underlines 
the importance of private investment (and re-
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mentioned. Th eir aggregation yields an impres-
sive total projected lending activity of nearly EUR 
56 billion for the period 2014-2020, which un-
derlines the (oft en forgotten) importance of the 
EIB as an instrument of the EU’s foreign fi nancial 
policy and the signifi cant role it could play in the 
EU’s external migration policy. 
Th e growing importance of the EIB’s external 
lending, its insuffi  cient expertise in lending to 
developing countries and the unclear future role 
of EBRD as transition countries graduate from 
its lending has led to calls to revamp the archi-
tecture of European development banks. Th us, a 
committee of wise men chaired by former IMF 
Managing Director Michel Camdessus, commis-
sioned to make proposals in the context of the 
mid-term review of the 2007-2013 ELM, rec-
ommended in 2010, as one of several possible 
options for the future, the merger of the external 
lending activities of the EIB with the EBRD in 
order to create a “European Bank for Coopera-
tion and Development” (Camdessus et al., 2010). 
Th e idea has not faded away and, at a recent 
bilateral summit, France and Germany agreed in 
a formal joint declaration to set up another group 
of high-level wise persons to assess the European 
covers operations in the ACP countries, mostly 
in SSA.52 Th is includes operations fi nanced by 
the ACP Investment Facility, a revolving fund 
that has been operational since 2003 and is part 
of the EDF. Th is facility focuses on private sector 
operations, oft en through blending operations. 
Th e EIB also lends under the CPA with its own 
resources under guarantees directly provided by 
the EU countries, mainly for public infrastruc-
ture projects. Th e total lending capacity for the 
period 2014-2020 under the CPA is about EUR 
6.7 billion. In addition, the EIB provides a very 
substantial amount of loans to third countries 
without guarantees, i.e. at its own risk. Th is 
own-risk lending has been rising and is mostly 
directed to a few large countries covered by the 
ELM, in particular, Turkey, Brazil, China and 
India. In 2007-2014, the EIB’s own-risk lending 
amounted to EUR 14.3 billion. 
Table 5.1 shows the volumes and allocation by 
main region of the external lending activities of 
the EIB for the three types of external lending just 
52 Like for the EDF grants, a small part of the EIB’s lending 
under the CPA goes to overseas countries and territories (OCT) 
linked to EU countries. See Bilan and Grosse-Puppendahl (2016) 
for a discussion of EIB operations under the CPA.
Table 5.1: Regional allocation of the EIB’s external lending
Source: European Commission.
(1) Aft er augmentations or reallocations agreed as part of the mid-term reviews of the ELM.
(2) Includes lending under the Pre-Accession Facility, the Neighbourhood Finance Facility, the Climate Action and Environment 
Facility and the Strategic Projects Facility.
(3) Actual signatures. For 2014-20, projections based on  the extrapolation of actual signatures in 2014-17.




Figure 5.1: Trends in regional shares in EIB’s 
external lending, 2007-2017
(In percent of total external lending; based on loan signatures)
One problem with the EIB’s external lending is 
its excessive concentration on a few middle-in-
come countries, most of them countries with 
high absorption capacity and larger markets and 
in which EU companies are actively involved. As 
Table 5.2 shows, ten countries received 60% of all 
the external lending provided by the EIB between 
2000 and 2017, with some of them accounting for 
the bulk of the lending to the regions they belong 
to (for example, Turkey and Brazil received 62% 
and 41% of the lending to the pre-accession 
countries and Latin America, respectively).54
Th ese countries oft en do not coincide with those 
where migration and refugee pressures originate. 
Even when they do coincide (Turkey is a case in 
point), the EIB oft en devotes important amounts 
of its lending to large infrastructure projects that 
have little relevance for migration or refugee 
pressures. 
Beyond its geographical pattern, the migra-
tion-relevance of the EIB’s external lending also 
depends crucially on the extent to which the EIB 
focuses on projects that can directly help ease 
migration pressures. As suggested in Chapter 
2, these should include, in particular, projects 
aimed at strengthening the infrastructure for the 
provision of key public services (water, energy, 
54  Th e shares of these top ten countries in the EIB’s total or 
regional lending are even higher if regional projects, i.e. projects 
benefi tting several countries in the region, are excluded from the 
total.
fi nancial architecture for development, especially 
regarding the respective roles of the EIB and the 
EBRD, and to make concrete proposals for con-
sideration by the European Council.53 While this 
discussion is unlikely to materialise in the short-
term and is beyond the scope of this book, the 
creation of such a European development bank 
would mean that the contributions of the EIB and 
the EBRD to the investment aspects of the EU’s 
external migration policy would be taken over 
by the new institution, with possible implications 
also for the EEIP. 
But let us return to the current role of the EIB 
as it stands. From the point of view of migration 
policy, two things seem important: fi rst, the 
EIB should give more priority in its external 
lending to countries that are at the origin of, or 
very aff ected by, migration and refugee fl ows. 
In this respect, Table 5.1 shows that the EIB’s 
external lending has so far been concentrated in 
two regions (the pre-accession countries, led by 
Turkey, and the EU’s Mediterranean neighbours) 
that are signifi cant as sources, hosts or transit 
countries of migration. Together, these two 
regions are expected to receive about 60% of the 
EIB’s external lending in the period 2007-2020. In 
terms of the regional classifi cation used through-
out this book, the focus of the EIB’s external oper-
ations is, therefore, clearly on the MENAT region, 
although the share of this region in the EIB’s 
external lending has declined substantially since 
2007 (see Figure 5.1). Another important benefi -
ciary region is Eastern Europe (including Russia), 
which has seen a substantial increase in its share 
since 2010, partly refl ecting eff orts to support 
Ukraine since its 2014 revolution. Th e share of 
Asia has also increased signifi cantly in recent 
years, driven by a surge in relatively large opera-
tions in China and India. By contrast, SSA is un-
derrepresented when compared with its current 
and potential future importance in EU migration 
infl ows, having received only 11% of the EIB’s 
external lending during the 2007-2017 period. 
53 See “France and Germany Pledge New Elysée Treaty in 
2018” (https://uk.ambafrance.org/France-and-Germany-pledge-
new-Elysee-Treaty-in-2018). See also Wolff  (2017).
Source: EIB
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Th is section focuses on one of them, namely its 
Economic Resilience Initiative. Th e following 
section examines the second one, i.e. the adoption 
of the EEIP. 
Th e Economic Resilience Initiative (ERI) was 
launched by the EIB in October 2016, following a 
request by the European Council in March of that 
year, in order to mobilise additional fi nancing to 
support growth, vital infrastructure and social 
projects in 15 countries and territories of the 
EU’s Southern Neighbourhood and the Western 
Balkans that have been most aff ected by the 
migration and refugee crisis, in the case of the 
Western Balkans benefi ciaries because of their 
role as transit countries. Th e initiative, which was 
endorsed by the European Parliament and the EU 
Council in February 2018 as part of the mid-term 
review of the 2014-2020 ELM, amounts to EUR 
5.7 billion.55 Th is includes EUR 2 billion that the 
EIB is expected to achieve at its own risk, that is, 
without relying on a commensurate increase in 
the EU Budget guarantee (this is called building 
block 1 of the initiative), EUR 1.4 billion aimed 
at supporting the public sectors of the benefi ciary 
55 See European Parliament and EU Council (2018b). Th e 
ERI is also sometimes presented as a contribution of the EIB to the 
EEIP, discussed in the next section (ibid.; recital 4).
Source: EIB
Note: Includes lending under the ELM, the CPA and at the EIB’s own risk.
education, health care, etc.) of communities that 
are important sources of migration or that are 
hosting large number of displaced people, as well 
as rural development projects. Projects aimed at 
encouraging the development of Small and Me-
dium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and at facilitat-
ing access to fi nance (including microfi nance) 
by individuals in those communities may also 
help. While the EIB’s traditional operations are 
admittedly not well suited for the type of social 
support projects that the facilities examined in 
the previous chapter oft en deal with, it can make a 
contribution in the area of basic public service in-
frastructure and access to fi nance, usefully com-
plementing their activities. Th e EIB should also 
continue to attach high importance to climate 
change-related projects. As discussed in Chapter 
7, while the bank is making a serious eff ort to 
increase the share of climate fi nance in its lending 
to developing and transition countries, there is 
substantial scope for increasing the share of adap-
tation (as opposed to mitigation) fi nance, which 
is more relevant for easing forced displacement 
pressures, and for improving its geographical al-
location. 
Two recent initiatives should enhance the future 
involvement of the EIB in migration issues. 
Table 5.2: Concentration of EIB’s external lending in top 10 countries, 2000-2017
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new livelihood opportunities for potential 
migrants, returnees and refugees, and to address 
pressures on healthcare, education and childcare 
facilities. There is, therefore, a welcome attempt to 
move the EIB, to some extent, away from its tra-
ditional lending for large infrastructure projects 
and into an area of assistance that is more social, 
more micro and more focused on the quality of 
those public services that, according to the recent 
literature, are key for migration intentions.
The ERI (and the revised ELM more generally) 
is, therefore, a step in the right direction in the 
efforts to increase the share of the EIB’s external 
lending devoted to migration- and refugee-relat-
ed projects. These efforts are also supported by 
the decision to allocated at least EUR 1.4 billion 
of the ERI (and at least EUR 3 billion of the total 
increase in the ELM agreed at the mid-term 
review) to climate change projects, given the im-
portance of climate finance for easing forced dis-
placement related to natural catastrophes. It will 
be important for the EIB, however, to make sure 
that this increase in the EIB’s lending power for 
the Southern Neighbourhood and the Western 
Balkans focuses on projects that are of direct 
relevance for migration and refugee policy, as 
required by the amended ELM Decision, and 
is not spent on big infrastructure projects in a 
few relatively large countries with a capacity to 
generate profitable investment opportunities. 
It will also be important to continue to support the 
ERI and, more generally, the ELM in the context 
of the next MFF. This is an issue that, like other 
important elements of the future MFF, remains 
to be negotiated and agreed. The budgetisation of 
the EDF under the Commission’s proposal for the 
next MFF is likely to result in the merger of the 
guarantee systems of the ELM and the CPA, pre-
sumably under the proposed new External Action 
Guarantee. This new Guarantee instrument would 
support operations of up to a maximum total of 
EUR 60 billion, including the operations guaran-
teed by the EEIP and macro-financial assistance 
loans (see the next two sections). The Commis-
sion’s proposal is, however, not specific about 
the total amount of guarantees that the EIB will 
be able to rely upon for its external lending, let 
alone about its breakdown by region. In fact, the 
Commission’s proposed regulation on the NDICI 
and its Communication of 12 September 2018 on 
the EU’s future financial architecture for invest-
countries (building block 2) and EUR 2.3 billion 
to enhance the range of products offered to their 
private sectors (building block 3). For the projects 
under building block 3, it was agreed to extend 
the EU guarantee to commercial risks. Except 
building block 1, the ERI was covered by the EUR 
5.3 billion increase in the EU Budget guarantee 
agreed at the mid-term review of the ELM, 3 
billion of which were the optional increase for 
climate change projects that was already envisaged 
when that ELM was first adopted.
The amendments to the original Decision on 
the ELM introduced at the mid-term review 
represent a sea change in the importance that the 
European co-legislators want the EIB to attach 
to migration in its external lending, and this 
goes beyond the ERI. In fact, the first recital of 
the amended Decision starts by noting that “The 
international community faces an unprecedent-
ed migration and refugee crisis” and goes on to 
say that “all actors need to work together to […] 
develop and support initiatives which contribute 
to the UN’s sustainable development goals and to 
addressing the political, economic and environ-
mental factors that constitute the root causes of 
migration.” Then, Article 3(1)(d) adds, as a new 
general objective of the ELM, the promotion of 
“the long-term economic resilience of refugees, 
migrants, host and transit communities, and 
communities of origin as a strategic response to 
addressing the root causes of migration.”
The amended ELM Decision is also very explicit 
regarding the types of projects the EIB should 
finance in order to support the objective mentioned 
in Article 3(1)(d). And these are precisely the 
kind of projects recommended by the new litera-
ture on the impact of aid on migration and on the 
developmental approach to refugee protection. 
Indeed, Article 3(8) of the revised ELM Decision 
calls for the EIB to finance operations that will: 
“a) address increased needs for infrastructure and 
related services to cater directly or indirectly for 
the influx of migrants while also benefitting the 
local population; (b) boost employment oppor-
tunities for host and refugee communities; (c) 
foster economic integration and enable refugees 
to become self-sufficient; and (d) strengthen hu-
manitarian action and support the creation of 
decent jobs.” And later, the same Article calls on 
the EIB to support SMEs, mid-caps, corporate 
finance and microfinance, which can help provide 
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It also builds on the EU’s experience with the 
blending facilities managed by the European 
Commission, which “blend” grant contributions 
with loans provided by the EIB and other finan-
ciers in order to reduce the overall risk of invest-
ment projects, subsidise the interest cost of the 
loans or provide technical assistance supporting 
the projects in question.59 
The EEIP consists of three pillars60:
i) A financing pillar, known as the EFSD, 
amounting to EUR 4.1 billion in the form of 
grants for the period up to 2020. The EFSD 
consists, in turn, of two regional Investment 
Platforms, which reformat into this new 
framework two already existing blending fa-
cilities, namely the Africa Investment Facility, 
amounting to EUR 1.5 billion, and the Neigh-
bourhood Investment Facility, amounting to 
EUR 1.1 billion, as well as a new guarantee 
facility, the so-called EFSD Guarantee, 
amounting to EUR 1.5 billion, which has 
been funded with contributions from the EU 
Budget and the EDF.61 It was hoped that EU 
countries and possibly other donors would 
contribute financially to the EFSF but, un-
fortunately, the contribution of EU countries 
has so far been limited, adding to their dis-
appointing contribution to the trust funds 
discussed in the previous chapter.62 
ii) A technical assistance pillar, to help develop 
bankable projects and support reforms aimed 
at improving the investment climate of the 
recipient countries.
one roof other existing internal EU financial instruments, building 
on the guarantee model of the EFSI.
59 Blending was introduced in the EU at the beginning of 
the 2007-2013 MFF and has evolved into an important tool of the 
EU’s external cooperation assistance. 
60 For a good description of the EEIP, see European 
Commission (2017d). 
61 The total contribution from the EU Budget and the EDF 
to the EFSF Guarantee amounts to only EUR 750 million because 
only 50% of the guarantees extended by the EFSD Guarantee need 
to be provisioned for.
62 By end-August 2018, only three EU countries had 
contributed to the EFSD (the Czech Republic and Estonia had 
pledged together EUR 400.000 to the Guarantee Fund, while 
Estonia and Germany had contributed each EUR 1 million to the 
Neighbourhood Investment Platform). Contributions from other 
donors were limited to a commitment of about EUR 50 million by 
the Gates Foundation, mostly for the Guarantee Fund, to support 
health sector investments in SSA.
ment outside the EU suggest that EIB external 
lending guarantees will be part of those provided 
by a reformed and expanded EEIP, which will be 
covered by the new External Action Guarantee 
and will also be open to operations managed 
by other European financiers.56 Whatever the 
approach finally chosen, it will be important to 
ensure that sufficient priority is attached to mi-
gration-relevant projects in the design and allo-
cation of the EIB’s external lending.
5.2 The European External 
Investment Plan
In September 2017, the EU adopted a Regulation 
establishing the European Fund for Sustainable 
Development (EFSD) as the core of a EEIP.57 The 
EEIP is aimed at promoting the “achievement of 
the Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 
Agenda, […] thus addressing specific socioec-
onomic root causes of migration and fostering 
sustainable reintegration of migrants returning 
to their countries of origin, and strengthening 
transit and host communities” (ibid.; Article 3). 
The EEIP is intended to promote investment, par-
ticularly by the private sector, in the EU’s Neigh-
bourhood (more precisely, in the 16 countries 
covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy) 
and SSA, two regions that, as noted, are key 
sources and major hosts of irregular migrants and 
displaced people. 
The EEIP has been modelled on the relatively 
successful Investment Plan for Europe (IPE) (also 
known as “the Juncker Plan”), launched in July 
2015, which is also managed by the EIB Group.58 
56 See European Commission (2018e) and European 
Commission (2018k).
57 European Parliament and EU Council (2017). The 
creation of the EEIP had been proposed by the Commission in 
its Communication of 7 June 2016 establishing a new Partnership 
Framework with Third Countries on Migration (European 
Commission, 2016a).
58 The IPE has at its core the European Fund for Strategic 
Investments (EFSI), which provides guarantees to support the 
risk-bearing capacity of the EIB Group, comprising the EIB 
and the European Investment Fund (EIF), and crowd-in private 
investment. Initially launched in July 2015 for three years, its 
success led to its extension until 2020 and to the doubling of the 
guarantee capacity of the EFSI. Currently, the EFSI can provide 
up to EUR 26 billion in guarantees, which, together with the own 
resources contributed by the EIB Group, is intended to mobilise 
at least EUR 500 billion of additional investments, mainly within 
Europe. Under the Commission’s proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF, 
the IPE would be integrated into a wider investment promotion 
programme called Invest EU, which would bring together under 
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to be managed separately by the Commission 
(through two separate Operational Boards, one 
for each platform) but the approach is now coor-
dinated by a newly created EEIP Secretariat that 
also manages the EFSF Guarantee.
Whether one looks at the EFSD Regulation or at 
the Communication of the Commission that ac-
companied the proposal (European Commission, 
2016b), the objective of addressing the socio-eco-
nomic root causes of migration figured promi-
nently in the political justification of the EIPP. By 
shifting budgetary resources and investment by the 
participating development banks and the private 
sector towards two regions that are key sources 
of migration pressures, the initiative could have 
some positive impact on their economic develop-
ment and, to the extent that development affects 
migration, on migration flows. But, as underlined 
in Chapter 2, this cause-effect mechanism is far 
from certain. Hopes about the effectiveness of the 
EIPP must be, rather, based on its direct, short-
er-term impact, provided that it focuses on social 
and public service infrastructure projects with 
direct bearing on the livelihoods of refugees and 
potential migrants. And, in that respect, the five 
investment windows approved by the Strategic 
Board in September of 2017 represent a serious 
effort to shift from the large and capital-intensive 
infrastructure projects that have characterized 
the operations of the EIB and many development 
banks to interventions that act at the microeco-
nomic and social level.64 This is true, in particu-
lar, for the windows in support of MSME finance 
and agricultural and rural development. Also, the 
sustainable cities window could potentially be 
used to address key urban and social problems 
such as pressures on water, sanitation and social 
infrastructure (including health and educational 
facilities). Moreover, several windows (in par-
ticular the energy and agricultural development 
ones) place a welcome emphasis on climate 
change-related projects, including the impact of 
climate change on desertification, agricultural 
production and food security, which is, as noted, 
of direct relevance for alleviating migration pres-
64 The five windows are: 1) Sustainable Energy and 
Sustainable Connectivity; 2) Micro, Small and Medium 
Enterprises (MSMEs) Financing; 3) Sustainable Agriculture, 
Rural Entrepreneurs and Agroindustry; 4) Sustainable Cities; 
and 5) Digitalisation for Sustainable Development. See European 
Commission (2017e).
iii) An investment climate pillar, foreseeing 
a structured dialogue with both the private 
sector and the authorities of the recipient 
countries on ways to strengthen the invest-
ment climate and business environment, 
drawing on a number of existing dialogue 
fora such as the Sustainable Business for 
Africa (SB4A) Platform and the EU4Busi-
ness Platform for the Eastern Partnership 
countries.
The EFSD offers credit enhancement, risk-shar-
ing and investment grants. It also finances part 
of the technical assistance provided under the 
second pillar. With its EUR 4.1 billion budget 
until 2020, it is expected to catalyse up to EUR 44 
billion in new investments, assuming a leverage 
ratio of 1:11 based on the experience with 
existing blending schemes. While projects may, 
in principle, be lead-managed by any financial in-
stitution meeting certain requirements, including 
private institutions, the EFSD Regulation, in 
its Article 11(2), expresses a preference for im-
plementing the projects covered by the EFSD 
Guarantee under the lead of European eligible 
counterparts, either regional institutions (such 
as the EIB, the EIF and the EBRD) or national 
development banks from EU countries (such as 
KfW,  AFD or DFID). And this is essentially what 
has been happening.63 The same is true for the 
blending operations financed by the Investment 
Platforms. Non-European regional and multilat-
eral development banks have until now mostly 
acted only as supporting financial institutions, 
only contributing to co-finance the projects. 
The EFSD is steered by a Strategic Board co-
chaired by representatives of the European 
Commission and the EU’s High Representa-
tive for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and 
also including representatives from all the EU 
countries and the EIB. The European Parliament 
has permanent observer status, while contributing 
financial institutions and beneficiary countries 
might also attend as observers on an ad hoc basis. 
Each regional Investment Platform continues 
63 Thus, out of the first 12 projects approved under the 
EFSD Guarantee in July 2018, worth EUR 800 million, only two 
are lead-managed by a non-European institution (the African 
Development Bank) (see European Commission, 2018l). In the 
Commission’s interpretation of Article 11(2), for a non-European 
counterpart to be selected for implementating an EFSD guarantee 
programme, it should be demonstrated that no European financial 
institution is in a position to do so.
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this principle be applied to the operations of the 
Investment Platforms more generally, and not 
only to those covered by the guarantee. 
Another potential drawback of the current design 
of the EEIP is the preference for working with 
European institutions as lead managers. The 
same criticism has sometimes been addressed to 
the IPE, which has an even more strict limitation, 
namely that all projects must be lead managed by 
either the EIB or the EIF. While this restriction 
might be easier to justify in the case of the IPE 
because its focus is on investment projects within 
Europe, where the EU financial institutions have, 
admittedly, a comparative advantage, in the case 
of investment operations abroad, the argument 
seems weaker. Further opening the EEIP to other 
financiers, including from outside Europe, should 
not only help mobilise more resources but should 
also make it easier to bring in the expertise of 
Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) such 
as the World Bank or the African Development 
Bank on the type of social and public services 
projects that are most relevant for addressing the 
root causes of migration. 
Looking ahead, it is important to ensure the con-
tinuity of the EEIP in the next MFF and, in this 
respect, it is reassuring that the Commission’s 
proposal for the NDICI, as well as its Commu-
nication of September 2018 on a more efficient 
financial architecture for investment outside the 
EU (Commission, 2018k, op. cit.) foresees its 
reinforcement. The EEIP would be integrated 
into a broader external investment framework 
including a geographically expanded EFSD 
(the EFSD+), also covering Asia, the Pacific, 
Latin America, the Caribbean and the pre-ac-
cession countries, and the new External Action 
Guarantee, which would support the operations 
previously covered by the EFSD Guarantee. Both 
the EFSD+ and the provisioning of the External 
Action Guarantee would be financed by the geo-
graphical pillars of the NDICI and, for operations 
in pre-accession countries, by the IPA. The Com-
mission (ibid,; pp. 6-7) stresses that the EFSD+ 
guarantees would be accessible not only to the 
EIB Group but also to other financiers. The guar-
antees would be approved and managed by a new 
governance structure called the EU external in-
vestment platform, which would be steered by 
the Commission and bring together all actors 
concessional terms should be considered.
sures.65 The emphasis on climate finance is further 
supported by Article 9(1h) of the EFSD Regula-
tion, which requires that at least 28% of the EFSD 
Guarantee be allocated to projects that contribute 
to climate action, renewable energy and resource 
efficiency.
It is, nonetheless, regrettable that migration is 
not explicitly mentioned among the areas of in-
tervention of any of the five investment windows 
and that a window specifically targeting mi-
gration-focused projects has not been created. 
Although migration is among the key policy ob-
jectives of the EFSD and, as such, targeted hori-
zontally across the five windows, only two of the 
first 12 projects approved by the EFSD Steering 
Board are directly related to migration (European 
Commission, 2018l). These include a project (the 
so-called NASIRA Risk-Sharing Facility) to give 
refugees, IDPs and returnees access to invest-
ment loans and another one (known as InclusiFI) 
to encourage diaspora communities in the EU 
to invest in their regions of origin. While these 
two projects are undoubtedly welcome steps, the 
migration relevance of projects should be used 
more explicitly as a criterion in the screening of 
projects and in the allocation of the portfolio of 
the EIPP. 
There is also the risk that, as noted when referring 
to the EIB’s ERI, a few relatively large (and often 
more developed) countries, with more profit-
able markets and absorption capacity, end up 
receiving the lion’s share of the overall invest-
ment this initiative is meant to trigger. This risk 
is somewhat mitigated by Article 9 (4) of the 
EFSD Regulation, which foresees that, within 
the African Investment Platform, a significant 
share of the EFSD guarantee should be allocated 
to fragile, conflict-affected, landlocked and least 
developed countries. Moreover, although this 
provision refers specifically to the operations in 
SSA, it has been agreed that it should also guide 
the operations of the EFSD guarantee in the 
Neighborhood.66 But it would be important that 
65 It is also reassuring that in a screening conducted 
by the European Commission of the pipeline of projects of the 
African Investment Facility many were deemed to contribute 
to addressing the root causes of migration. See the Legislative 
Financial Statement annexed to the Commission’s proposal for the 
EFSD Regulation (https://bit.ly/2IdGX17).
66 See European Commission (2017d; p. 14). The EFSD 
Regulation (Article 9.2.d) also foresees that for countries 
experiencing fragility or conflict, for those classified as least 
developed countries and for heavily indebted poor countries more 
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economic transitions from centrally-planned, 
socialist economies to fully-fledged market 
economies, a transition that was initially accom-
panied by substantial macroeconomic instability 
and balance of payments needs.68 
MFA normally takes the form of medium-term 
loans (with maturities of up to 15 years and 
similarly long grace periods) but, for relatively 
poor and highly indebted countries, it can take 
the form of grants or entail a grant component. 
MFA loans carry a very low interest rate, normally 
the same rate at which the EU borrows the funds 
in the international capital markets with its 
triple-A rating. Even when it takes the form of 
loans, therefore, MFA usually provides a relative-
ly cheap source of medium-term finance for the 
recipient country, which normally has either lost 
access to the capital markets or can only tap them 
at prohibitive interest rates. The assistance goes 
either to the budget of the beneficiary country 
(budget support) or it is kept by the central bank 
to rebuild its reserves or intervene in the foreign 
exchange markets (balance of payments support). 
It is normally disbursed in two or three tranches, 
with the disbursement being conditional on the 
beneficiary country implementing a number of 
policy conditions negotiated by the European 
Commission with the authorities and making 
good progress under the IMF programme that 
the MFA is linked to.69
MFA is normally reserved to countries in the EU´s 
neighborhood, that is, those that are formally 
considered candidates or potential candidates 
for accession to the EU and those covered by the 
European Neighbourhood Policy. Exceptionally, 
however, countries outside this normal geograph-
ical scope may receive MFA. For example, the 
EU approved in 2013 an MFA operation for Kyr-
gyzstan. Since its creation, the EU has approved 
66 MFA operations amounting to a total of EUR 
12.7 billion, of which EUR 9.3 billion have been 
effectively disbursed. They have averaged 192 
68 For a good description of the rationale, historical genesis 
and evolution of this instrument, see European Commission 
(2011). For a more critical view, see Emerson (2012).
69 Each MFA operation requires an ad hoc legislative 
decision by the European Parliament and the Council. Contrary to 
other external financial instruments of the EU, the rules applicable 
to MFA are not enshrined in a regulation passed by the European 
Parliament and the Council. However, these two institutions 
adopted in 2013 a Joint Declaration defining the main principles 
and rules applicable to MFA. See European Parliament and EU 
Council (2013). 
benefitting from the guarantees. In order to make 
this new and more ambitious external investment 
framework fully effective, however, it would be 
important that EU countries, and possibly other 
donors, contribute financially to it, for example by 
augmenting the resources available for the EFSD+ 
within the future External Action Guarantee. 
5.3 Macro-Financial 
Assistance
Another form of financial assistance that is 
relevant for migration and refugee policy but that 
is not captured by the empirical work on aid and 
migration is, as noted, assistance of a macroe-
conomic nature, which normally carries policy 
conditionality. Indeed, for countries where the 
outflow of migrants or/and asylum seekers is 
caused by a negative interaction between political 
and macroeconomic instability, increasing the 
traditional forms of aid (ODA) may be inef-
fective and may actually contribute to increase 
migration by easing the budget constraint. In 
those scenarios, or in other less extreme cases 
where migration flows are driven by a poor and 
relatively unstable macroeconomic performance 
and the lack of an adequate macroeconomic and 
structural reform strategy, macro-financial assis-
tance, such as the one provided by the IMF and 
certain policy-based operations of the World 
Bank and some bilateral donors, might be fun-
damental. By helping to restore macroeconomic 
stability and put in place a sounder institutional 
and governance framework, it can increase the ef-
fectiveness of other assistance instruments.
The EU disposes, in its arsenal of external financial 
instruments, of an exceptional instrument called 
Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) that allows it 
to provide large amounts of assistance to non-EU 
countries undergoing severe balance of payment 
difficulties and having agreed with the IMF on an 
adjustment programme entailing the actual use of 
IMF resources.67 This instrument was created at 
the end of the 1980s, after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, to support the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe as they went through difficult 
67 A IMF precautionary programme is not enough 
for a country to be eligible for EU MFA. The programme must 
be supported by a financial arrangement of the IMF. Another 
precondition for MFA, known as the political criterion, is the 
existence in the beneficiary country of democratic institutions 
based on the rule of law and the respect of human rights.
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Figure 5.2 summarises the evolution of MFA op-
erations since the creation of this instrument. In 
recent years, total MFA commitments have risen 
markedly to a new historical peak, driven not 
only by the large operations for Ukraine but also 
by operations directed to the Southern Mediterra-
nean, notably Tunisia and Jordan, in the wake of 
the Arab spring upheavals of 2011 and the Syrian 
war. Figure 5.3 shows that the geographical focus 
partly shift ed from Central and Eastern Europe 
until the mid-1990s to the Western Balkans in the 
2000s (refl ecting the economic impact of the wars 
and dissolution of the former Yugoslavia) and to 
Eastern Europe and the Southern Mediterranean 
since then. 
million in size, going from a minimum of EUR 
15 million (in the case of several operations for 
Moldova) to a maximum of EUR 1.8 billion in the 
2015 operation for Ukraine.70
70 Th e latter was part of an exceptionally large package 
of MFA, including three operations totalling EUR 3.4 billion, 
made available by the EU to Ukraine during 2014-2017, of which 
EUR 2.8 billion were eff ectively disbursed. Th e package, which 
accompanied two multi-billion dollar packages of the IMF, was 
the largest assistance ever disbursed by the EU to a third country 
in such a short period of time. See European Commission 
(2018m) and previous annual reports by the Commission on the 
implementation of MFA, available at https://bit.ly/2hrkhQV. On 4 
July 2018, the EU approved a fourth MFA operation for Ukraine 
in the amount of EUR 1 billion (see European Parliament and EU 
Council, 2018c).
Figure 5.2: Annual commitments and disbursements of MFA, 1990-Aug. 2018
(In EUR million)
Figure 5.3: Regional distribution of MFA: a changing pattern
(Shares in total commitments)
Source: Europena Commission
Source: European Commission.
(1) Before joining the EU in 2004 or 2007.




of Syrian refugees.73 In this way, MFA usefully 
complemented the efforts the EU was making 
through other instruments to address the refugee 
emergency in Jordan, including the ENI, human-
itarian assistance and trade policy. The EU has 
committed itself to a third MFA for Jordan of at 
least EUR 200 million, if and once the second 
operation has been completed successfully and 
following an updated assessment by the Commis-
sion of Jordan’s external financing needs.74
In the case of Ukraine, the series of exception-
ally large MFA and IMF operations implement-
ed since 2014 were crucial to restore macroeco-
nomic stability in the challenging context that 
emerged after the orange revolution of 2014 and 
the eruption of a military conflict in the East of 
the country. The crisis led to a large displace-
ment of people from the East of the country to 
other parts of Ukraine and abroad, many moving 
to Russia and other countries as refugees. At the 
same time, the difficult political and economic 
situation in the country encouraged many 
Ukrainians to emigrate, with the EU being the 
main destination.75 By helping to restore macroe-
conomic stability, this assistance package is likely 
to have contributed to moderate the total outflow 
of both forcibly displaced people and economic 
migrants. Moreover, the third MFA operation 
also contained conditionality aimed at ensuring 
appropriate social assistance from the Ukrainian 
government to IDPs, thus contributing to some 
extent to reduce their motivation for moving 
abroad. 
One could also mention the MFA operations 
approved by the EU for Tunisia (two operations 
for a total of EUR 800 million approved between 
2014 and 2016) and Moldova (EUR 100 million, 
approved in 2017), two important sources of 
migration (including irregular flows) to the EU 
in recent years, as relevant examples of the use 
of MFA to support, at least implicitly, migration 
policy. Egypt is another case in point. Indeed, with 
73 For the EU-Jordan Compact and its rules of origin 
scheme, see Chapter 9.
74 See Joint Statement of the European Parliament, the 
Council and the European Commission annexed to the Decision 
granting the second MFA to Jordan (European Parliament and EU 
Council, 2016).
75  According to Eurostat data, Ukraine was, by far, the 
country that received the largest number of residence permits 
issued by the EU between 2014 and 2016 (1.4 million, or 17% of 
the total). See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database, series 
migr_resfirst.
In a context of increasing calls on the MFA in-
strument, the EU decided in 2017, as part of 
the mid-term review of the 2014-2020 MFF, to 
increase the annual ceiling for MFA loans from 
EUR 500 million to EUR 2 billion until 2020. And 
the same annual ceiling has been suggested by 
the European Commission in its proposal for the 
NDICI (European Commission, 2018e), as part of 
the MFF for 2021-2027. This reflects the realiza-
tion that an effective assistance strategy requires 
an appropriate mix of instruments and that quite 
a few countries in the EU´s neighbourhood are 
suffering from significant macroeconomic in-
stability. It also reflects the hard constraints the 
EU´s traditional aid budget is facing and the fact 
that since most of the funds for the EU´s MFA 
are obtained through borrowing by the European 
Commission,71 its budgetary impact is much 
more limited.72
Two MFA operations recently conducted by the 
EU have been of particular relevance for the EU´s 
policy on forced displacement and migration, 
namely those for Jordan and Ukraine. In the 
case of Jordan, the assistance (two medium-term 
loans of up to 15 years approved in 2013 and 2016 
amounting to a total of EUR 380 million), helped 
the country cover part of the budgetary impact 
of the large number of Syrian refugees living in 
Jordan, estimated by the authorities at 1.3 million 
(or 14% of Jordan’s population), of whom 668,000 
had been registered as refugees by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for the Refugees 
(UNHCR) by July 2018. The assistance, together 
with that of other donors, notably the IMF and 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, 
helped restore macroeconomic stability, coun-
ter-balancing the economic impact of the Arab 
spring revolts of 2011 and the Syrian conflict, 
which also affected negatively Jordan’s trade and 
tourism inflows. In addition, the second operation 
contained specific policy conditionality support-
ing the scheme agreed in the EU-Jordan Compact, 
which eased the EU’s rules of origin for Jordanian 
export companies employing a minimum share 
71 There is also a line in the EU budget to finance MFA 
grants, but it normally amounts to only between 70 and 100 
million euros per annum.
72 Under current budgetary rules, the budgetary 
implication of a MFA loan is limited to the need to provision the 
so-called Guarantee Fund for External Action in the amount of 9% 
of each actual disbursement two years after it takes place. 
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a very large, young and rapidly growing popula-
tion, and a difficult political and macroeconomic 
situation since the 2011 revolution, the risk that 
a destabilization of the country triggers substan-
tial population flows and threatens stability in 
the Middle East has been on the minds of many 
European politicians. The EU considered an 
operation in the order of EUR 500 million in early 
2013 to complement a large IMF programme 
that was being negotiated at the time, to help the 
country regain macroeconomic stability and to 
support its political transition process. But the 
failure of the administration under President 
Morsi to confirm the agreement reached at staff 
level with the IMF in late 2012 and the subsequent 
political developments in the country led to an 
interruption of the discussions on possible MFA. 
In November 2016, with the country approaching 
a balance of payments crisis, the IMF agreed with 
Egyptian government on a programme supported 
by a very large (USD 12 billion) Extended Fund 
Facility. While the EU decided not to supplement 
it with its own MFA, EU countries supported the 
programme at the IMF Board.
The financial crisis that Turkey has been expe-
riencing since the summer of 2018 could also 
create a situation where the EU may want to use 
MFA partly on refugee policy grounds. With 
Turkey hosting already about 3.5 million Syrian 
refugees, the combination of macroeconom-
ic instability and a possible new and important 
inflow of refugees into its territory due to the 
expected offensive by the Syrian regime against 
the last rebel stronghold in the Idlib province, 
in Northern Syria, could trigger a fresh strong 
flow of refugees to the EU.76 Indeed, recession 
and inflation, together with Turkey’s increasingly 
polarized political situation, could well encourage 
not only Syrian refugees but also Turkish citizens 
to seek asylum or/and better economic oppor-
tunities in the EU, similarly to what has been 
happening between Venezuela and its neighbours 
in the last two years. By helping restore macro-
economic stability, a package of macro-financial 
support, which given Turkey’s large potential 
76 Idlib is home to about 3 million people, a third of 
whom are Syrians displaced by the conflict from other parts of the 
country and, according to the UN, an offensive there could cause 
a new humanitarian catastrophe, pushing up to 800.000 people 
to try to flee to Turkey. See http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-
09-07/could-the-rebel-stronghold-of-idlib-be-about-to-fall-in-
syria/10213156.
financial needs would necessarily have to be led 
by the IMF, could help ease refugee pressures.77
Although the increase in the budgetary envelope 
for MFA decided in 2017 and proposed by the 
Commission for the next MFF is a welcome de-
velopment from the point of view of the EU´s 
external migration policy (even if the decision 
reflected mainly other considerations), a signif-
icant shortcoming of the EU´s MFA instrument 
at present is the fact that its normal geographi-
cal scope is restricted to the countries in the 
immediate EU neighbourhood. Unfortunately, 
many of the countries that should be priorities in 
the EU´s migration policy (because of their role 
as source, transit or host countries) are beyond 
the EU´s neighbourhood and many of them, in 
particular in SSA, suffer from very fragile and 
vulnerable macroeconomic situations (charac-
terised by considerable balance of payments and 
fiscal needs), where MFA could make a useful 
contribution. 
The EU should, therefore, consider enlarging 
the normal geographical scope of MFA opera-
tions, at least to countries in SSA but perhaps 
also in a more general manner. The Commission 
should also further emphasise, where appropri-
ate, migration- or refugee-relevant reforms in 
the policy conditionality that it negotiates with 
countries receiving MFA, as it has done in the 
recent operations for Jordan and Ukraine. In 
addition, priority could be given in the allocation 
of MFA funds to countries experiencing serious 
migration or displacement pressures or risks, 
provided that their macroeconomic situation and 
financial needs warrant a package of macro-finan-
cial support. Moreover, the EU should encourage 
the adoption of such an approach by the IMF and 
the World Bank.
Some observers have also called for an easing of 
the link of MFA programmes to the existence of 
an IMF programme, arguing that this unduly con-
straints the EU´s room for maneouvre.78 However, 
the participation of the IMF with a funding 
programme seems important for several reasons: 
77 Claeys and Wolff (2018), from Bruegel, the Brussels-
based think-tank, have called on the EU to use its MFA instrument 
to help avoid an escalation of the crisis in Turkey. 
78 See, for example, Emerson (op. cit.; pp. 41-44), 
who proposes to overcome the subordination of MFA to IMF 
programmes and to allow partnerships with other international 
financial institutions as well.
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first, it is a sign of the gravity of the situation and of 
the existence of genuine macro-financing needs; 
second, it helps enlarge the potential size of the 
support package and extend the burden-sharing 
to other institutions and donor countries; third, 
it is useful in order to benefit from the IMF´s 
expertise in the design and monitoring of macro-
economic adjustments programmes; and finally, 
the IMF’s seal of approval of a country’s economic 
programme can have a catalytic effect on foreign 
investment.
In sum, macroeconomic stabilisation assistance 
can make in certain cases a useful contribution to 
alleviating migration and refugee pressures and, 
although its impact should not be exaggerated, it 
should be seen as part of the panoply of financial 
instruments that the EU can use to address the 
root causes of migration and forced displace-
ment. This requires both making the EU’s own 
MFA instrument more operational and using the 
EU’s political weight at the boards of internation-
al financial institutions and in other fora in order 
to support, where warranted, the organisation of 
rescue packages for countries that are a priority 
for the EU´s migration and refugee policy.
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The IDA’s refugee facility is aimed at both 
refugees and host communities. Top-up assis-
tance under this facility is provided in grant terms 
only for highly-indebted distress countries or, in 
cases where the beneficiary country has only a 
moderate or low risk of debt distress, for projects 
that only benefit the refugees and not the host 
communities. In other cases, a 50%-50% mix of 
grants and concessional loans is used. Moreover, 
in all projects, the required financial national 
contributions are half of those normally required 
by the IDA.79 
This World Bank initiative reflects the realization 
that, as indicated above and illustrated in Annex 
1, the vast majority of the refugees hosted outside 
the developed world live in a few low- and lower 
middle-income countries and that many of these 
are IDA-eligible countries. Actually, the majority 
of the refugees hosted by IDA-eligible countries 
are in SSA and the MENA region. Eight countries 
(Cameroon, Chad, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Niger, Pakistan and Uganda) have been 
found to be eligible for this facility so far, although 
discussions are underway with other potential 
beneficiaries.80 These eight countries collective-
ly host 4.1 million refugees or 60% of the total 
number of refugees living in IDA countries. 
The USD 2 billion of the refugee window are to 
be provided during the IDA’s 18th replenishment 
period, which spans from July 2017 to June 2020. 
The decision to link eligibility to the facility to 
the existence of an appropriate refugee protection 
framework and an action plan for refugees and 
host communities is consistent with the develop-
ment approach to forced displacement, whereby 
assistance is linked to commitments by host gov-
ernments to enact policy changes that address the 
economic and social dimensions of refugee situ-
ations. 
6.2 The Global Concessional 
Financing Facility
While the IDA’s refugee window was a welcome 
step to address the refugee crisis, it had the 
problem that it did not cover a number of mid-
79 See World Bank (2016b and 2017a).
80 According to the World Bank (2016b; p. 19), Syria, 
which it considers an IDA-eligible country, could in principle also 
qualify for this refugee window. But the continuing conflict in this 
country has so far prevented this.




At the international level, some new multilater-
al financial facilities, managed by development 
banks, have been launched to respond to the 
refugee crisis. They are all aimed at low- and mid-
dle-income countries hosting large populations 
of refugees and are intended to support both the 
refugees and their host communities, reflecting 
a growing international consensus that those 
countries are not only being deeply affected by 
the refugee inflow but are also providing a global 
public good by hosting them. The EU, who seats 
at the boards of those institutions, has generally 
been supportive (with varying degrees of enthu-
siasm) of such initiatives. This Chapter discusses 
the main ones.
6.1 The IDA’s refugee 
facility for low-income 
countries
In the context of the 18th replenishment of In-
ternational Development Association (IDA), the 
concessional lending arm of the World Bank for 
the poorest countries, which was agreed at the 
end of 2016, a USD 2 billion Financing Window 
for Refugees was created. In order to qualify for 
the facility, a country must host at least 25,000 
UNHCR-registered refugees, or refugees must 
represent at least 0.1% of its population, and it 
must have an adequate framework for the protec-
tion of refugees as assessed by the World Bank, 
with guidance from the UNHCR, based on criteria 
such as whether the country has ratified the UN’s 
1951 Convention for Refugees and the related 
1967 Protocol. Moreover, the country must have 
an action plan or reform strategy, with concrete 
steps, aimed at providing long-term solutions that 
benefit refugees and host communities. When 
deciding on a country’s eligibility, the World Bank 
also takes into account the impact refugee inflows 
are having on the country in question, including 
on its fiscal position and the pressure on public 
services, and the risk of increased instability in 
the country and the surrounding region. 
Heliodoro Temprano Arroyo
45
The funds of the GCFF, as its name suggests, are 
used to provide development assistance on highly 
concessional terms to medium-term countries 
that are most affected by the refugee crisis. This is 
done mainly by subsidizing the interest loans on 
loans granted by the MDBs to these countries for 
projects that benefit refugees and host communi-
ties. The World Bank estimates that each dollar 
of grants from the facility can bring approximate-
ly four dollars of loans to IDA-type concessional 
terms. If the objective of raising USD 1.5 billion 
in grants is met, this would allow the GCFF 
to unlock about USD 6 billion in concession-
al finance for middle-income countries hosting 
refugees. The argument is that although these 
middle-income countries should in principle not 
have access to IDA-type of concessional finance, 
the refugees they host often come from countries 
that do have such access under normal condi-
tions. Moreover, as already noted, it is considered 
that host countries are providing a global public 
good by hosting and protecting the refugees and 
should, therefore, be supported by the interna-
tional community on concessional terms and in 
ways that do not harm their debt sustainability. 
Like the IDA refugee window and several of the 
facilities discussed above, the GCFF tries to bridge 
the gap between humanitarian assistance and tra-
ditional development assistance by supporting 
projects directly aimed at easing the socio-eco-
nomic conditions of refugees and their hosting 
communities. Projects financed by the GCFF’s 
soft loans try to address infrastructure and public 
service needs that have been overstretched by the 
presence of large populations of refugees. The 
nine projects approved by January 2018 covered 
areas such as water and wastewater infrastruc-
ture, health care services, urban transport, em-
ployment and education.
The country eligibility criteria for accessing the 
GCFF are very similar to those applicable to 
the IDA Refugee Window but the GCFF is not 
open to IDA countries; only to middle-income 
countries. While any middle-income country in 
the world meeting those criteria is in principle 
eligible for the GCFF, most of the funding pledges 
made so far have been earmarked for Jordan and 
Lebanon and all the projects approved so far have 
been for these two countries. Indeed, the USD 1.5 
billion funding objective is broken down between 
a target of raising USD 1 billion for Jordan and 
Lebanon (an objective that had already been 
agreed when the CFF, the predecessor of the GCFF, 
dle-income countries that are not IDA benefi-
ciaries but that account for a large share of the 
refugees living outside developed countries. They 
include countries such as Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon 
and Turkey (see Annex 1). To try to fill this gap, 
the World Bank, in partnership with the Islamic 
Development Bank and the UN, proposed at 
the end of 2015 to establish a so-called Conces-
sional Financial Facility to support refugees and 
strengthen the resilience of host communities 
in the middle-income countries of the MENA 
region.81 The facility was effectively created at 
the 2016 Spring Meetings of the IMF and the 
World Bank and was initially focused on Jordan 
and Lebanon. However, following an initiative by 
President Obama, it was expanded to the global 
level through its transformation in September 
2016 into the Global Concessional Financing 
Facility (GCFF), which can address refugee crises 
anywhere in the world.82
While the funding objective is to raise USD 1.5 
billion in grants, by early 2018, only USD 512 
million had been raised. The rest is supposed to be 
raised during the next five years. Nine countries 
have made pledges, five of them (Denmark, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) 
from the EU.83 The EU budget has also provided a 
token contribution of EUR 5 million, the minimum 
required for a donor to become a decision-mak-
ing member of its Steering Committee. Total con-
tributions from the EU, including the one from 
the EU budget, amount to USD 269 million, or a 
bit more that 50% of the facility. Donor contribu-
tions have been pooled in a trust fund managed 
by the World Bank as trustee. Four MDBs, namely 
the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, 
the EIB and the EBRD, can lead-manage projects 
financed by the GCFF (as Implementing Support 
Agencies), which positions the EU prominently 
in the facility as two of them are EU-controlled 
institutions.84 
81 The Concessional Financing Facility was part of a more 
general initiative, known as the MENA Financing Initiative, 
launched at the time by these three institutions, which also 
included the creation of a so-called Guarantee Facility to support 
reconstruction and economic recovery in conflict-affected 
countries of the MENA region, but this part of the initiative has so 
far remained at pilot level.
82 The GCFF was formally announced at the Leaders’ 
Summit on Refugees organised in the context of the UN General 
Assembly in New York in September 2016. For a description of 
the facility and progress with its implementation, see World Bank 
(2016c and 2017b). 
83 In addition, Japan has pledged to provide JPY 100 
billion in concessional loans. 
84 The UN can also act as Implementing Support Agency.
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6.3 The EBRD´s refugee 
response package
Another recent multilateral initiative aimed at 
addressing the socio-economic needs of refugees 
and their host communities that is of particular 
interest for the EU is the one launched in 2016 by 
the EBRD, which focuses on the Syrian refugee 
crisis. Indeed, an overview of the EU’s toolkit of 
financial instruments relevant for migration and 
refugee policy would not be complete without 
mentioning the EBRD. In fact, with the EU 
holding a controlling stake of 63% in the capital of 
the EBRD (including the stakes of the European 
Community and the EIB, each amounting to 3%), 
this bank is sometimes seen as another develop-
ment bank of the EU. 
The EBRD’s involvement in the Syrian refugee 
crisis has been made possible by the extension 
of its mandate first, in 2009, to Turkey and then, 
in 2012, to the Southern and Eastern Mediterra-
nean (SEMED) region. Five SEMED countries are 
currently shareholders and countries of operation 
of the EBRD, namely, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
Tunisia and, since September 2017, Lebanon.86 
By the end of 2017, the EBRD had invested EUR 
10.3 billion in Turkey and EUR 6.7 billion in the 
SEMED region. Together, these clients already 
accounted for to 30% of the investment portfolio 
of the EBRD outstanding at the end of 2017 (see 
Figure 6.1) and for nearly 40% of the new invest-
ment approved by the bank during that year. This 
is quite a transformation for a bank that was orig-
inally created, in 1991, to support the economic 
transition of the former communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union. And this transformation is a welcome de-
velopment from the point of view of the EU´s 
availability of financial power for a region that has 
become one of the main sources of refugee and 
irregular migration flows. 
At the same time, the EBRD has remained very 
active in some Eastern European countries such 
as Ukraine and Moldova, which are significant 
sources of economic migration into the EU, 
with Ukraine having also become, as noted, a 
source of substantial flows of forcibly displaced 
people since 2014. Indeed, in the context of the 
86 In addition, In May 2017, the EBRD agreed to start 
operations in Palestine for an initial period of five years, financed 
through the creation of two special trust funds.
was created) and a target of USD 500 million for 
the so-called global window within the facility.85 
This is, currently, a significant shortcoming of this 
facility. Indeed, while the facility is supposed to 
have been transformed into one of global scope, it 
remains de facto focused on Jordan and Lebanon. 
Although Jordan and Lebanon are the top second 
and fourth refugee-hosting countries in the 
world and the international donor community 
is strongly committed to supporting them, as 
made clear in the three high-level conferences on 
supporting Syria held since 2016, there are other 
middle-income countries that also host very large 
populations of refugees and should be supported 
by a facility of global nature.
Another limitation of this facility is that it has 
not elicited, until now, an enthusiastic donor 
response. Even the unachieved objective of 
raising USD 1.5 billion seems unambitious. For 
example, the EU’s EEIP alone already has a size 
about three times as big and the four EU facilities 
discussed in Chapter 4, which also target forced 
displacement, amount together, as noted, to EUR 
8.6 billion (about USD 10 billion). Some major 
donors such as the GCC countries are notably 
absent from the GCFF, despite their geopoliti-
cal interest and involvement in the Middle East 
region, from which many of the refugees come. 
The EU could also do more, both through the EU 
budget (the contribution of which remains, as 
noted, symbolic) and by having more EU member 
states among its supporting countries. Unfortu-
nately, there is some competition among all these 
different facilities, with some EU countries ap-
parently being reluctant to channel GCFF funds, 
for example, to SSA countries or Turkey because 
they already benefit from the other special EU fa-
cilities created for them. This is understandable. 
But establishing a few well-designed refugee facil-
ities at global level, and managed by multilateral 
institutions such as the World Bank, with ample 
experience in supporting fragile and conflict-rid-
den countries, is important to strengthen donor 
coordination and to produce real improvements 
in the socio-economic environment refugee com-
munities live in. This facility was designed to be 
one of them and deserves to be supported.
85 Moreover, Lebanon and Jordan can also access in 
principle the global window.
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butions from both the EBRD’s accumulated net 
income (EUR 100 million) and other donors, 
including bilateral donors, the EU and the GCFF.89
Th e aim is to mobilise EUR 400 million in grants, 
to be combined with EUR 500 million in loans 
provided by the EBRD from its own resources. 
Unfortunately, grant contributions from donors 
other than the EBRD have been somewhat below 
target, amounting to EUR 237 million by end-July 
2018.90
Th e package focuses on projects that can benefi t 
directly refugees or their host communities and 
in which the EBRD has a comparative advantage. 
Th is includes: i) projects to strengthen municipal 
infrastructure and services such as water, waste-
water, solid waste and urban transport, strained 
by the presence of large populations of refugees; 
ii) credit lines to support refugee-led MSMEs and 
advisory projects to help develop the small-scale 
private sector in host communities, drawing on 
the EBRD´s expertise in private sector develop-
ment; and iii) projects to support skill mapping, 
training and employment opportunities (notably 
for women) in priority sectors such as textile and 
food processing, which off er signifi cant employ-
ment possibilities for both refugees and the local 
population. 
While the EBRD’s Community Resilience package 
may also benefi t other countries in the Eastern 
Mediterranean region and even transit countries 
in the Western Balkans route aff ected by the 
refugee fl ow, the initiative has so far focused on 
Turkey and Jordan. By end-June 2018, the EBRD 
had approved 11 projects for these two countries 
under the initiative, for a total of EUR 354 million, 
blending EUR 231 million in EBRD loans and 
EUR 123 million in grants (both co-investment 
grants and technical assistance). Within these 
two countries, the package has been narrowly 
targeted at the cities and regions that are hosting 
large numbers of Syrian refugees (Amman and 
the northern governorates of Jordan and the 
South of Turkey, notably cities such as Gaziantep 
and Hatay). 
89 As one of the MDBs that can lead-manage projects 
supported by the GCFF, the EBRD can also obtain grant fi nancing 
from this facility, which has so far supported two EBRD-led 
projects in Jordan in the area of wastewater management.
90 At the time of writing, only Finland, Norway, Tapei 
China, the UK, the United States, the EU and the GCFF had 
contributed. A EUR 150 million contribution from the EU´s FRT 
that the EBRD was hoping for has not materialized.
Ukrainian crisis, the EBRD has stepped up its 
investment eff ort in Ukraine, while freezing the 
approval of new operations in Russia. Th e in-
terruption of lending to Russia, combined with 
the gradual reduction in lending to the Central 
European countries and the Baltic states as these 
countries complete their economic transitions,87
has opened space for the EBRD to shift  focus 
towards the Mediterranean (Turkey, the SEMED, 
as well as Cyprus and Greece), putting it in a 
better position to play a role in migration and 
refugee policy (see Figure 6.1).88
Figure 6.1: Allocation of the EBRD’s 
investment to selected regions, 2005-2017
(As a share of the outstanding stock of investments)
But the EBRD has, as noted, moved more ex-
plicitly to tackle the refugee crisis. In the context 
of the London Conference of February 2016 on 
Supporting Syria and the Region, it announced a 
fi nancing package, worth EUR 900 million for the 
period mid-2016 to mid-2019, aimed at providing 
concessional fi nancing through blending opera-
tions to countries directly aff ected by the Syrian 
refugee crisis (see EBRD, 2016). Th is so-called 
Community Resilience initiative is supported by 
the mobilisation of grants funded from contri-
87 One of these countries, the Czech Republic, has fully 
graduated from EBRD lending,
88 Since 2015, the EBRD has been, exceptionally, also 
active in Greece and Cyprus, among the EU countries, in an eff ort 
to help these countries recover from their debt and fi nancial crises. 
Th is would in principle also open the possibility of refugee-related 
projects in Greece, a key country in the Eastern Mediterranean 
refugee route. But the involvement of the EBRD in these two 
countries is meant to be temporary, with the plan being to end it 
by 2020. 
Source: EBRD.
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With Lebanon, which hosts over one million 
Syrian refugees (equivalent to nearly one quarter 
of its resident population), having become, as 
noted, a country of operations of the EBRD, the 
bank is already preparing an extension of its 
refugee programme to this country. It would seem 
advisable, however, to accompany this expansion 
of the geographical scope with a reinforcement of 
the financial resources allocated to it by the EBRD 
and other donors. It would also seem important to 
ensure the continuity of the programme beyond 
mid-2019.
In sum, both the extension of the EBRD´s geo-
graphical scope to Turkey and the SEMED region 
and its Community Resilience initiative have 
increased the relevance of the EBRD for the efforts 
of the EU and of the international community to 
address the refugee crisis. The package seems very 
well targeted, both geographically and regarding 
the type of projects that it finances, to facilitate 
the professional development and economic in-
tegration of refugees, improve strained municipal 
infrastructure and increase the resilience of host 
communities. Regrettably, the financial contribu-
tions of donors, including the EU, to it have so 
far been less than hoped for. The EBRD´s com-
parative advantage in private sector development 
and the financing of MSME is particularly useful 
for supporting the entrepreneurial development 
of refugees and does not overlap with actions 
financed through other external financial instru-
ments of the EU. It would, therefore, seem in the 
EU´s interest to support this EBRD initiative, 




more natural disasters than in the 1980s, with 
the annual economic losses resulting from them 
averaging 1% of GDP but being much higher for 
relatively poor countries, notably small island 
states (World Bank, 2016b; Hsiang and Jina, 
2014). Poor countries are not only more exposed 
to climate shocks but also tend to have a weaker 
capacity and readiness to buffer their economies 
from them. As a result, their overall vulnerability 
to climate change tends to be higher, as reflected 
by composite indicators like the ND-GAIN Vul-
nerability Index, which measures a country’s 
exposure, sensitivity and ability to adapt to the 
negative impact of climate change (see Figure 7.3). 
Disasters in developing countries tend to affect 
agriculture the most, which is critical for food 
security, jobs, livelihoods and export earnings, 
adding to the motivation of their citizens to 
migrate. Within developing countries, poor 
people are more exposed to hazards because they 
are more dependent on agricultural earnings and 
hold more vulnerable and less diversified assets 
(Hallegatte et al., 2016).
The higher vulnerability of the poorest countries 
to weather-related catastrophes is illustrated by 
the estimates of prospective annual displace-
ments due to natural disasters recently produced 
by the IDMC using its Global Displacement Risk 
Model.92 These estimates are displayed in Figure 
7.4, which shows that low- and lower middle-in-
come countries are much more likely to experi-
ence, in proportion to their population, displace-
ments due to natural disasters, in particular those 
related to the types of catastrophes that are being 
exacerbated by climate change, such as floods, 
storms, and wind.
92 For an explanation of the methodology behind these 
estimates, see IDMC (2017b).
7. The relevance 
of climate change 
finance
Environmental change, and in particular climate 
change and climate-related disasters, can be a sig-
nificant factor contributing to migration, notably 
forced displacement, and there is indeed a rapidly 
growing literature on the matter. This chapter 
looks at the debate and at the potential role of 
international climate finance as an instrument to 
mitigate climate change-related displacement.
Climate change is expected to worsen over time 
and the number of climatological, meteorologi-
cal and hydrological events is already increasing 
worldwide (see Figure 7.1). According to flow data 
compiled by the Internal Displacement Monitor-
ing Centre (IDMC), natural catastrophes already 
account for a dominant share of new internal dis-
placements of people, far exceeding the number 
of displacements caused by conflict and gener-
alized violence (Figure 7.2; first panel).91 And 
the bulk of natural disaster-driven annual dis-
placements are due to weather-related disasters 
(Figure 7.2; second panel). Moreover, the data in 
Figure 7.2 only refer to disasters triggered by rap-
id-onset hazards. It does not capture the people 
who abandon their homes because of slow-onset 
events or gradual environmental transformations 
related to climate change.
Unabated climate change (including global 
warming) is expected to accelerate the desertifi-
cation of arid areas such as the Sahel and increase 
the frequency of heat waves, droughts, extreme 
precipitation, coastal flooding and other extreme 
events. Arid and semi-arid regions, low-lying 
coastal areas, deltas, small island states, as well 
as some regions in high latitudes exposed to 
floods, are particularly at risk. And although 
these trends are being felt across the globe, the 
poorest regions are the most affected. According 
to the World Bank, during the 2005-2015 period, 
IDA-eligible countries experienced eight times 
91 There are, for the time being, no data on the global 
stock on persons displaced by natural disasters. However, over 
the period 2008-2016, the number of new IDPs associated with 
disasters reached 227.6 million (an annual average of 25.3 million 
each year). This compares with an estimated stock of 40.3 million 
of people displaced by violence and generalized conflict at the end 
of 2016. See IDMC (2017a). 
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Figure 7.1: Incidence of climate change-related natural disasters, 1960-2017
(Number of disasters per disaster subgroup)
Source: EM-DAT:Th e Emergency Events Database. University of Louvain(UCL) - CRED. D.Guha-Sapir-www.emdat.be
Figure 7.3: ND-GAIN Index of Vulnerability to Climate Change
Source:  Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) database.
Note:  Vulnerability measures a country’s exposure, sensitivity and ability to adapt to the impact of climate change. It is measured in six 
life-supporting sectors (food, water, health, ecosystem service, human habitat and infrastructure). Th e subindices can varie from 0 to 1, 
with 1 refl ecting maximum exposure, maximum sensitivity or a minimum capacity to adapt. Th e total vulnerability index is the average 
of the subindices.
Figure 7.2: New forced displacements: the role of climate change
Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Center.
Dispacements: natural disasters versus confl ict Displacements due to natural disasters by hazard category
In million




could also result in forced displacement through 
this indirect route. For example, Kelley et al. 
(2015) suggest that climate change contributed 
to the civil unrest that led to the war in Syria, 
by causing the most serious drought in modern 
Syrian history. Th e draught provoked a mass 
migration of about 1.5 million people from rural 
areas to the cities, which overcrowded urban 
centers. Social dissatisfaction was exacerbated by 
the government’s decision to reduce fuel and food 
subsidies and the rise in international commodity 
prices, which pushed up local food and energy 
prices. Similarly, Diessenbacher (1998) links the 
Rwanda genocide with a problem of overpopula-
tion in a context of environmental degradation.95
Other authors argue, however, that the link 
between climate change and migration or 
refugee fl ows has been exaggerated.96 Th ey note 
that estimates or predictions of environmental 
refugee fl ows are in general not based on rigorous 
empirical evidence and that many episodes char-
acterized as environmental displacement were in 
fact driven by a multiplicity of factors, of which 
climate change was only one, and oft en not the 
main, cause. For example, Findlay and Geddes 
(2011) question the conventional view that sees 
Bangladesh as a paradigmatic example of mass 
displacement due to sea-level rise, arguing that 
migration in this country has more to do with 
socio-economic factors such as poverty, access to 
social networks and household and community 
structures. In a more recent study based on a 
panel dataset of bilateral migration fl ows from 
1960 to 2000, Beine and Parsons (2015) found 
no direct eff ect of long-term climatic factors on 
international migration, although they found 
strong evidence that natural disasters produced 
greater fl ows of migrants from rural to urban 
areas. Th ey see this as consistent with the mixed 
results yielded, according to their reading (pp. 
726-727), by the existing literature on the eff ect 
of environmental change and natural disasters 
on migration. Some authors have also noted that 
environmental degradation can in some cases 
discourage, rather than encourage, international 
migration because populations impoverished by 
factors such as droughts or fl oods are less capable 
95 For a discussion of possible channels through which 
environmental change can aff ect confl ict, see Homer-Dixon 
(1994).
96 See Black (2001), Castles (2002), Castles, De Haas and 
Miller (2013), McLeman (2011) and Foresight (2011).
7.1 The debate on the 
relationship between climate 
change and migration
In this context, a strand of the migration litera-
ture has been warning about the emergence and 
rapid expansion of a new type of refugees, called 
“environmental refugees,” i.e. people who have 
been forced to migrate due to deteriorating en-
vironmental conditions, of which climate change 
is a subset of growing importance.93 Among the 
most quoted contributions are those of El-Hinna-
wi (1985), and Jacobson (1988), as well as the in-
fl uential work of British ecologist Norman Myer 
(Myers and Kent, 1995; Myers, 2002). Myers 
claimed that in the mid-1990s there were already 
about 25 million “environmental refugees”, which 
compared to the 22 million offi  cially registered 
as refugees by the UNHCR, and that their total 
number could reach 200 million by the middle of 
the 21st century. Other authors or organizations 
also made alarming predictions.94 And the UN, 
in its fi rst intergovernmental report on climate 
change, warned that “the gravest eff ects of climate 
change may be those on human migration as 
millions will be displaced” (IPCC, 1990; p. 103). 
Some political scientists have even argued that 
environmental degradation is at the root of some 
confl icts that have provoked important refugee 
movements, which means that climate change 
93 In this context, some authors have been calling for a 
broadening of the defi nition of refugee in international law to 
include people displaced by climate change.
94 See McLeman (2011) for examples of these predictions. 
Figure 7.4: Prospective annual displacements 
due to natural disasters
(IDPs per 100,000 inhabitants)
Source:  IDMC, estimates produced by the Global Displacement 
Risk Model, 2018.
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what we are seeing for now is a very sizeable 
increase in the number of IDPs, rather than in the 
number of “environmental refugees.” However, 
while a significant share of people displaced by 
natural disasters tends to return home within a 
relatively short period of time, many stay away 
for protracted periods of time. This suggests that 
there is a significant potential for such internal 
or regional displacement to transform itself into 
longer-range international migration, especially 
once the diasporas of migrants that can provide 
logistical and financial support are sufficiently 
developed. Indeed, IDMC data on displacement 
associated with conflict show a significant cor-
relation between IDP and refugee movements 
(IDMC, 2017a; p.51) and ten of the 15 countries 
that generate more IDPs are also among the 
15 countries that originate more refugees (see 
Annexes 1 and 2).100 
There is, therefore, a significant prospect that 
today’s IDPs could become tomorrow’s refugees 
or irregular migrants. And if climate change and 
environmental degradation continue to advance 
as in recent years, they will undoubtedly become 
a more important underlying cause of migration, 
even if it will still be incorrect, in most cases, 
to talk about environmental migration, for the 
reasons just discussed. 
7.2 The EU’s climate finance 
response in an international 
context 
Despite the controversy, the analysis above suggest 
that strengthening international climate finance 
for developing countries should help mitigate, 
especially over the medium-term, one signifi-
cant source of forced displacement and migration 
flows. But what are the EU and the international 
donor community actually doing to that effect, 
and what else could they do? The response, in a 
snapshot, is that, over the last ten years, both have 
been making impressive efforts to reorient part 
of their official assistance towards projects with 
climate co-benefits and to increase the involve-
ment of the private sector in them.
100 For example, a high share of the Afghan and Syrian 
refugees interviewed in Greece in early 2016 (about 55% and 
85%, respectively) said that they had not come directly from their 
areas of origin. And nearly 70% of the female asylum seekers 
from Central America surveyed in 2015 had also been internally 
displaced before deciding to flee abroad. See IDMC (2017a; p.51), 
citing surveys conducted by the UNHCR in 2015.
of financing the costs of migration.97 Finally, it 
has been noted that migration or internal dis-
placement can be a useful adaptation strategy of 
threatened populations to environmental change 
and should not necessarily be discouraged (Tacoli, 
2009; Zetter, 2010; McLeman, 2011; Castles et. al, 
2013; Adger et al., 2014). 
This is not to say that environmental change does 
not matter for migration but, rather, that some 
of the literature has tended to exaggerate its im-
portance and that it is often hard to disentangle 
its influence from that of other factors driving 
migration. At the same time, the literature points 
towards an increasing role of climate change in 
future forced displacement and migration, given 
that the disruptive effects of climate change are 
expected to intensify over time. 
An important finding of the literature is that 
people in relatively poor, rural areas and without 
previous experience with international migration 
are more likely to move within the country or to 
the nearby region in response to a natural disaster, 
rather than internationally and far away.98 They are, 
therefore, often counted (when they are counted 
at all) as IDPs rather than as refugees or migrants. 
Also, displacements induced by disasters tend to 
be temporary in nature, with the affected people 
often returning home after a few months or a 
few years, once conditions in the area hit by the 
natural shock improve.99 With people in develop-
ing countries displaced by climate change tending 
to stay close to their original location, much of 
97 For example, Findley (1994) found that a major 
and protracted drought in Mali, occurring over a three-year 
period, reduced long-term international migration, reflecting 
the tightening of credit constraints, although it provoked some 
temporary, circular migration within the country. For other 
evidence that long-distance migration might, in some cases, be 
reduced or interrupted by drought or other effects of climate 
change, see Adger et al. (2014; pp. 767-768).
98 Thus, Piguet, Pécoud and De Guchteneire (2011) review 
a number of micro-level studies and conclude that natural disasters 
are more likely to result in short-term internal displacements than 
in long-term, long-distance migrations. Foresight (2011), Adger 
et al. (2014; pp. 767-768) and IDMC (2017a; p. 53) reach the 
same conclusion. Empirical evidence also suggests, however, that 
developing countries are more likely than developed countries 
to experience international migration following a disaster (even 
if their dominant reaction to disasters is internal displacement). 
Belasen and Polachek (2013; p. 316) make this point after 
conducting a meta-analysis of past findings.
99 As noted by IOM (2017b; p. 38), citing the IDMC, “a 
significant portion of the global total of those newly displaced by 
disasters is usually associated with short-term evacuations in a 
relatively safe and orderly manner.” 
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sion’s proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF implies 
a marked increase in the share of climate main-
streaming, which would reach 25% of total ex-
penditure.
Th e EIB has also been making strong eff orts to 
increase the share of climate fi nance in its lending 
to developing countries. Th is is part of a more 
general strategy of the EIB aimed at making cli-
mate-related projects account for at least one 
third of its total lending, including lending within 
the EU. Th e EIB defi nes a so-called global target 
for its climate fi nance over its total operations and 
this target has been gradually increased and is 
currently set at 25%.102 Indeed, when its domestic 
operations (those inside the EU) are included, 
the EIB is the largest multilateral provider of 
climate fi nance in the world. Moreover, as part of 
its current ELM (covering, as noted, the period 
2014-2020), the bank is committed to providing 
at least 25% of its lending for climate mitigation 
and adaptation, a target that it has been amply met 
so far (see next paragraph).103 In fact, at the min-
isterial meeting of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that 
took place in Lima in October 2015, ahead of the 
Paris COP 21 conference on climate change, the 
President of the EIB announced a more ambitious 
target: by 2020, the EIB intends to devote to 
climate change projects at least 35% of its lending 
to developing countries (including lending under 
the ELM, the CPA and at its own risk).104 A 
reference to this more ambitious, 35% target for 
2020 was added to the Decision on the ELM at the 
time of its mid-term review.105
Th e EBRD, the other key MDB in which the 
EU has a controlling capital stake, has also been 
investing a large and growing share of its portfolio 
in climate change relevant projects. Figure 7.6 
and Table 7.1 show the climate fi nance to devel-
102 Th is target was set at the EIB Climate Strategy adopted 
in September 2015. See EIB (2015a).
103 See Recital 16 and Article 3 of European Parliament and 
EU Council (2014). 
104 A the same meeting, other MDBs also announced 
ambitious targets for their climate fi nance, to be met by 2020. See 
“Climate Finance Ministerial Meeting, Lima, October 9th: Co-
Chairs Conclusions” (https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/
PDF/Lima-conclusions-20151009en.pdf.)
105 See Recital 16 and Article 3 of European Parliament 
and EU Council (2018b). Th e 35% target, as an objective to be 
gradually met by 2020, as well as the already applicable 25% target, 
are also mentioned in the External Lending Mandate Climate 
Strategy adopted by the EIB in December 2015. See EIB (2015b).
Figure 7.5: EU climate fi nance to developing 
countries, 2010-2016
Th e EU is not only the world’s biggest donor 
in terms of total ODA but it has also become 
the biggest donor in terms of climate fi nance. 
According to the data compiled by the OECD’s 
DAC based on the Rio Markers methodolo-
gy,101 the EU institutions and the EU countries 
accounted together for 59% of the bilateral climate 
fi nance provided by DAC donors to developing 
countries in the period 2010-2016, with the share 
having increased from 57% in 2000 to an average 
of 62% in 2015-206 (see Figure 7.5). In 2016 alone, 
they provided a total of nearly EUR 23 billion in 
bilateral climate fi nance to developing countries. 
Th is rapid increase has been spearheaded by the 
EU institutions, which multiplied by fi ve their 
climate fi nance to developing countries during 
that period, although EU countries continue to 
account for the bulk (over two thirds) of the EU’s 
total. In recent years, the share of climate fi nance 
in total EU ODA has increased signifi cantly, 
reaching 29% of it in 2015-2016 (Figure 7.5).
Th e EU budget, in particular, has been devoting 
an important share of its expenditure to climate 
change programmes and, as noted, the Commis-
101 Th e Rio Markers on climate change mitigation and 
adaptation were introduced in 1998 and 2010, respectively, 
and help determine whether a given project can be classifi ed as 
contributing to climate change mitigation (because it reduces 
or limits greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or enhances GHG 
sequestration) or adaptation (because it reduces the vulnerability 
of countries to the impact of climate change). See OECD DAC 
Rio Markers for Climate. Handbook, (https://www.oecd.org/dac/
environment-development/Revised%20climate%20marker%20
handbook_FINAL.pdf).
Source: Creditor Reporting System, OECD.
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ment climate fi nance provided by those six MDBs 
in that year. Table 7.1, for its part, shows that, by 
2017, climate fi nance projects accounted for 27% 
and 38% of the total lending committed by the 
EIB and the EBRD, respectively, to developing 
and transition countries.
Th e EU is increasingly leveraging climate invest-
ments from MDBs and the private sector in the 
context of blending operations supported with 
grants from its regional blending facilities, as it 
does through the EEIP. Between 2007 and 2014, 
these facilities provided more than EUR 1 billion 
oping and transition countries provided by the 
six main MDBs since 2011, based on the most 
recent (2017) Joint Report on Multilateral De-
velopment Banks’ Climate Finance produced by 
these six banks using commonly agreed method-
ologies for tracking climate mitigation and ad-
aptation projects.106 Figure 7.6 shows that the EIB 
and the EBRD together provided (in terms of new 
commitments) over USD 10 billion of climate 
fi nance to developing and transition countries in 
2017 alone, accounting for 29% of the develop-
106 See EBRD et al. (2018).
Figure 7.6: MDBs’ climate fi nance to developing and transition countries, 2011-2017
(In USD million)
Source: 2017 Joint Report on Multilateral Development Banks Climate Finance (EBRD et al., 2018). 
Note:  For 2016 and 2017, the EIB includes climate fi nance provided to 12 EU countries, namely, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. Th e EBRD includes climate fi nance provided 
to Greece.
Table 7.1: MDBs’ climate fi nance to developing and transition countries, 2017
(In USD millions, unless otherwise indicated)
Source: Joint Report on Mulitateral Development Banks’ Climate Finance (EBRD et al., 2018).
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in grants for climate change-related projects in 
developing countries, triggering a total invest-
ment of about EUR 25 billion, and their con-
tribution to climate change projects is expected 
to double between 2014 and 2020 (European 
Commission, 2017f). Furthermore, one of the 
fi ve priority lending windows of the new EEIP 
focuses precisely, as noted, on climate change and 
should invest in countries that are key sources of 
migration pressures.
Th e EU is also by far the main donor to the 
plethora of multilateral climate funds created by 
the international community, which contributed 
USD 2.8 billion to the new global climate fi nance 
provided to developing countries in 2016.107 It 
accounts for about half the pledges received so far 
by those climate funds, which compares to a share 
of about 20% pledged by the United States (see 
Table 7.2). For some funds the EU contribution 
is even higher (e.g. 96% for the Adaptation Fund 
and about 75% for the Least Developed Countries 
Fund).
Th ese eff orts on the part of the EU refl ect its 
commitment to contribute its fair share towards 
the developed countries’ goal, agreed at COP16 
(Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreements 
reached by the Conference of the Parties of the 
UNFCCC), of making available by 2020 USD 100 
billion per year in climate fi nance to developing 
107 See Carbon Brief (2017).
countries through a variety of public and private, 
bilateral and multilateral sources of fi nance. At the 
Paris Agreement reached at the COP21, this goal 
was extended until 2025 and it was decided that a 
new collective goal would be decided before that 
year. And, indeed, substantial progress is being 
achieved by the international donor community 
towards that end. According to a recent report 
by the OECD (OECD, 2017), total bilateral cli-
mate-related development fi nance, including 
both concessional and non-concessional fi nance, 
has been on an upward trend since 2010 and 
surpassed USD 30 billion in 2016. Its share in total 
development fi nance has also been rising. To this 
must be added the climate fi nance provided by 
MDBs to developing countries (which the OECD 
estimates averaged USD 21.1 billion per year in 
2014-2015), the approximately USD 2.8 billion 
provided, as noted, by the multilateral climate 
funds in 2016 and the private sector climate in-
vestment in developing countries triggered by 
that public climate fi nance.108
108 Th e OECD estimates for the climate fi nance provided 
by MDBs are signifi cantly lower than those provided by the MDBs 
in their Joint Reports and shown in Figure 7.6 and Table 7.1. Th is 
seems due to several methodological diff erences. In particular, the 
fi gures in the MDBs’ Joint Report include climate fi nance directed 
to a number of transition countries that are not in the list of 
developing country benefi ciaries used by the UNFCCC Standing 
Committee on Finance in its Biennial Assessments of Climate 
Finance (so-called non-Annex I Parties). See note to Figure 7.6.
Source: Climate Funds Update dashboard (https://climatefundsupdate.org/data-dashboard/).
(1) Excludes income from investments and proceeds from sales of assets.
(2) Excludes the SCCF and the LDCF, as well as the Adaptation Fund, which, however, is administered on an interim basis by the GEF.
Table 7.2: Main Multilateral Climate Funds: size and contributors, 2017
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EU’s climate fi nance follows the same pattern: 
only 26% of the climate fi nance-related ODA 
provided by the EU during 2010-2015 targeted 
mainly adaptation, although the share of adapta-
tion shows a distinct upward trend. Moreover, the 
EIB and the EBRD are the two MDBs that devote 
the lowest share of their climate-related develop-
ment fi nance to mitigation (see Table 7.1). 
Figure 7.7: Bilateral and Multilateral Climate-
Related Development Finance, 2014-2015
To be fair, the share of public adaptation fi nance 
is larger for the poorest and most vulnerable 
countries and those countries received a larger 
share of their climate fi nance in the form of 
grants, as it should be. Th is is true both for the 
EU and for donors as a whole. Indeed, while mit-
igation fi nance tends to focus on middle-income 
countries and is largely channeled in the form of 
loans, adaptation fi nance tends to focus on the 
least developed and other low-income countries, 
as well as on the lower middle-income countries 
(see Figure 7.8 and OECD, 2017; pp. 8-11). Th ese 
two groups together received 62% of the global ad-
aptation fi nance provided to developing countries 
in 2014-2015. In per capita terms, SSA countries, 
Central American and Andean countries, some 
South-East Asian countries and the small island 
states were the main benefi ciaries, refl ecting their 
high vulnerability to the adverse eff ects of climate 
change. Nevertheless, there are still substantial 
unmet adaptation needs in these countries and in 
developing countries as a whole (UNEP, 2016). 
Committee on Finance in its latest Biennial Assessment show 
an even stronger concentration on mitigation (about 70% of 
public climate fi nance going to developing countries in 2013-
2014), particularly for the MDBs (more than 80% of their climate 
development fi nance). See UNFCCC (2016; p.6).
Looking ahead, the OECD (2016) projects that 
by 2020 developed countries’ public climate-re-
lated development fi nance will be close to USD 
67 billion (of which approximately USD 37 billion 
will be bilateral and USD 30 billion multilateral). 
Based on a simple extrapolation of the amount of 
private climate fi nance directly mobilized in the 
past by public climate fi nance, the OECD projects 
that total climate fi nance from developed to de-
veloping countries could be close to, although 
still somewhat below, the USD 100 billion target 
in 2020.
7.3 Scope for improvement 
in the composition of 
climate change finance
We have just seen that the EU and other donors are 
making great eff orts to help developing countries 
respond to the climate change challenge. While 
the main aim of these eff orts is to arrest the 
worrying climate change trends, they will also 
contribute indirectly to ease migration and forced 
displacement pressures by mitigating climate 
change-induced natural disasters and slow-onset 
environmental degradation and by making de-
veloping countries more resilient to their impact. 
But can the response be improved from the point 
of view of migration and refugee policy? Th is 
section argues that it can. It can be strengthened 
by reorienting the climate fi nance strategy in two 
ways: by shift ing resources towards adaptation 
and by fi ne-tuning the geographical allocation of 
climate fi nance.
Regarding the fi rst proposed reorientation, it 
refl ects the fact that, although climate change ad-
aptation is much more relevant for reducing forced 
displacement and voluntary migration because it 
increases the resilience of poor countries to the 
impact of climate change, the bulk of the climate 
development fi nance provided by the interna-
tional community is aimed at mitigation. Th us, 
according to OECD estimates, while 60% of the 
public climate fi nance provided by developed 
countries in 2014-2015 targeted mitigation, only 
27% of it targeted adaptation, while the remaining 
13% targeted both mitigation and adaptation. Th e 
focus on mitigation is particularly marked in the 
case multilateral climate fi nance, 73% of which 
went to mitigation projects (see Figure 7.7).109 Th e 
109 Th e data published by the UNFCCC’s Standing 




Increasing the share of climate fi nance devoted 
to adaptation would not only be helpful from 
the point of view of addressing one major root 
cause of forced displacement but it would also be 
consistent with the overall objective, enshrined 
in the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agree-
ments, and refl ected also in the Paris Agreement, 
to rebalance climate fi nance towards adaptation 
over time.110 Indeed, although mitigation is what 
really matters to arrest climate change trends 
and, therefore, should also help limit, over the 
medium term, forced displacement and migration 
pressures in developing countries, getting the 
mitigation-adaptation mix right is essential to 
cope with the implications of climate change. 
110 On the need to increase the share of adaptation in 
climate fi nance to the most vulnerable countries, see also UNDESA 
(2016). 
Figure 7.8: Climate-related developing fi nance, 
by income group, 2014-2015
(Shares in fi nance received by developing countries)
Source: OECD, Climate-Related Development Finance in 2016, December 2017.
Figure 7.9: Climate-related development fi nance by region
(2014-2015 average)
Source: OECD (2017).
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Regarding the geographical focus, there is 
currently an overwhelming concentration of 
climate-related development fi nance on Asia, 
which received 46% of total commitments in 
2014-2015 (see Figure 7.9), and a very sizeable 
share of climate fi nance (27%) is going to upper 
middle-income countries (see Figure 7.8). Th is is 
broadly appropriate since Asian and upper mid-
dle-income countries are responsible for a high 
share of the GHG emissions (because they are 
more industrialised) and also for a large share of 
the observed weather-related internal displace-
ments inside developing countries (because of 
their large populations and their high exposure to 
storms and river and coastal fl oods).111
Indeed, Asian countries account for an over-
whelming share of the internal displacements 
due to sudden-onset natural hazards (see Figure 
7.10). It is also reassuring that a relatively high 
share of adaptation fi nance is going, as noted, 
to the low- and lower middle-income countries, 
including SSA. However, also here there is scope 
for improvement by shift ing climate fi nance to 
some extent towards the poorer and most exposed 
countries, notably towards SSA, where the fatal 
combination of climate change, confl ict and poor 
living conditions makes it one of the main sources 
of forced displacement and irregular migration. 
Figure 7.10: New displacements due to natural 
disasters, by region, 2016
Source:  IDMC. 
111 Most of the cities with the highest exposure to coastal 
fl ood losses are located in South and Southeast Asia. See Hallegatte 
et. al (2016; p. 84).
Figure 7.11: MDBs’ climate fi nance to 
developing countries, by region
(2016-2017 average)
Source: 2016 and 2017 Joint Reports on Multilateral Development 
Banks’ Climate Finance.
Th e scope for regional reorientation is particu-
larly clear for the MDBs, which devote a very 
large share of their climate-related development 
fi nance to Asia and a very low share (only 12% 
in 2016-2017) to SSA (see Figure 7.11). Th e two 
European MDBs (the EIB and the EBRD) have 
contributed to this trend, in the case of the EBRD, 
because it does not have operations in SSA at all. 
Finally, another strategic consideration one could 
make, when trying to optimize the EU’s mix of 
external fi nancial instruments with migration and 
refugee policy in mind, is whether the EU should 
devote less to climate fi nance and more to other 
forms of assistance more directly targeting the 
socio-economic situation of potential migrants 
and refugees. Indeed, the EU has been devoting 
in recent years, as noted, more than one quarter 
of its ODA and of the EIB’s external lending to 
climate-fi nance related projects. Th is is a huge re-
orientation of its external assistance, achieved in 
little time. Is the EU not overdoing it given other 
pressing external priorities? 
Th e right answer to this question is probably 
negative. Th ere are several reasons for this. First, 
and as argued throughout this chapter, climate 
fi nance directly addresses one signifi cant source 
of forced displacement and potential migration 
and refugee fl ows. Second, climate fi nance to de-
veloping countries is also development fi nance. 
Indeed, there is ample evidence that natural 
disasters and slow-onset environmental degrada-
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tion greatly complicate poverty reduction efforts 
in developing countries.112 Moreover, climate 
finance, including that for mitigation, helps de-
veloping countries introduce modern and more 
efficient technologies that, for example, save 
energy or produce energy more cheaply. This not 
only helps the world climate but also the recipient 
countries’ economic efficiency and development. 
Third, in contrast to humanitarian assistance and 
other forms of income support provided through 
standard ODA, climate finance projects do not 
normally encourage migration by easing credit 
constraints. Finally, the effectiveness of the EU’s 
external development finance strategy, including 
with regards to migration, hinges, as noted, on 
ensuring an appropriate balance between different 
types of assistance. This includes not only human-
itarian, development and macroeconomic stabi-
lization assistance but also, and increasingly so, 
climate change assistance. The effort to provide at 
least one fourth of the EU’s assistance for projects 
with climate change relevance seems consistent 
with achieving such balance, and it is a welcome 
development from the point of view of migration 
and refugee policy.
112 See Hallegatte et al. (2016; Chapter 3). In particular, 
there is evidence that natural disasters tend to increase poverty 
and inequality because, as noted, poor people tend to be more 
exposed and normally lose a greater share of their assets and 
income when hit by disasters (see, for example, Karim and Noy, 
2014). 
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Figure 8.1: Remittance fl ows to developing 
countries, 1990-2019
Moreover, offi  cially recorded remittances (those 
shown in Figure 8.1) substantially underesti-
mate actual fl ows because they do not capture 
fl ows that occur through a number of informal 
channels operating outside the banking system. 
In particular, they do not include fl ows through 
so-called Alternative Remittances Systems, such 
as the Hawala system, used extensively in Middle 
East and South Asian countries, nor remittances 
transferred in cash by hand. Available estimates of 
the size of unrecorded remittances to developing 
countries in percent of offi  cial fl ows range widely, 
from a conservative estimate of 10% produced by 
the IMF (El Qorchi, Maimbo and Wilson, 2003) 
to estimates exceeding 100%.116
Th e EU is the second source of world remittanc-
es, accounting for approximately 24% of them. In 
2017, it sent an estimated EUR 148 billion of re-
mittances to developing countries, a volume just 
behind that of the United States (USD 149 billion) 
(see Table 8.1).117
116 Estimates tend to be higher (mostly in the 40-100% 
range) for SSA countries but much lower, and oft en negligible, for 
the Asian countries. See Page and Plaza (2006) for a comparison 
across regions. See Brown and Jiménez-Soto (2015; pp. 1084-
1089) for a general discussion on unrecorded remittances and a 
good survey of available estimates. 
117  Th e analysis here is based on the Bilateral Remittances 
Matrix estimated by the World Bank. Th e estimated outfl ows are 
substantially above offi  cial data on remittance outfl ows based 
on IMF Balance of Payments statistics supplemented with data 
8. The role of 
remittances
While this book focuses on the potential role of 
offi  cial fi nancial fl ows in migration and refugee 
policy, the role of international migrant remit-
tances cannot be disregarded. Although private 
in nature, remittances are a fi nancial fl ow that 
is directly related to both development and 
migration and is oft en seen as an alternative to 
ODA. Indeed, remittances have been growing so 
rapidly over the last two decades that they already 
dwarf ODA fl ows. Worldwide remittance fl ows 
have increased almost fi ve-fold since 2000 (from 
USD 126 billion in 2000 to USD 575 billion in 
2016)113 and their growth has been largely driven 
by fl ows to developing countries, which account 
at present for about three quarters of global remit-
tances. Larger stocks of migrants, rising incomes 
in developed countries and a reduction in the 
costs of transferring remittances have all contrib-
uted to this trend.
8.1 A financial ﬂow of 
growing importance
Figure 8.1, which displays data compiled by the 
World Bank, shows trends in remittances to devel-
oping countries since 1990. Aft er increasing very 
rapidly since the early 2000s and, despite some 
brief and moderate decline in 2009 (refl ecting the 
global fi nancial crisis) and, again, in 2015-2016 
(refl ecting lower transfers from oil exporting 
countries such as the GCC countries and Russia 
due to the downturn in oil prices), total remittanc-
es to developing countries (the vast majority of 
which come from developed countries) resumed 
a strong upward trend in 2017. On that year, total 
inward remittances to developing countries are 
estimated to have reached USD 466 billion, a new 
record. Th is is four times larger than total ODA 
and about 80% of the total value of FDI fl owing 
into developing countries.114 And the World Bank 
projects that this upward trend will continue in 
the coming years.115
113 IOM (2017b; pp. 30-31).
114 In fact, if China is excluded, remittance fl ows to 
developing countries also exceed signifi cantly FDI fl ows (World 
Bank, 2016d; p.16)
115 World Bank (2018a; pp. 3-6). 
Sources: World Bank (2018a); World Development Indicators.




to developing countries underline their potential 
importance in the EU’s external migration policy 
and the role the EU can and should play in inter-
national discussions on the matter.
Th e main remittance-receiving region is Asia, 
accounting for more than half of the remittances 
received by developing countries (see Table 8.2). 
Th is partly refl ects the dominant role of India and 
China, which are by far the largest recipients of 
remittances in the world, having obtained each 
well over USD 60 billion of remittances in 2017. 
But it also refl ects substantial remittances to other 
Asian countries (e.g. Philippines and Pakistan) 
that are also among the top ten global recipients. 
Aft er Asia, Latin America is the main benefi ciary 
region, led by Mexico, followed by the MENA 
region and SSA, in this order. Remittances have 
become very large for a number of countries 
in terms of their GDP, playing a crucial role in 
fi nancing both their balance of payments and 
their economic development. As can be seen in 
Figure 8.2, while the top recipients in dollar terms 
tend to be large countries, those that show the 
highest ratios of remittances infl ows over GDP 
and are, therefore, most dependent on them, tend 
to be small economies.
Th e other main source of global remittances are 
the GCC countries. Together, these three areas 
accounted for 66% of global remittances and 
for 67% of those sent to developing countries. 
Because a large share of the remittances sent from 
EU countries go to other EU countries (most of 
which are classifi ed as high-income countries), 
the share of the EU in the global remittances 
directed to developing countries is much lower 
(16.6%) than its share in global remittances and 
lower than that of the GCC countries. Despite 
this, the very large remittance fl ows from the EU 
from central banks. Th is partly refl ects the under-recording 
of outfl ows in offi  cial statistics. Th e estimates in Table 8.1 are, 
however, consistent with offi  cial estimates of remittance infl ows. 
For a discussion of the methodology behind the calculation of 
the World Bank’s Bilateral Remittances Matrix, see World Bank 
(2017c; Appendix A).
Table 8.2: Remittance infl ows received by low- and middle-income countries
(In USD billion and in percent of infl ows)
Source: World Bank (2018a).
Source: World Bank (KNOMAD). 
Note: Based on estimates of remittances outfl ows produced by the 
Bilateral Remittances Matrix. 
Table 8.1: Top remittance-sending countries or 
regions, 2017
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es depend on the accumulated stock of migrants 
living abroad rather than on the current fl ow of 
migrants. While the latter oft en responds rapidly 
to changes in economic conditions in destina-
tion countries the former responds much more 
slowly. Second, migrants make eff orts to sustain 
the transfers to their families even when the 
economic situation deteriorates in the destination 
countries and their personal incomes drop. Th ere 
is also evidence that migrants increase transfers to 
their families following natural disasters in their 
home countries (Yang and Choi, 2007; Brown, 
Leeves and Prayaga. 2014). For example, aft er 
the 1998 fl ood in Bangladesh, remittances helped 
smooth consumption and fi nance reconstruction 
(Mohapatra, Joseph and Ratha, 2009).
Th eir stability and the fact that they tend to 
increase when family dependants in the home 
country experience fi nancial hardship or a 
natural disaster makes them act as a sort of 
informal social safety net or insurance, which can 
alleviate migration (and forced displacement) 
pressures in diffi  cult times regardless of their me-
dium-term impact on growth and development. 
Several authors have stressed this point. For 
example, Brown and Jiménez-Soto, 2015 argue 
that although empirical evidence on the impact 
of remittances on economic growth and other 
key macro variables (including Gini coeffi  cients) 
might not be conclusive, microeconomic studies 
confi rm that remittances play a useful social pro-
tection role by putting in place an informal, fam-
absorption capacity of remittances, see Bugamelli and Paterno 
(2009), Chami, Hakura and Montiel (2009) and World Bank 
(2006a and 2015). 
8.1 Why remittances matter 
for migration
We have seen that global remittances are very 
large and that the EU is one of the main sources of 
remittance fl ows going to developing countries. 
But why are remittances important in the context 
of the EU’s migration strategy? Th ere are several 
reasons for it. First, because there is evidence, 
though not conclusive, that they can be an eff ective 
channel to foster economic development in poor 
countries and because, by complementing offi  cial 
ODA, they can help potential migrants reach the 
income threshold beyond which the propensity 
to migrate starts to decline. Regarding the fi rst 
point, while empirical evidence on the impact 
of remittances on economic growth and income 
inequality is mixed, the literature generally high-
lights positive impacts on education, health, 
nutrition and fi nancial development (see Box 2). 
But perhaps the most relevant eff ect of remit-
tances on migration has to do with their stabi-
lizing and social safety net properties. Indeed, 
remittances tend to be more stable than other 
international private fi nancial fl ows, and can 
even play a counter-cyclical role from the point 
of view of the recipient countries, as illustrated 
by the relative modest contraction that they ex-
perienced during the global fi nancial crisis when 
compared to the sharp declines witnessed in FDI 
and other private capital fl ows (see Figure 8.1).118 
Two factors help explain the relative stability 
of remittances even in the face of economic 
shocks in the sending country: fi rst, remittanc-
118 For evidence on the relative stability and shock-
Figure 8.2: Top 10 remittance-receiving developing countries, 2017
Source: World Bank (2018a).
In USD billion In percent of GDP
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Box 2: Remittances and development: a reading of the literature
There is a large body of empirical literature on the rela-
tionship between remittances and different measures 
of development in the receiving countries. Mohapatra 
and Ratha (2011), Brown and Jimenez-Soto (2015) 
and World Bank (2016d) provide useful surveys of it. 
The results of the literature focusing on the impact of 
remittances on economic growth are mixed. An early 
and often cited study produced by IMF staff (Chami, 
Fuellekamp and Jahjah, 2005), based on panel data 
for 82 developing countries for the period 1970-98, 
found a negative impact of remittances on growth. 
It explained the negative relationship by the moral 
hazard effect of remittances on labour supply (and in-
vestment in human capital) by the recipients of the re-
mittances. Other studies (e.g Azam and Gubert, 2006 
and Bussolo and Medvedev, 2007) have also found that 
remittances lower work effort and hence long-term 
growth. Remittances may also affect growth negative-
ly by putting upward pressure on the real exchange 
rate and causing Dutch-disease situations (e.g. Amue-
do-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004, for a sample of 13 Latin 
American countries). 
However, other papers have questioned the method-
ological approach of the studies just mentioned or/
and have detected a positive impact of remittanc-
es on growth. Lucas (2008), for example, has argued 
that the negative relationship could simply reflect 
reverse causality from lower growth to higher remit-
tances, consistent with the observed counter-cyclical 
behavior of remittances. He also questioned Chami et 
al.’s results because they ignored the impact remittanc-
es could have on growth through their effect on in-
vestment. Subsequent studies including investment as 
explanatory variable (e.g. Adelman and Taylor, 1990, 
for Mexico, and Bougha-Hagbe, 2004, for Morocco) 
generally found a positive effect of remittances on 
growth, and the effect was even stronger when con-
trolling also for institutional quality (Faini, 2002). The 
World Bank (2006a) and the IMF (2005) also found 
a positive or neutral relationship between remittanc-
es and growth. Moreover, some authors have found 
positive growth effects of remittances in countries with 
certain characteristics, e.g. Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz 
(2009) for countries with underdeveloped financial 
sectors, Singh et al. (2011) for countries with sounder 
political institutions and Feeny, Iamsiraroj and McGil-
livray (2014) for the small island states of Africa and 
the Pacific. 
In a recent, influential paper, Clemens and McKenzie 
(2018) provide three new explanations why macroe-
conomic studies have struggled to detect an effect of 
remittances on economic growth. First, much of the 
recorded rise in remittances may be illusory, reflecting 
measurement errors. Indeed, only about one fifth of the 
measured increase in remittances can be attributed to 
the observed growth of migrant stocks and income in 
countries of destination. Second, cross-country panel 
regressions may have too little power to detect the 
growth effect of remittances. Third, even if increases 
in remittances do raise GDP, they are typically as-
sociated with a relocation of labour from countries 
of origin to countries of destination, which in itself 
reduces the labour force and GDP in the former. The 
authors conclude that although remittances have clear 
first-order positive effects on migrant households’ 
welfare and global GDP, their effect on growth in the 
countries of origin is hard to detect econometrically.
The literature on the impact on inequality is also 
mixed. It generally finds that, although remittances 
contribute to increase inequality in the early stages of 
migration because only the relatively more skilled and 
well-off can afford the costs of migration, inequality 
tends to fall later on as diasporas and networks expand, 
facilitating the migration of poorer households. 
Other strands of the literature are more encouraging. 
For example, studies examining the impact of remit-
tances on education, health and nutrition outcomes in 
the home country come up, by and large, with positive 
results. Regarding education, quite a few studies (e.g. 
World Bank, 2006b; pp. 42-97; Edwards and Ureta, 
2003) have found that households receiving remit-
tances tend to invest more in education and have 
lower drop-out rates. This might be due to the fact that 
remittances ease the budget constraint and increased 
the motivation of recipient households to acquire 
skills for future migration. But it might also reflect an 
endogeneity bias through self-selection as households 
with higher school attendance rates and skill levels 
have a higher propensity to migrate and send remit-
tances home. 
Finally, the literature generally finds a positive effect 
of remittances on financial development, and some 
studies find that the resulting financial deepening 
improves the responsiveness of growth to remittances 
(Gupta, Patillo and Wagh, 2009; Mundaca, 2009).
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Martínez and Yang, 2010 and Gibson, McKenzie 
and Rohorua, 2006). Unfortunately, according to 
World Bank estimates based on its Remittance 
Price Worldwide database, which covers 365 
remittance corridors, while the average cost of 
sending remittances has been on an encouraging 
downward trend since the World Bank started to 
monitor and publish the cost of remittances in the 
late 2000s, it remains very high (see the first panel 
of Figure 8.3). The average cost of a transferring 
USD 200 internationally (inclusive of all fees 
and charges) was estimated at 7% in the second 
quarter of 2018, which is well above the 3% target 
set by the UN’s SDGs.120 Among the different 
regions, South Asia had the lowest costs, at 5.2%, 
while SSA continued to have the highest average 
cost (9.1%) (Figure 8.3; second panel). Target 10c 
of the SDGs commits signatory countries to: “By 
2030, reduce to less than 3 percent the transaction 
costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remit-
tances corridors with costs higher than 5%.”121 
Furthermore, at the EU-African Union Valletta 
Summit on Migration held in November 2015, 
the EU committed itself to a more ambitious goal 
by agreeing to substantially reduce remittances 
costs by 2020 in the main corridors between EU 
and African countries and within Africa.122 The 
situation in SSA is clearly inconsistent with these 
commitments. 
The reduction in remittance costs achieved 
since the late 2000s, while welcome, also under-
shoot the target announced by G-8 leaders at 
their summit of L’Aquila of July 2009, when they 
agreed to endeauvour to cut the global average 
cost of remittances from about 10% to 5% in five 
years (an undertaking that became known as the 
5 x 5 objective). The World Bank had estimated 
that a 5 percentage point reduction in the average 
cost of sending remittances could save migrants 
120 See World Bank (2018b). The World Bank also calculates 
a global weighted average cost of remittances, which takes into 
account the relative size of the flows in each remittance corridor. 
This weighted average has always been significantly below the 
global average, reaching 5.2% in the second quarter of 2018, 
although it has shown a similar downward  trend since 2008. This 
indicator is show as the red line in Figure 8.3.
121 See UN, Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform 
(https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg10). Reducing the cost 
of transferring remittances is also an objective of the UN’s global 
Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. See World 
Bank (2018a; p. 16).
122 See point 1(2) of the Action Plan of the Valletta Summit, 
11-12 November 2015 (https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/21839/action_plan_en.pdf).
ily-based system of transfers that contributes to 
alleviate poverty and provides essential support 
in times of hardship in the home country.119
Having said that, whether remittances will 
encourage or discourage migration will also 
depend, as it does for official aid, on where 
exactly the recipient country finds itself on the 
hump-shaped curve linking per capita GDP 
with migration. If a country is relatively poor (if 
it is situated in the positively slopped part of the 
curve), remittances may encourage migration 
by easing the budget constraint. In fact, when 
compared to ODA flows, remittances are likely 
to entail stronger network effects, which tend to 
encourage, as noted, further migration. Indeed, 
the migration of a family member sending re-
mittances brings very relevant information and 
logistical support for other family members or 
friends wishing to migrate. It also demonstrates 
the potential success of the migration decision. 
And perhaps more importantly, remittances ease 
the budget constraint of family members (such 
as wife and children) that would like to reunify 
with the migrant, helping them pay for the trav-
elling and settlement costs related to family re-
unification. All this could offset the stabilizing 
and social insurance advantages of remittances 
just discussed. Over time, however, the develop-
mental impact of remittances is likely to intensify 
and as the country reaches the position in the 
migration-income curve where the propensity to 
migrate declines, remittances should contribute 
to ease migration flows also through their income 
effect. 
8.3 An EU policy strategy 
for remittances
Given that remittances provide a useful social 
safety net for migrants’ relatives and are likely to 
encourage development and diminish migration 
pressures over time, the EU should support efforts 
aimed at facilitating their transfer, including 
by reducing their costs. Indeed, evidence from 
surveys and field experiments suggests that remit-
tance flows do respond to reductions in the cost 
of transferring them (see, for example, Aycinena, 
119 When compared to aid, remittances also have 
the advantage that they do not have to go through complex 
administrative mechanisms to be delivered. Instead, they flow 
directly and rapidly to the families of migrants and are therefore, 
arguably, a more efficient way to meet the needs of the recipients.
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closer scrutiny of the informal money transfer 
systems favoured by migrants, such as Hawala. 
Th is tightening of regulations on Anti-Mon-
ey Laundering and Combating the Financing of 
Terrorism (AML/CFT) has tended to increase the 
costs of sending remittances. A major issue here 
has been the de-risking behavior of internation-
al banks, that is, their decision, under pressure 
from AML/CFT regulations, to close the accounts 
of Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) such as 
Western Union and MoneyGram in order to limit 
the risk of money laundering and fi nancial crime. 
Th is is also preventing new, smaller operators 
with modern technologies from entering the 
market, which reduces competition (World Bank, 
2017c; pp. 5-6; World Bank, 2018a; pp. 6-8). 
De-risking could also push remittances back 
toward informal channels. In response to in-
creasing concerns about the impact of de-risking 
on remittance costs, the G-20 has been working 
closely with the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
and the Financial Action Task Force to identify 
possible solutions.126 Addressing de-risking is also 
an explicit objective of the above-mentioned 
G-20’s Financial Inclusion Action Plan.
Another problem, aff ecting the EU in particu-
lar, is the existence of exclusivity partnerships 
between national post offi  ces and a single MTO 
or other fi nancial intermediaries for the conduct 
126 In November 2015, the FSB launched an action plan 
to assess and address the decline in correspondent banking and 
it has reported regularly on its implementation since then, most 
recently in March 2018 at a meeting of G-20 Ministers of Finance 
and Central Bank Governors. See FSB (2015 and 2018).
up to USD 16 billion a year (https://remittance-
prices.worldbank.org/en). Since the mid-2000s, 
the G-8 and the G-20 have been coordinating 
world eff orts to reduce the cost of remittances. 
In addition to the G-8’s L’Aquila target, which 
was subsequently endorsed by the G-20, these 
eff orts have included, inter alia: the launching in 
2008 of the above-mentioned Remittance Price 
Worldwide database, in order to monitor trends 
in the price of sending remittances; the creation of 
the Global Remittances Working Group in 2009; 
the development by the World Bank and the Bank 
for International Settlements of a set of General 
Principles for International Remittances Services; 
and the adoption by the G-20 of several action 
plans. In 2014, G-20 leaders agreed on a Plan to 
Facilitate Remittances Flows123 and committed to 
implementing National Remittances Plans, which 
are reviewed annually and updated every two 
years.124 Th e 5 x 5 objective has now been super-
seded by target 10c of the SDGs, which has also 
been included in the G-20’s Financial Inclusion 
Action Plan, as updated in 2017.125 As a member of 
the G-8 (now the G-7) and the G-20, the EU has 
been supportive of all these eff orts.
One serious problem encountered by the ongoing 
eff orts to reduce remittance costs is that, with the 
threat of international terrorism rising since the 
September 2011 attacks, there has been a much 
123 https://bit.ly/2OGqrcd.
124 For an overview of the National Remittances Plans, see:
https://bit.ly/2I6vIr5.
125 https://bit.ly/2Nzvfnl.
Figure 8.3: Trend in the cost of sending $200 of remittances and situation by region
Source: Remittance Prices Worldwide, World Bank.
Note: EAP = East Asia and Pacifi c; SA = South Asia; LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; MENA = Middle East and North
Africa; SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa; ECA = Europe and Central Asia.
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countries to do the same as part of the initiatives 
agreed in multilateral fora. The EU has made 
some progress in this direction, notably through 
the entry into force of the Payment Services 
Directives of 2007 and 2015, which although 
focused on intra-EU money transfers had the 
advantage of increasing competition among 
payment service providers and (especially the 
second Directive, which applied also to one-leg 
transactions involving non-EU countries) limited 
of international transfers of remittances. While 
many developing countries forbid these exclu-
sivity contracts, the EU continues to allow them 
despite the fact that they stifle competition and 
tend to increase remittances fees (see World Bank, 
2017c; pp. 4-5, and Ponsot, 2011).
The analysis above suggests that the EU should 
do more to reduce the cost of sending remittanc-
es, and that it should encourage other developed 
Box 3: Why the EU’s Payment Services Directives should help reduce remittance costs
Since 2007, the EU has taken a number of steps to 
reduce the cost of intra-EU payments while increas-
ing transparency, security and consumer protection. 
Progress has been particularly marked in the case 
of cashless payments in euros, with the creation of a 
so-called Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), covering 
the EU countries and six other European countries 
and territories. This box focuses on the aspects of this 
legislation that might have a favourable impact on re-
mittance costs.
The first EU Payment Services Directive (PSD1; 
2007/64/EC) was adopted in 2007 and entered into 
full effect in November 2009. It applies to the whole 
European Economic Area, including the EU as well 
as Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway (European Par-
liament and EU Council, 2007). By introducing a new 
category of payment service providers—the so-called 
“payment institutions”—it eased access to new market 
entrants, thus increasing competition and consumer 
choice. This has helped reduce transaction fees. The 
Directive also increased transparency obligations, in 
particular by banning implicit fees. These obligations 
only applied to “two-leg transactions”, that is, to trans-
actions in which the two institutions involved (those 
of the payer and the payee) are located in the EU. 
However, when transposing the Directive into national 
legislation, some EU countries extended those obliga-
tions to “one-leg transactions,” with potential positive 
effects on international remittances. 
In addition, the Directive of 2007 laid the ground 
for the introduction of the SEPA, which harmo-
nized and made faster, cheaper and safer cross-bor-
der bank payments in euros between the 32 par-
ticipating European countries. The creation of the 
SEPA was supported by the adoption of Regulation 
(EC) 924/2009, which required charges applied to 
cross-border payments in euros or other EU cur-
rencies to be the same as those for corresponding 
payments within the EU country undertaking them, 
and Regulation 260/2012, which harmonized condi-
tions for electronic credit transfers and direct debits 
in euros, including for transfers to countries outside 
the euro area.
In 2015, the EU adopted a more ambitious Payment 
Services Directive (PSD2; (EU) 2015/2366), which 
had to be transposed into national law by EU 
countries by January 2018 and superseded PSD1 
(European Parliament and EU Council, 2015). The 
new directive extended the information and trans-
parency obligations to payments to and from non-EU 
countries (“one-leg” transactions), as well as to 
payments involving non-EU currencies. It also incor-
porated new categories of payment service providers 
(such as internet and mobile payment providers), 
which were previously unregulated but that have 
brought innovation and competition to the market 
by offering cheaper payment options. The PSD2 was 
complemented by a new Regulation ((EU) 2015/751) 
that limits fees for transactions based on credit cards 
and banned retailers from imposing surcharges on 
customers. By increasing competition and extending 
most of the transparency obligations and caps on fees 
to payments to third countries and in third currencies, 
the PSD2 is expected to help reduce also the cost of 
international remittances. 
While these legislative changes are mainly relevant 
for intra-EU payments (including intra-EU migrant 
remittances), some of them are also applicable, as 
noted, to remittance transfers towards non-EU 
countries. Moreover, by promoting competition and 
structural change in the electronic payments market 
and transparency in fee-setting practices, they should 
help reduce the cost of international remittances 




Another idea is to encourage the use of remittanc-
es or the repatriation of other capital to finance 
productive investments at home. The EU and 
other countries have already put in place schemes 
to stimulate the establishment of business by en-
trepreneurial migrants in their countries of origin, 
as part of their co-development policies, but their 
impact has so far been mixed (see Gubert, 2014; 
pp. 134-137).128 There is scope for fine-tuning and 
allocating more funds to these schemes. 
Finally, EU countries should refrain from taxing 
remittance transfers. In addition to increasing 
the cost of remittances, taxing remittances would 
amount to double taxation, since migrant income 
is already subjected to personal income taxation 
in the host country, and would be highly regres-
sive. It would also contribute to drive remittance 
flows into informal, unregulated channels, with 
also a negative effect on tax collections.129
offered by diaspora bonds, see Ketkar and Ratha (2011).
128 Sometimes these schemes have been linked to policies 
to stimulate returns.
129 For a discussion of why taxing remittances is a bad idea, 
see World Bank (2017d; p. 4). Despite the arguments against, 
some developed countries and several US states have considered 
taxing remittance outflows, partly to raise revenue and partly 
to discourage undocumented migrants by imposing a fine on 
transfers by remitters without a legal status.
the fees they can apply to payment transactions 
(see Box 3). But it should now go beyond this 
and require financial intermediaries to reduce the 
cost of international transfers by migrant workers 
meeting certain conditions. It should favour 
competition among MTOs or other financial in-
termediaries, including by avoiding exclusivity 
partnerships with national post offices. It should 
also support an increased use of digital tech-
nologies such as smartphones and computers 
among migrants, which allow cheaper and more 
convenient online transfers. All this should go 
hand-in-hand with regulatory changes ensuring 
that remittance transfers are properly recorded 
statistically and do not weaken the fight against 
tax evasion, anti-money laundering and coun-
ter-terrorism financing. But this should be com-
patible with a simplification of AML/CFT regu-
lations for small-value transfers, where the risks 
are more limited, as some experts are proposing 
(Mohapatra and Ratha, 2011; pp. 38 and 41).
In addition to taking regulatory measures to help 
reduce the cost of remittances, the EU could 
promote the mobilization of both remittanc-
es and migrant savings to finance development 
in the countries of origin of migrants. Indeed, 
migrants from the developing world not only 
transfer to their home countries, as noted, more 
than USD 450 billion in remittances each year 
but they also save large amounts of money that 
remain in their countries of destination. One idea 
recommended by experts is the use of diaspora 
or remittances bonds. For example, Ratha and 
Plaza (2011) argue that, with the African diaspora 
saving an estimated USD 53 billion annually, if 
every one in ten members of that diaspora could 
be persuaded to invest USD 1,000 in such bonds, 
Africa could raise USD 3 billion a year to finance 
development.127 The EU could facilitate invest-
ment in such bonds by migrants residing in the 
EU by easing applicable foreign exchange or tax 
regulations. 
127 Diaspora bonds are retail saving instruments 
marketed to diaspora members. They can be issued by either the 
governments or reputable corporations of the country of origin. 
They can be issued in small denominations to tap into the savings 
of relatively poor migrants, but also in larger denominations to 
attract the capital of wealthier migrants or diaspora groups, as well 
as institutional investors not necessarily related to the diaspora. 
Their funds may be earmarked to social or development projects 
that are of the interest of migrants (such as schools, hospitals 
and other projects directly benefitting their home communities), 
thus contributing to trigger a patriotic or emotional interest by 
diaspora members. For an in depth-discussion of the potential 
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discussed below, the developmental idea has not 
been sufficiently reflected in these compacts. 
Some observers have also seen the compact 
approach in the controversial EU-Turkey 
Statement of 2016, in which a substantial increase 
in EU financial assistance was agreed in exchange 
for Turkey’s commitments to take back asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants from Greece and 
to strengthen its border controls. But, like in the 
case of the compacts with SSA countries, the de-
velopmental and labour market access aspects of 
the agreement with Turkey have not been suffi-
ciently emphasized. 
Perhaps for these reasons, these compacts cannot 
be said to have been successful so far when it 
comes to fostering refugees’ economic integra-
tion and self-reliance, even though some of them 
might have been effective in stemming the flow 
of irregular migration to the EU. Moreover, as 
mentioned in Chapter 4 with reference to the 
EUTFA, the EU has sometimes been seen as 
acting in a purely defensive manner, using its aid 
mainly as a lever to obtain cooperation on border 
control or returns.131 
Migration or refugee compacts can increase aid 
effectiveness both by eliciting a regulatory and 
policy response on the part of recipient countries 
that is essential for the success of assistance 
packages and by facilitating coordination among 
donors. But for them to work, the approach must 
be developmental and supported by appropriate 
regulatory and structural reforms by recipient 
countries. After recalling the main arguments 
behind the compact approach to refugee pro-
tection, this chapter looks at the EU’s experi-
ence in channeling aid for refugee and migration 
purposes in the context of compacts or bilateral 
agreements, and makes some suggestions on 
how the approach could be strengthened. It 
also discusses the UN’s future Global Compact 
on Refugees, which could provide an appropri-
ate framework in which to apply the Compact 
approach in order to increase aid effectiveness in 
forced displacement situations. 
131 For example, in its 2017 annual report, the IDMC argues 
that the readmission agreement signed by the EU with the Afghan 
government in October 2016 focused on deportation, noting that 
the EU is understood to have threatened to strip Afghanistan of 
aid if it failed to cooperate (IDMCa, 2017; p. 63; The Guardian, 
2016).
9. Increasing aid 
effectiveness 
through compacts 
In recent years, a number of scholars, policy-mak-
ers and institutions have been advocating a fun-
damental shift in the assistance approach to the 
refugee crisis as part of a more general rethink-
ing of the international refugee system, which 
is considered to be dysfunctional. Authors such 
as Betts and Collier (2017) from Oxford Uni-
versity, and institutions such as the World Bank 
have been calling for a developmental approach 
in which refugees are given the right to work 
formally and to access public services in countries 
of first asylum and in which traditional refugee 
camp-based humanitarian assistance is replaced, 
at least in part, by development support and 
private sector encouragement, including through 
trade preferences. This approach is sometimes 
known as the “compact approach” and it inspired 
the Compact agreed between the EU and Jordan 
in 2016.130 It is also behind the Comprehensive 
Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) adopted 
by the UN in September 2016, as a building block 
towards the Global Compact on Refugees. 
While these ideas and initiatives have focused 
on the refugee issue, the compact approach, in 
the sense of a deal in which donors provide de-
velopmental assistance and other policy incen-
tives in exchange for commitments on the part 
of recipient countries to collaborate on migration 
issues, is also applicable to other migration sit-
uations. And, indeed, the EU has used the term 
compacts to refer to the bilateral cooperation 
agreements on migration signed with a number 
of (mostly SSA) countries under the new Part-
nership Framework with Third Countries on 
Migration adopted in June 2006, which is meant 
to offer increased financial assistance and a 
possible opening of new legal migration pathways 
in exchange for commitments on migrant returns 
and the fight against irregular migration on 
the part of the EU’s partners. Unfortunately, as 
130 The new approach was also reflected in a Communication 
on forced displacement adopted by the European Commission 
in April 2016. The Communication proposed overcoming 
protracted situations of aid dependency “by fostering self-reliance 
and enabling the displaced to live in dignity as contributors to 
their host societies, until their voluntary return or resettlement” 
(European Commission, 2016c; p. 2)
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and to integrate in their host countries but also 
prevents the latter from benefitting from refugees’ 
skills and potential economic contribution. 
Moreover, it makes it harder for the refugees to 
develop or maintain the skills that will be needed 
to reconstruct their countries after the conflict 
that led them to flee is over.
The new approach, which has been gaining 
ground in recent years, proposes to overcome 
this humanitarian model and to adopt a devel-
opment-based model of refugee protection that 
sees refugees also as an economic opportunity for 
the host countries. Under this approach, refugees 
must be given the right to work formally outside 
refugee camps and to access the host countries’ 
basic public services, in particular education and 
health care. This new model, sometimes referred 
to as “the Compact approach,” is often linked to the 
proposal to employ refugees in special economic 
development zones (either already existing or 
to be created) with financial support from both 
donors and private investment, in some cases 
backed up by the granting of special trade pref-
erences for products manufactured in them. This 
is, indeed, the approach followed until now in the 
case of the EU-Jordan Compact. But the compact 
approach does not require the concentration of 
refugee employment in economic zones.
9.2 The EU-Jordan Compact
The EU-Jordan Compact represents perhaps the 
best example of the new approach to refugee pro-
tection. Proposed by the Jordanian authorities in 
the run-up to the London conference of February 
2016 on “Supporting Syria and the Region” (see 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2016) and for-
malised a few months later, it is essentially an 
agreement by the EU to increase very substan-
tially its assistance to Jordan and to ease the rules 
of origin applicable to its exports to the EU in 
exchange for commitments by Jordan to facilitate 
the access of Syrian refugees to formal employ-
ment opportunities and to its educational system 
(EU Council, 2016b).
The EU’s assistance package agreed in the 
EU-Jordan Compact was in fact part of a wider 
compact (sometimes referred to as the “interna-
tional compact” for Jordan) agreed at the London 
conference, which also entailed a large increase 
in assistance from other bilateral and multilater-
9.1 Compacts as a 
developmental approach to 
refugee protection
The new approach to refugee protection (Betts 
and Collier, op. cit.; World Bank, 2017e; CGD 
and IRC; 2018), starts with the observation that 
over 85% of world refugees and the overwhelm-
ing majority of IDPs live in developing countries, 
with most refugees actually remaining in neigh-
bouring countries. The new approach is also 
based on the realization that most refugee (and, to 
a lesser extent, internal displacement) situations 
are very protracted. Indeed, the average duration 
of refugees’ exile in 2015 was about ten years, with 
about half of the refugees having been in exile for 
at least four years (World Bank, 2017e; p. 5).
And yet, while most refugees tend to stay close 
at home, developed countries spend much more 
money on the asylum seekers that come to their 
territories than on the refugees that stay in de-
veloping countries.132 Moreover, because refugee 
situations are so protracted, the current interna-
tional model of refugee protection for the 85-90% 
of refugees that remain near their countries of 
origin has turned into a humanitarian assistance 
system that excessively relies on the provision 
of food, clothing and shelter within refugee 
camps run by the UNHCR. Refugees are often 
not allowed to work formally or move freely 
and they lack access to the host country’s basic 
public services such as education and health, even 
though this goes against the UN’s 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol. In this context, 
camps that were initially meant to be temporary 
often become permanent while refugees experi-
ence an erosion of skills and aspirations, creating 
a sense of frustration and alienation. Many, if 
allowed, decide to leave the camps and move to 
cities, often renouncing at least part the human-
itarian assistance they get in the camps, in the 
hope of finding an informal job and recover their 
economic autonomy. But they face little support 
from the host authorities, which often restrict 
legally or make it expensive and cumbersome to 
get the necessary work and residence permits. 
This system not only constrains the refugees’ 
capacity to become economically autonomous 
132 Thus, Betts and Collier (op. cit.; p. 129) estimate that the 
world spends USD 123 on a refugee living in developed countries 
for each US dollar spent on a refugee living in developing 
countries.
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Syrian refugees (estimated to account for about a 
quarter of Lebanon´s population), most of them 
Sunni Muslims, is seen in Lebanon as a potential-
ly destabilizing development. While a Compact 
entailing a substantial increase of financial as-
sistance was also agreed between the EU and 
Lebanon following the London Conference, it 
did not include trade concessions. Nor were such 
measures granted to the other countries partici-
pating in the London conference. 
Efforts to create jobs for Syrian refugees under 
the EU-Jordan compact are being supported by 
several policy-based budget support operations 
and substantial technical assistance from the 
EU and other donors. Policy based operations 
include: a EUR 55 million budgetary support 
grant financed by the ENI, which includes con-
ditionality on the employment of Syrian refugees 
in the 18 designated areas and on the issuance of 
work permits to Syrian refugees in the economy 
as a whole; the second MFA operation mentioned 
in Chapter 5, which, as noted, is conditional on 
progress with the implementation of the rules 
of origin scheme; and a USD 300 million Pro-
gramme-for-Results operation from the World 
Bank co-financed by the GCFF, which targets 
progress with the issuance of work permits to 
Syrian refugees in the economy as a whole. 
Regarding technical assistance, the German de-
velopment agency and the US Agency for Interna-
tional Development have put in place multi-mil-
lion programs to increase the competitiveness of 
Jordanian exporting firms, promote matchmak-
ing with EU firms, and help them take advantage 
of the rules of origin agreement. The EU and the 
ILO, for their part, have joined forces to support 
the creation of employment services and voca-
tional training programs that are general in scope 
but also assist the factories in the 18 designated 
zones. 
Despite these supportive measures and the col-
laboration of the Jordanian authorities, the 
results of the rules of origin scheme, and of the 
compact more generally, have been mixed until 
now. On the positive side, there has been substan-
tial progress with the issuance of work permits to 
Syrian refugees in the economy as a whole. Work 
permits issued to refugees increased from about 
4,000 in early 2016 to over 53,000 in September 
2018 (see Figure 9.1). This partly reflects a 
number of measures taken by the authorities to 
al donors. In fact, the total assistance pledged by 
donors at the London conference was the largest 
amount of money ever raised in a single pledging 
conference in response to a humanitarian crisis, 
and the pledges were augmented in two follow-up 
conferences. 133 However, while the internation-
al compact was essentially about financial aid, 
the EU-Jordan Compact also included, as noted, 
a trade concession by the EU, and this was the 
most innovative aspect of it. Specifically, the 
EU agreed to ease the rules of origin for certain 
Jordanian exports produced in 18 designated 
Special Development Zones and Industrial Areas 
provided that they employ a minimum share of 
Syrian refugees.134 The scheme entered into force 
in July 2016, initially for ten years. The EU also 
agreed that if Jordan meets Jordan’s own target, 
announced at the London conference, of formally 
employing 200,000 Syrian refugees across the 
economy, it will consider extending these more 
flexible rules of origin to the entire economy.135
Jordan, for its part, agreed to facilitate the formal 
employment of Syrian refugees, not only in the 
18 designated zones but in the economy more 
generally. It also agreed to provide free education 
in public schools to at least 140,000 Syrian 
children in 2016 and to at least 190,000 Syrian 
children by end-2017 and to provide access to vo-
cational training for Syrian refugees.
The EU considered offering a similar scheme 
to Lebanon in the discussions preceding the 
London conference. However, it appears that 
the Lebanese authorities showed reluctance 
to this approach, reflecting Lebanon’s particu-
lar political context. Indeed, the integration of 
133 At the London conference, donors (including the EU) 
pledged more than USD 53 billion for Syria and five neighbouring 
refugee-hosting countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and 
Turkey) for the period 2016-2020, over USD 12 billion in the 
form of grants and over USD 41 billion in the form of loans. 
While a significant part of the pledges was not allocated by 
country (especially for the loan pledges), Jordan was the second 
main beneficiary of the allocated grant pledges (after Turkey) and 
the main one in per capita terms. See Development Initiatives 
(2017). Donors made substantial additional pledges for these five 
countries at the follow-up conferences organized in Brussels on 5 
April 2017 (covering 2017-2020) and 24-25 April 2018 (covering 
2018-2020). See Development Initiatives (2018) and EU Council 
(2018b).
134 For a company to benefit from the scheme, Syrian 
refugees must represent at least 15% of its workforce in the first 
two years of application, and at least 25% of it thereafter.
135 For a more detailed description of this rules of origin 




Th ere are several reasons why the EU-Jordan rules 
of origin scheme has not had stronger eff ects on 
Jordanian exports and refugee employment. Th ey 
include the following (Temprano Arroyo, 2018): 
trade incentives are less attractive than those 
off ered by comparable preferential schemes, given 
that number of important competitors from Asia 
in the production of apparel and textiles already 
benefi t from preferential access to the EU market; 
there is a lack of Jordanian companies with the 
experience and marketing networks necessary 
for exporting to the EU the products that benefi t 
from the scheme, and meeting the EU’s technical 
standards for manufactured goods; Syrian 
refugees are reluctant to work in the designated 
zones for fear of losing their refugee status and 
associated cash assistance, for cultural reasons 
(notably in the case of women) and because they 
lack the necessary skills; and Jordan continues to 
impose sectoral quotas on the number of foreign 
workers that Jordanian companies can employ, 
which apply also to the sectors benefi tting from 
the rules of origin scheme. 
In an attempt to make the rules of origin scheme 
more eff ective, the European Commission 
proposed to the EU Council on 14 June 2018 to 
ease some of its requirements (European Com-
mission 2018n). In particular, it proposed to drop 
the requirement that Jordanian exports must be 
produced in one of the 18 designated zones and 
to postpone from the third to the fourth year 
the increase from 15% to 25% in the minimum 
share of Syrian refugees that companies wishing 
to benefi t from the scheme must employ. While 
these would be steps in the right direction, they 
are unlikely to aff ect fundamentally the eff ective-
ness of the scheme. Other options the EU could 
consider are to include processed agricultur-
al goods in the scheme and to continue to work 
with the Jordanian authorities to promote the 
employment of Syrian refugees in the Jordanian 
economy at large. 
Despite the mixed results, the EU-Jordan 
Compact represents a welcome change by the 
EU towards a more eff ective refugee aid strategy. 
Th e combination of a very large and interna-
tionally coordinated fi nancial assistance package 
and trade incentives has triggered a change in 
Jordan’s policy towards Syrian refugees’ access to 
its formal labour market and educational system, 
a change that would have been unthinkable only 
stimulate the issuance of work permits, including 
the waiving of the fee for the issuance of work 
permits (Howden, Patchett and Alfred, 2017; ILO, 
2017). On the other hand, many of those permits 
simply formalize the existing work situation of 
refugees, without entailing the creation of new 
jobs. Indeed, the majority of the Syrian refugees 
working in Jordan continue to do so informal-
ly and, at the recent rate of annual net issuance 
of work permits, Jordan is unlikely to meet its 
200,000 target before 2025.136 Moreover, the rules 
of origin incentives have, until now, had a disap-
pointing impact on the creation of jobs for Syrian 
refugees in the designated economic development 
zones. By November 2017, only ten factories had 
obtained the authorization to export under the 
scheme. Th e combined workforce of those ten 
factories was only 697 employees, of whom 233 
were Syrian refugees.137 By September 2018, two 
more companies had been authorized but of the 
12 companies participating in the scheme, only 
six were successfully exporting to the EU.
136 According to the World Bank (2016e; p. 61), between 
90,000 and 130,000 Syrian refugees were still working informally 
in Jordan in 2016. Other available estimates suggest that between 
85,000 and 331,000 Syrians worked in Jordan in 2017, of which 
only a small part had work permits (ILO, 2017; p. 29).
137 See Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 
of Jordan (2017).
Figure 9.1: Jordan -Work permits issued to 
Syrian refugees, 2016-2018
Sources: ILO, Jordanian Ministry of Labour and author’s own 
estimates.  
Note: Monthly changes in the stock do not coincide with monthly 
gross issuance because  work permits expire every 12 months.
Stock of work permits 
Monthly gross issuance of work permits
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• Any new irregular migrant arriving to the 
Greek islands from Turkey as from 20 March 
2016 was to be returned to Turkey.
• For every Syrian returned to Turkey from 
the Greek islands, another Syrian was to be 
resettled from Turkey to an EU country.
• Turkey was to take all the necessary measures 
to prevent new illegal crossing to the EU by 
sea or land routes.
• Once irregular crossings between Turkey and 
the EU ended or be substantially and sus-
tainably reduced, the EU would activate the 
so-called Voluntary Humanitarian Admission 
Scheme (to which EU countries contribute on 
a voluntary basis).
• Disbursements under the first tranche of the 
FRT would be expedited. Moreover, it was 
agreed, as noted, that, provided that Turkey 
met in full the commitments in the Statement, 
the EU would mobilise a second tranche of 
the same size (EUR 3 billion) by the end of 
2018.
In addition to the elements related to the refugee 
crisis, the EU offered Turkey to accelerate the im-
plementation of the visa liberalisation plan for 
Turkish citizens wishing to enter the EU, to work 
on the upgrading of the Customs Union between 
the two parties and to re-energise the negotia-
tions on the accession of Turkey to the EU.
Now, has the EU-Turkey Statement helped 
increase the effectiveness of the EU’s refugee- and 
migration-related financial assistance to Turkey? 
And is it consistent with the new developmental, 
compact approach to refugee protection?
The EU-Turkey Statement is often presented, 
notably by the EU institutions, as a success in 
that it produced a very rapid decline in irregular 
crossings from Turkey to Greece and in the 
number of lives lost at sea (see Figure 9.2). Reset-
tlements from Turkey to the EU also progressed 
steadily, with nearly 12,500 Syrian asylum seekers 
having been resettled in the two years following 
the adoption of the Statement, and a similar 
number of migrants having returned voluntarily 
from Greece (including its mainland) during that 
period, assisted by the EU’s Voluntary Return and 
Reintegration Programme (European Commis-
sion, 2018a; p.7; and 2018o; p.3). Moreover, the 
first tranche of the FRT was fully committed by 
a few years ago. And this change has produced 
some tangible (if only partial) results. From that 
point of view, the strategy seems appropriate even 
if it can be improved, and the EU should continue 
to work in this direction. As discussed below, the 
case of the Ethiopian Jobs Compact, within the 
UN’s CRRF, provides another opportunity to test 
the new approach. 
9.3 The EU-Turkey Statement
Another important cooperation agreement 
recently concluded between the EU and a third 
country that focuses on migration management 
and entails very substantial financial assistance 
is the EU-Turkey Statement. Announced at the 
EU-Turkey Summit of 18 March 2016, it was 
preceded by another migration-related statement 
between the two parties agreed in November 
2015, which activated a Joint Action Plan, and 
by the launching on that same month of the first 
tranche of the FRT. The main objective of the 
statements and the Joint Action Plan was to put an 
end, or to drastically reduce, the inflow of asylum 
seekers (mostly Syrians) and irregular migrants 
from Turkey to Greece, which had reached record 
levels in the final months of 2015, while opening 
legal and safe channels for the resettlement of 
refugees from Turkey to the EU.138 The significant 
additional financial assistance offered to Turkey 
(up to EUR 6 billion between the two tranches 
of the FRT) was meant to improve the human-
itarian situation and integration of refugees and 
to relieve pressures on host communities. But it 
should also be seen, together with other elements 
of the package (see below), as an incentive to 
persuade Turkey to cooperate.
They main migration-related elements of the 
March 2016 Statement were the following:139 
138 In the month of October 2015 alone, irregular arrivals 
on the Greek islands from Turkey had reached almost 200,000 
(European Commission, 2018o). At the time the second 
statement was agreed, Turkey was already hosting more than 2.5 
million Syrian refugees registered under the so-called temporary 
protection regime. By August 2018, their number had risen to 3.5 
million, according to the Turkish Ministry of Interior (http://www.
goc.gov.tr/icerik6/international-protection_915_1024_4747_
icerik). While 7% of these refugees reside in 21 camps established 
by the government in the South of the country, the overwhelming 
majority live in urban, semi-urban and rural areas. In addition, 
Turkey hosts about 300,000 refugees and asylum seekers from 
Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Somalia (European Commission, 
2018g).
139 EU Council (2016a).
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mitment to facilitate the access of Syrian refuges 
to employment, and although Turkey passed in 
2016 new legislation easing restrictions on the 
right of refugees to work formally, only about 1% 
of the more than 1.7 million Syrians of working 
age estimated to live in Turkey have been able 
to obtain work permits, refl ecting a number of 
de facto obstacles (İçduygu and Diker, 2017). 
Th e vast majority of Syrians working in Turkey 
continue to do so informally (as it is the case in 
Jordan and Lebanon). 
Another problem is that a lot of the increase 
in EU fi nancial assistance has focused on 
providing short-term relief to Syrian refugees 
to cover basic needs. Almost half of the EUR 3 
billion FRT has been allocated to humanitari-
an assistance projects, although some of these 
projects (e.g. the Conditional Cash Transfer for 
Education programme) are also likely to have a 
longer-term developmental impact. Moreover, 
while the developmental (non-humanitarian) 
part of the portfolio seems well conceived and 
comprises very relevant projects in the education 
and health sectors (including the construction of 
schools and healthcare centres), the part devoted 
to directly supporting refugees’ socio-econom-
ic integration (e.g. through vocational training 
and employment assistance) is relatively small. 
More could also be done to support the signifi -
cant and growing number of small companies in 
Turkey that are owned by Syrians (see Kadkoy, 
2018), which normally employ Syrian refugees 
and could facilitate their economic integration in 
a sustainable way.  
Th e insuffi  cient developmental and refugee in-
tegration emphasis of the fi nancial assistance 
provided under the EU-Turkey Statement is exac-
erbated by the lack of any mention of the potential 
role of the EIB. Th is contrasts, for example, with 
the EU’s fi nancial response to the Ukraine crisis, 
which, as noted, relied on several key fi nancial 
instruments, including a large increase in EIB 
lending as well as MFA, in addition to regular 
cooperation and humanitarian assistance. 
Moreover, Turkey is not a benefi ciary of the EIB’s 
ERI, nor of the EIPP (although it would become 
eligible for the EEIP if the European Commis-
sion’s proposal to expand its geographical scope 
in the context of the new MFF is adopted). In fact, 
in the context of the mid-term review of the EIB’s 
ELM, the EU decided to reduce markedly the 
end-2017, in 72 projects that delivered welcome 
relief for refugees and host communities in 
Turkey (European Commission, 2018g). On the 
other hand, the pace of returns of migrants from 
Greece to Turkey has been much lower than 
intended, refl ecting a backlog in the processing of 
asylum claims in Greece. With migrant arrivals in 
Greek islands continuing to amply exceed (despite 
their marked decline) the number of returned 
migrants, pressure on the hotspots’ reception 
capacity has remained acute. 
Figure 9.2: Sea the Turkey to Greece and 
fatalities in the East Mediterranean
Sources: UNHCR and Missing Migrants Project (IOM).
Despite the partial failure of the returns policy, one 
could argue that the provision by the EU of refu-
gee-related fi nancial assistance in the context of 
the EU-Turkey Statement made it more eff ective 
in terms of easing short-term migration pressures 
on the EU. Aid was somehow used as a bargaining 
chip to elicit more cooperation by a country of 
fi rst asylum to restrict irregular crossings from its 
territory. But the strategy was not really consis-
tent with the developmental approach advocated 
by the new literature on refugee protection. And 
this meant that its impact on the underlying, lon-
ger-term migration pressures was more limited. 
Th ere are several reasons for this. First, the 
approach was too defensive. Indeed, the policy 
commitments obtained from Turkey through the 
Statement were mostly about restricting irregular 
crossings to the EU, mainly through tighter 
border management and surveillance, and about 
Turkey accepting the return of irregular migrants 
to its territory. Although the EU-Turkey Joint 
Action Plan of November 2015 included a com-
EU-Turkey 
Statements
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temporarily placed in detention centres and 
many cannot submit an international protection 
application because they are not provided with 
the necessary information or legal and logisti-
cal support. Thus, the European Commission 
(2017g) reported in September 2017 that only 57 
out of the 1,144 non-Syrian migrants returned to 
Turkey since the date of the EU-Turkey Statement 
had applied for international protection, of which 
only two had been granted, by then, refugee status. 
The majority (831) had been repatriated to their 
countries of origin (on this point, see also Alpes 
et al., op. cit, and Amnesty International, 2016).
The shortcoming just mentioned might be part of 
a more general problem underlined by the critics 
of the EU-Turkey Statement, namely the insuf-
ficient guarantees provided by Turkey’s refugee 
legislation. While Turkey has ratified the 1951 
Refugee Convention, it applies a geographical 
limitation restricting its protection to nationals 
of countries that are members of the Council of 
Europe. Although it adopted in 2013 and 2014 
two pieces of legislation providing the status of 
either “temporary refugee” (for Syrian nationals) 
or “conditional refugee” (for other non-European 
nationals), these are granted under the assump-
tion that refugees will eventually be resettled or re-
patriated, and entail (de iure or de facto), particu-
larly for conditional refugees, certain restrictions 
regarding access to public services, employment 
and family reunification (Amnesty International, 
op. cit.). Moreover, according to Amnesty Inter-
national (2017), the legal protection of these two 
refugee categories has been weakened as a result of 
legislation adopted under the state of emergency 
that followed the failed coup d’état of 2016.141 
141 For some critics, this legislation and Turkey’s actual 
asylum policies mean that Turkey may not be deemed to be a 
“safe third country” in the sense the EU’s Asylum Procedures 
Directive. An implication is that a decision by Greece to declare 
“inadmissible” asylum applications by irregular migrants coming 
from Turkey and to return them to Turkey, a possibility envisaged 
by the EU-Turkey Statement, would be in breach of such Directive 
and of the non-refoulement principle of international refugee law. 
The European Commission has assessed, however, that Turkey can 
be deemed to be a “safe third country,” and/or a country of first 
asylum meeting the Asylum Procedure Directive’s requirements, 
for the purpose of returning irregular migrants from Greece 
to Turkey. Also, Turkey has provided written assurances that 
returned Syrians will be granted temporary protection and 
that non-Syrians will enjoy protection from non-refoulement 
(European Commission, 2016d). The issue was taken up by several 
Spanish NGOs and citizens to the European Ombudsman, who, 
on 18 January 2017, issued a Decision calling on the Commission 
ceiling for the pre-accession countries, reflecting 
concerns about excessive risk exposure to Turkey 
and political misgivings on the part of the EU 
following the Turkish government’s reactions to 
the failed coup attempt of July 2016.
The EU-Turkey Statement also fails to incor-
porate trade incentives related to refugee em-
ployment, in contrast with the EU-Jordan 
Compact. This is despite the fact that Turkey 
has itself shown interest in that type of preferen-
tial scheme. Thus, in a letter sent in August 2017 
to seven key members of the WTO, including 
the EU, Turkey proposed to grant preferential 
treatment to certain exports of countries hosting 
large numbers of refugees, provided that they are 
manufactured by companies employing refugees 
(Temprano Arroyo, op. cit.; pp. 29-31).140 While 
Turkey’s exports of industrial goods and of many 
processed agricultural goods already entered 
the EU free of duties and quotas by virtue of its 
customs union with the EU, the EU could con-
sidered granting preferences to Turkish exports 
of primary and some sensitive, non-processed 
agricultural products that have not yet been fully 
liberalized. Or it could support Turkey’s WTO 
initiative, which could also benefit, for example, 
Turkey’s apparel and textile exports to other 
countries (such as the United States), two sectors 
where many Syrian refugees are either employed 
or have the necessary skills (ibid.; p. 30).
Last but not least, another shortcoming of the 
EU-Turkey Statement is that if, as some observers 
contend, migrants returned to Turkey receive 
insufficient legal protection and access to public 
services and employment, many may decide to 
either return to their countries of origin (even 
if the political and economic situation remains 
unstable) or try again to come into the EU. 
Indeed, there is evidence that Syrians readmitted 
to Turkey and receiving “temporary protection 
status” find it often difficult to register in order 
to get the temporary protection cards needed to 
access public services or formal employment. As 
a result, some decide to return to Syria or to pay 
a smuggler to re-enter the EU (Alpes, Tunaboylu, 
Ulusoy and Hassan, 2017). Also, non-Syrian 
migrants returned by the Greek authorities to 
Turkey in accordance with the Statement are 
140 The proposal was tabled at the WTO Ministerial 
Conference of Buenos Aires in December 2017 but received only a 
cautious reaction by WTO countries. 
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on migration issues with third countries, which 
included a series of high-level dialogues with 
some countries, a regular and structured dialogue 
with the Western Balkans, the Action Plan agreed 
at the EU-African Valletta Summit of November 
2015 and, last but not least, the EU-Jordan 
Compact and the EU-Turkey Statement just 
examined.
The Valletta Action Plan could be seen as a first 
cross-country attempt by the EU to apply the 
compact philosophy because the EU tried to 
encourage cooperation on migration and forced 
displacement from its African partners in 
exchange of increased financial assistance. Indeed, 
it was, as noted, precisely at the Valletta Summit 
that the EUTFA was launched.142 But some of key 
elements of the compact approach were missing, 
notably regarding refugee integration. While the 
Valletta Action Plan stressed the importance of 
adhering to and complying with the 1951 Refugee 
Convention and its 1967 Protocol, it included no 
explicit commitments by the African partners to 
facilitate access of refugees to their labour markets 
and basic public services.
The new Partnership Framework can be seen as an 
attempt to push the Valletta Action Plan beyond, 
both in terms of actions and geographical scope. 
However, although the initiative is addressed in 
principle to all developing and transition countries 
of relevance from a migration point of view, 
the Commission initially focused it on five SSA 
countries (namely Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria 
and Senegal), with which it proposed to conclude 
tailor-made bilateral compacts. The Communica-
tion also mentioned as priority countries Jordan 
and Lebanon, with which ad-hoc compacts had 
just been agreed, as well as Libya and Tunisia. 
The main declared objectives of the new Part-
nership are: i) to prevent irregular migration and 
smuggling; ii) to promote the return, readmis-
142 The Action Plan agreed at the Valletta Summit defined 
16 priority domains, covering pretty much all key aspects of 
migration and forced displacement. They included: increasing 
efforts to address the economic and political root-causes of 
irregular migration and forced displacement; strengthening 
the protection of refugees and other displaced people; fighting 
migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; opening new 
legal channels for migration; promoting student and researcher 
mobility; visa facilitation; and strengthening cooperation on 
returns and readmissions. The Action Plan also included, as noted 
in Chapter 8, new commitments to reduce the cost of transferring 
remittances. See https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21839/
action_plan_en.pdf.
In sum, while the EU-Turkey Statement has con-
tributed to make EU financial aid more effective 
in achieving some of its objectives, notably the 
short-term containment of irregular migrant 
inflows from Turkey, its approach is not suffi-
ciently developmental nor sufficiently orientated 
towards encouraging the economic and social in-
tegration of refugees in Turkey. Although the FRT 
has gone well beyond the traditional humanitari-
an assistance approach to refugee protection and 
its projects seem well focused and well designed, 
the EU’s overall assistance strategy is not suffi-
ciently focused on supporting refugees’ liveli-
hoods and integration, nor is it complemented 
by trade incentives. The commitments obtained 
from Turkey are excessively geared towards 
restricting irregular crossings and accepting 
migrants returned by Greece, as opposed to fa-
cilitating refugee integration, while the short-
comings of its asylum system, including the lack 
of long-term settlement prospects, weaken the 
capacity and motivation of refugees to integrate. 
The approach differs in part, therefore, from the 
Compact model proposed by the new literature 
on refugee protection.
9.4 The Partnership 
Framework with Third 
Countries on Migration
In an effort to strengthen bilateral cooperation 
with developing and transition countries on 
migration matters, the European Commission 
launched, through a Communication adopted 
in June-2016, what it called a new Partnership 
Framework aimed at implementing some of the 
objectives of the European Agenda on Migration 
adopted in May 2015 (European Commission, 
2016a). The importance of cooperating with key 
migration countries was obviously not new: it 
had already been stressed as part of the Global 
Approach to Migration the EU adopted in 2005, 
which had guided the EU’s external migration 
policies for years. But the new Partnership 
Framework was meant to make the approach 
more concrete and operational. The initiative also 
built on the efforts the EU had been making in the 
previous 12 months to strengthen collaboration 
to strengthen, in its forthcoming progress reports on the EU-
Turkey Statement, the assessment of its human rights impact and 
to foresee, where appropriate, mitigating measures (see European 
Ombudsman, 2017).
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migration to the priority partners. All this has 
contributed to one of the main weaknesses of the 
initiative, highlighted in the European Commis-
sion in its Fourth Progress Report on the Partner-
ship Framework, namely, the insufficient leverage 
and incentives to persuade partner countries to 
collaborate (European Commission, 2017h). 
To be sure, the total financial assistance made 
available for the countries covered by the Part-
nership, even if not new, is very substantial (as 
it is obvious from the analysis in Chapters 3 to 
5). Also, the EU’s new financial facilities have 
been, as noted, targeted in part towards dealing 
with the root causes of migration. But, unfortu-
nately, this financial assistance has not been, until 
now, linked to policy commitments on the part 
of recipient countries to facilitate the economic 
integration and self-reliance of displaced people 
and other vulnerable people such as returning 
and potential migrants. 
Not surprisingly, the initiative has only produced 
significant results in two of its four declared 
objectives, namely, the fight against irregular 
migration (notably smuggling) and, to a lesser 
extent, returns and readmissions. And even here 
progress has been mixed. Cooperation on the 
part of Niger in dismantling smuggling networks, 
combined with targeted support from the EU 
(including to provide alternative income sources 
to migrant smuggling in Northern Niger), con-
tributed to a decrease in the number of irregular 
migrants transiting through Agadez from 340 per 
day on average in 2016 to 40-50 per day in 2017 
(European Commission, 2018a; p. 13). Also, the 
number of crossings by irregular migrants to Italy 
through the Central Mediterranean route, the one 
used by most of the migrants that transit through 
the five priority countries, decreased to 118,962 
in 2017, a 34% decline, and decelerated further 
in the first seven months of 2018 (see Figure 9.3). 
This can partly be attributed to the cooperation 
agreements reached with these countries as well 
as with Libya and Tunisia. However, the coopera-
tion with Libya has been controversial, producing 
a humanitarian problem as conditions deteriorat-
ed markedly in the detention centres where rising 
numbers of irregular migrants where placed after 
Libya agreed to tighten control on irregular de-
partures from its coast. Moreover, efforts to block 
the Libya route have partly resulted in a deviation 
of irregular flows towards the Western Mediter-
ranean route, including via Algeria (Figure 9.3). 
sion and integration of irregular migrants; iii) to 
address the root causes of irregular migration; and 
iv) to incorporate these objectives and approach 
into other external instruments and policies of 
the EU (e.g. trade policy and external assistance). 
Indeed, the Communication mentions the pos-
sibility to link trade preferences, in particular 
the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)+, 
to the collaboration by beneficiary countries on 
migration matters. 
Similarly to the Valletta Action Plan, the 
EU-Jordan Compact and the EU-Turkey 
Statement, the commitments by partner countries 
were to be supported by an increase in financial 
assistance from the EU. And, indeed, the Com-
mission’s Communication made reference to the 
EUTFA, the Madad Fund, the FRT, the financial 
pledges announced a few months before at the 
London Conference on Syria, MFA, the EIB and 
the proposal to put in place the EEIP. The Com-
mission also mentioned the intention to better 
target aid on migration priority countries and to 
refocus the multiannual indicative programmes 
for these countries on migration projects. 
Despite the use of the term compact, however, 
this initiative is not comparable to the EU-Jordan 
Compact and the developmental approaches to 
migration and refugee policy proposed by the 
recent literature. There are several reasons for this. 
Firstly, despite the rhetoric, its focus so far has not 
been on measures to address the root causes of 
irregular migration or to support the economic 
integration of displaced people in countries of 
first asylum. Rather, the emphasis has been put 
on the first two of its stated objectives (the fight 
against smuggling and the promotion of returns). 
Secondly, the new Partnership has not really been 
accompanied by a quantum leap in financial as-
sistance from the EU. Indeed, with the exception 
of the EEIP, which was at the time still under 
discussion, none of the financial instruments 
mentioned in the Communication was new. In 
particular, the EUTFA, the Madad Fund and the 
FRT had already been committed and the pledges 
of the first London conference on Syria had 
already been made. Nor has the suggestion made 
by the Communication to consider trade policy 
measures to support the initiative materialized 
(the rules of origin scheme for Jordan had already 
been agreed when the Partnership Framework 
was launched). Last but not least, there has been 
little progress in offering new legal pathways for 
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Another problem regarding cooperation with 
Libya on border security and irregular migration 
is that it was initially based on a Memorandum 
of Understanding concluded on 2 February 2017 
between Italy and the Libyan authorities, rather 
than on an agreement with the EU.143 While the 
Memorandum of Understanding was endorsed 
by the EU immediately aft er, in the context of 
the Malta Declaration on addressing the Central 
Mediterranean route,144 and the EU provides 
substantial support to both Italy (logistical and 
fi nancial) and Libya (notably by supporting its 
national coast guard, enhancing its border man-
agement capacity and helping Libya fi ght migrant 
smuggling activities), the EU as such has not 
yet concluded any cooperation agreement or 
compact on migration with Libya. Th is is despite 
the fact that this country is obviously a priority 
for the EU’s migration policy. While this is in part 
due to the still fragile political situation in Libya, 
it would seem important for the EU to conclude a 
bilateral compact with Libya, including substan-
tial fi nancial assistance, to provide a framework 
for increased cooperation on migration matters.
Regarding returns, despite recent progress with 
the irregular migrants stranded in Libya, results 
have been rather disappointing as it has been 
very diffi  cult to encourage partner countries 
to cooperate and sign return and readmission 
agreements. While standard operation proce-
dures (SOPs) on returns have been signed with 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Guinea and 
Gambia, the EU has not managed to sign a single 
fully-fl edged, formal return and readmission 
agreement cooperation with any country since 
the Partnership Framework on Migration was 
launched and, in fact, there are no SSA countries 
among the 17 countries that have signed such 
agreements with the EU.145 For many partner 
countries, these agreements are politically 
diffi  cult, especially in a context where the EU is 
not doing as much as it was hoped to create new 
143 “Memorandum d’intesa sulla cooperazione nel campo 
dello sviluppo, del contrasto all’immigrazione illegale, al traffi  co di 
esseri umani, al contrabbando e sul raff orzamento della sicurezza 
delle frontiere tra lo Stato della Libia e la Repubblica Italiana” 
(http://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/Libia.pdf).
144 “Malta Declaration by the members of the European 
Council on the external aspects of migration: addressing the 
Central Mediterranean route” (http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2017/02/03/malta-declaration/).
145 For the list of countries with which the EU has signed 
formal readmission agreements, see https://bit.ly/2thDUfe.
Figure 9.3: Irregular entries to the EU: Central 
and Western Mediterranean routes
Th e EU has been trying to address the appalling 
conditions many migrants experience in Libya, 
in particular by helping them return home or by 
resettling them. Th us, a Joint African Union-EU-
UN Nations Taskforce set up in November 2017 
at the EU-Africa Summit of Abidjan has been 
helping, with the support of the International Or-
ganisation for Migration (IOM), many irregular 
migrants stranded in Libya (oft en in detention 
centres) return to their home countries, mostly 
countries in Central and Western Africa. Between 
end-November 2017 and early April 2018, it 
helped more than 15,000 migrants return to their 
home countries, bringing to nearly 25,000 the 
number of assisted voluntary returns from Libya 
organised since the start of 2017. In addition, 
over 1,300 vulnerable refugees have been 
evacuated from Libya (mostly to Niger) under 
the new EU-funded UNHCR Emergency Transit 
Mechanism, with the aim of being resettled in 
Europe. While these eff orts have signifi cantly 
eased the humanitarian situation in Libya, the 
EU’s cooperation with Libya on migration remains 
overly defensive, focusing on improving border 
management, restricting irregular migration and 
fi ghting smuggler networks, and lacks a substan-
tial developmental component and the support of 
sizeable fi nancial assistance package. 
Source: European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). 
Note: Th e last observation covers the six months from February to 
July 2018. For the Western Mediterranean route, includes arrivals 
via the Western African route, connecting Senegal, Mauritania 
and Morocco with the Canary Islands.
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levels, prolonging a downward trend observed 
since 2014, despite the incentives for enhanced 
collaboration that the Partnership Framework 
was supposed to off er (Figure 9.4).
Th e only eff ective way for the EU to persuade 
partner countries to strengthen their coopera-
tion on returns is by off ering new legal pathways. 
Th is should be part of a more general change 
in the EU’s migration policy aimed at gradually 
shift ing, particularly concerning fl ows from SSA, 
from irregular to regular migration. Political-
ly, it is the best way in which local governments 
can explain to their populations their decision 
to cooperate with the EU on returns. Increased 
fi nancial assistance and trade concessions can 
also help but they are constrained and should 
only come as complements to the opening of 
new legal pathways. Without new legal avenues 
for migration, increased fi nancial assistance can 
be seen by local populations as their govern-
ments agreeing to betray their citizens by coop-
erating with the EU on returns in exchange for 
cash handouts. Regarding trade concessions, 
the scope is limited by the fact that many of the 
priority countries of the Partnership Framework 
(notably in SSA) already enjoy a high degree of 
preferential access to the EU market under either 
the GSP or the Economic Partnership Agree-
ments.146 Th e Commission’s Communication of 
September 2018 on Enhancing Legal Pathways to 
146 For the potential use of development aid, trade 
agreements and legal pathways to support cooperation with 
third countries on returns, see MEDAM (2018; pp. 39-50). Th is 
legal pathways for migration. Moreover, their ne-
gotiation is complex and lengthy, requiring the 
Commission to obtain a mandate from the EU 
Council that normally takes about a year to be 
adopted. For some experts, formal readmission 
agreements are, in any case, much less eff ective in 
supporting returns than intended, even when the 
EU manages to conclude them (see Carrera, 2016). 
Th is refl ects a number of obstacles that aff ects 
their operability, notably technical problems with 
the identifi cation of migrants and the delivery of 
travel documents for their return.
Data on returns published by Eurostat (Figure 
9.4) confi rm that progress in this area has been 
very slow, both in the fi ve priority countries 
selected by the Partnership Framework and 
more generally. Th e Commission acknowledged 
this lack of progress in its report of May 2018 on 
the implementation of the European Agenda on 
Migration, noting that although there have been 
some increase in 2017 in the number of return 
decisions issued by EU countries (largely attrib-
uted to the completion with negative decisions of 
a large number of asylum appeals in the countries 
most aff ected by the refugee infl ow surge of 
previous years), this had been accompanied by 
a marked decline in the number of implement-
ed returns, resulting in a signifi cant decline in 
the rate of return (the ratio between eff ective 
returns and return decisions issued) from 45.8% 
in 2016 to 36.6% in 2017 (European Commis-
sion, 2018b). Th e rate of return also declined for 
the fi ve priority countries, and from much lower 
Figure 9.4: Return decisions and eff ective returns of third country nationals
Source:  Eurostat.
(1) Five countries selected as priorities of the EU’s Partnership Framework, namely Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.
(2) Th e rate of return is the ratio of the number of persons eff ectively returned to the number of persons issued with a return decision, 
irrespective of whether the return is voluntary or forced.
         Total for the EU              Citizens of 5 priority countries (1)
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to move from a humanitarian to a developmen-
tal approach to refugee protection in countries 
of first asylum. These commitments are known 
as the New York Declaration for Refugees and 
Migrants, which sets out the main elements of the 
new CRRF.147 The New York Declaration also calls 
for the adoption of a Global Compact on Refugees, 
comprising both the CRRF and a concrete action 
plan to ensure its implementation.148
At the heart of this approach is the idea that 
refugees should be integrated in their host com-
munities by giving them full access to the local 
labour markets as well as the local education and 
health systems, so that they can build their skills 
and become self-reliant, thus benefitting also the 
host communities and reducing their dependency 
on aid. The New York Declaration recognizes that 
refugee camps should be the exception and only 
a temporary response in situations of emergency. 
Instead, refugees should live among host commu-
nities. The CRRF is based on the Compact idea 
of a deal between host countries, which commit 
themselves to adopting legislation and policies 
ensuring the socio-economic integration of 
refugees, and the international donor community, 
which commits itself to increasing assistance to 
host communities and transforming it into de-
velopmental support. The UNHCR is given a 
leading role in managing the new system, which 
means that it must make an effort to modernize 
its organization and expertise to move beyond a 
purely humanitarian support agency and help co-
ordinate measures and assistance strategies aimed 
at promoting the economic autonomy and inte-
gration of refugees in host countries. The CRRF 
also stresses the use of new multilateral financial 
facilities, such as the IDA’s refugee window and 
the GCFF, designed, as noted, to support refugees’ 
self-reliance and host communities’ resilience, as 
well as the participation of the private sector.
Seven SSA countries (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia), most 
of which are among the top 20 refugee-hosting 
countries (see Annex 1), have already agreed to 
apply the CRRF as pilot cases. The new Framework 
will also apply, although through regional ap-
147 “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,” 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 19 September 
2016, A/RES/71/1 (http://www.unhcr.org/57e39d987). 
148 See http://www.unhcr.org/58e625aa7. The New York 
Declaration also foresees the adoption in 2018 of the “Global 
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration.” 
Europe (European Commission, 2018p) recog-
nises the importance of opening legal avenues for 
migration in order to ensure a balanced migration 
policy and as an incentive to improve cooperation 
by third countries on migration, including on re-
admission and returns, and proposes to develop 
pilot projects on legal migration with African 
countries. But with decisions on legal migration 
being in the hands of EU member states, the 
success of this initiative will hinge on the actual 
engagement and cooperation of their govern-
ments. 
In sum, the Partnership Framework initiative has 
not lived up to its ambitions. On the part of the 
EU, the associated increase in financial assistance 
and the commitment to open legal pathways 
to migration has not been enough to produce 
the necessary political response by recipient 
countries, and insufficient emphasis has been put 
on projects aimed at addressing the root causes 
of migration. The Framework, like the EU-Turkey 
Statement, has been too focused on defensive 
measures aimed at limiting irregular migration to 
the EU and supporting returns. It has also failed 
to engage the beneficiary countries into legal 
reforms and policies to support the socio-eco-
nomic integration of displaced and other vulnera-
ble people. Also, a more comprehensive approach 
with a key country like Libya, probably in the 
form of a bilateral compact entailing a sizeable 
financial assistance component, is still missing. 
The Partnership Framework should, therefore, be 
modified to overcome these shortcomings. 
9.5 A new framework for 
refugee aid: the UN’s Global 
Refugee Compact
The UN’s future Global Refugee Compact provides 
a promising framework for enhancing the effec-
tiveness of refugee protection aid through the 
compact approach, particularly in SSA countries. 
At the UN’s General Assembly of September 
2016, its 193 member countries adopted a series 
of commitments that imply an ambitious attempt 
report proposes to expand formal access to EU labor markets, 
notably for African citizens, conditional on effective inter-
governmental cooperation to reduce irregular migration and 
accelerate readmissions. It also notes, however, that “regardless of 
the direct effects of foreign aid on incentives to emigrate, foreign 
aid could still serve as a bargaining chip in the negotiation of EU 
readmission agreements” (p. 40). 
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Refugees. For some of them, these commitments 
represent a historical change in their policies on 
refugee integration. Relevant examples include: 
Kenya’s plan to further develop the economic 
potential of the Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement, 
a refugee settlement that has, since its creation in 
2015, promoted refugees’ economic self-reliance; 
Chad’s commitment to facilitate the access of up to 
236,000 refugees to arable land; Rwanda’s pledge 
to provide, by mid-2018, formal employment 
opportunities to 60,000 refugees and to provide 
access to banking services to 58,000 refugees, 
while graduating camp-based refugees out of 
assistance programmes; and Uganda’s pledge to 
provide access to legal employment to 120,000 
additional refugees, mainly by allocation to them 
plots of land where they can live and do farming. 
Several countries also made detailed pledges 
regarding the access of refugees to the education 
system (Djibouti is a clear case in point), the 
issuance of residence permits, ID cards and trav-
elling documents to refugees, and the adoption or 
amendment of key refugee legislation. 
In sum, the UN’s new CFFR and the future Global 
Compact on Refugees represent a fundamental 
departure from the camp-based, humanitarian 
aid-focused refugee protection system that has 
prevailed since the 1980s. The CFFR is already 
producing policy commitments on the part of 
host countries and the EU is actively participating 
in it, notably through its support for the Ethiopia 
Compact. Together with the new, better focused 
financial facilities adopted by the EU and the in-
ternational community in recent years, the CFFR 
should provide a good framework for the EU to 
coordinate with other donors the negotiation 
of refugee compacts with key countries of first 
asylum. Such compacts could increase the effec-
tiveness of aid for two main reasons. First, because 
they would combine a developmental, public 
services orientation of assistance with serious 
policy commitments by recipient countries to fa-
cilitate the integration of refugees. And second, 
because they would provide a platform to coor-
dinate assistance with other donors, increasing 
in this way both the consistency of assistance 
projects and donors’ leverage to trigger the 
necessary regulatory and policy changes in refu-
gee-hosting countries.
Admittedly, while the CFFR might provide a 
useful framework to enhance aid effectiveness 
proaches, to Somalia and six Central American 
countries. Furthermore, at the Leaders’ Summit 
on Refugees that took place in New York a few 
days after the adoption of the New York Declara-
tion, 17 countries with significant refugee popu-
lations, including many of the above-mentioned 
countries, pledged to enact policy measures 
favouring the socio-economic integration and 
access to public services of their refugee popu-
lations. In the same Summit, donors pledged to 
increase financial assistance by approximate-
ly USD 4.5 billion above 2015 levels, and made 
also substantial new commitments on refugee 
admission and resettlement. 149
A good example of the application of the compact 
philosophy that guides the CRRF is the “Jobs 
Compact” being negotiated with Ethiopia, the 
country with the second largest refugee popula-
tion in Africa. This compact will entail the creation 
of industrial development zones employing up 
to 100,000 people, with a significant portion of 
the jobs reserved for refugees, and the distri-
bution of 10,000 hectares of available irrigable 
land to some 20,000 refugees, where they will be 
allowed to grow their own crops. Ethiopia has 
also committed, inter alia, to expanding its “out-
of-camp” policy, to issuing the necessary work 
permits for refugees and to facilitating access by 
refugees to its education system and essential 
social services. The Jobs Compact is expected to 
be supported by substantial, well-targeted de-
velopment assistance projects co-financed by 
a coalition of key donors, including the EU, the 
UK and the World Bank, using some of the new 
financial facilities for refugees discussed in this 
book. Because of its emphasis on industrial de-
velopment zones, some analysts already see the 
Ethiopian Jobs Compact as a follow up to the 
EU-Jordan Compact, although, in contrast with 
the latter, no special preferential trade scheme is 
being planned for Ethiopia.150 
Other SSA countries also made significant 
policy commitments at the Leaders Summit on 
149 See United Nations, “Summary Overview Document. 
Leaders’ Summit on Refugees,” 20 September 2016:  https://
refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/public_summary_
document_refugee_summit_final_11-11-2016.pdf.
150 Ethiopia already enjoys very favourable preferential 
access to the EU market under its Economic Partnership 
Agreement, equivalent to the access granted by the Everything-
But-Arms version of the GSP, and to the US market under the US 




in dealing with refugee and IDP situations, it is 
not meant to deal with other migration challeng-
es. However, it illustrates how compacts can help 
increase the effectiveness of migration-related 
assistance more generally through: i) improved 
donor coordination, focus and leverage; ii) policy 
commitments on the part of beneficiaries; and 
iii) a developmental approach to aid. Migration 
compacts (as opposed to refugee compacts) 
should contain those elements as well, but other 
aspects such as the opening of legal pathways, 
border cooperation, returns and measures to dis-
courage irregular migration are likely to figure 
prominently.
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of macro-financial assistance and non-conces-
sional development loans and guarantees (such 
as those provided by the EIB and other multilat-
eral development banks). A well-balanced assis-
tance package can increase the impact of each of 
its components. Last but not least, aid effective-
ness can be increased if framed in the context of 
bilateral cooperation compacts or partnerships 
that facilitate donor coordination and increase 
their leverage to persuade recipient countries 
to adopt the necessary regulatory and policy 
reforms, including, where appropriate, measures 
to facilitate the access of displaced people to their 
formal labour markets and public services. 
The book recommended applying these guide-
lines to the EU’s aid strategy towards migra-
tion-relevant countries. This entails shifting, 
where possible, from humanitarian to develop-
ment aid, further stressing public services and 
livelihood projects, and increasing the share of 
rural aid and aid aimed at strengthening govern-
ance and institutions. It also implies redoubling 
efforts among EU institutions and EU countries 
to better coordinate their aid policies, including 
through joint programming.
Actual response of EU external assistance to the 
migration and refugee crisis
The book then looked at the actual response or 
sensitivity of the EU’s ODA to the migration and 
forced displacement challenge, using the histori-
cal data provided by the OECD’s CRS and drawing 
on existing academic studies. It found that EU aid 
is sensitive to forced displacement pressures and 
that the EU has in fact been increasingly targeting 
its aid, particularly since the mid-2000s, on the 
31 countries that host or are at the origin of about 
90% of the refugees and IDPs living in low- and 
middle-income countries. But the response of 
EU aid to forced displacement, like that of other 
donors, has been much stronger in the case of hu-
manitarian aid than in the case of long-term de-
velopment aid, resulting in a marked increase in 
the share of humanitarian aid in total aid to those 
countries. There is, therefore, substantial scope 
for rebalancing the mix of aid to those countries 
in a manner consistent with the new approach to 
refugee protection.
The book also examined the geographical alloca-
tion of ODA among the main developing country 




This book has examined the potential contribu-
tion of external financial assistance to the EU’s 
new external migration policy, notably to the 
EU’s efforts to address the underlying causes of 
migration and refugee flows. 
Can aid help reduce migration pressures?
Much of the academic literature of the last 25 
years finds that that the hope of politicians that 
aid will help reduce migration pressures is not 
born out by the empirical evidence. Instead, there 
is a significant, though not full, consensus on 
the existence of an inverted U curve relationship 
between per capita income and migration, which 
carries over to the link between aid and migration. 
For countries still in the upward slopped part of 
the curve, therefore, aid might actually encourage, 
rather than reduce, migration. 
However, after revisiting the debate on the link 
between aid and migration, drawing on the 
most recent literature, the book concluded that 
aid can still be effective in reducing migration 
pressures if it is properly designed and if it is 
part of a comprehensive strategy encompassing 
also other policy instruments (such as labour 
market reforms, trade preferences and regulato-
ry cooperation by third countries). First, recent 
empirical evidence suggests that development 
aid can be more effective than humanitarian aid 
in stemming migration flows. This is especially 
the case when aid is directed towards facilitating 
access by potential migrants or refugees to basic 
public services such as health care, education, 
water and electricity. Rural development aid and 
governance assistance also seem to be relatively 
effective. Second, aid can be more impactful if 
donors coordinate well their aid policies. Third, 
the effectiveness of aid depends on its mix more 
generally, including the dose of other assistance 
instruments that are typically not included in the 
definition of ODA because they do not meet the 
concessionality requirement and that, for that 
reason, are also not included in the empirical 
studies that have tried to measure the link between 
aid and migration. This is the case, in particular, 
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will increase the EU’s flexibility and capacity to 
respond to emergencies such as refugee crises. All 
this bodes well for the potential to use the external 
assistance heading of the EU budget to support 
migration and refugee policy. But the proposal 
implies a further shift in resources towards SSA, 
which would increase its overrepresentation 
beyond what an optimal regional allocation of the 
EU’s would suggest.
Suitability of the EU’s financial toolkit and other 
multilateral facilities for migration policy
The book took stock of the arsenal of EU external 
financial instruments that are directly relevant 
for migration and refugee policy. Decisions taken 
in recent years in response to the migration and 
refugee challenge have considerably strength-
ened this arsenal, not only in terms of the volume 
of resources available but, perhaps more im-
portantly, in terms of the design of the instru-
ments. Indeed, new instruments, such as the 
trust funds or facilities for Africa, the Syrian 
refugee crisis and Turkey, the EIB’s Resilience 
Initiative and the EEIP, have been created with 
a migration or refugee management objective 
in mind. Moreover, they are in part aimed at 
bridging the gap between humanitarian and 
development assistance and are partly focused 
(some more than others) on strengthening public 
services of host communities and providing real 
livelihood opportunities to refugees and other 
potential migrants. Some of them also have the 
advantage of allowing the EU to act in a swifter, 
more flexible and better coordinated manner. The 
MFA instrument has also been appropriately re-
inforced in the context of the mid-term review of 
the 2014-2020 MFF and some recent operations 
have either been in part justified by the macroeco-
nomic impact of the Syrian refugee crisis (the two 
recent MFA operations for Jordan) or/and have 
included conditionality related to the situation of 
refugees (Jordan) or IDPs (Ukraine). Moreover, at 
the global level, a number of relevant multilateral 
facilities have been set up, with the support of the 
EU, to respond to the refugee crisis, including the 
GCFF, the IDA’s refugee window and the EBRD’s 
Community Resilience initiative, which are also 
consistent with the developmental approach to 
refugee protection. These are all welcome steps.
There is substantial scope, nonetheless, for 
fine-tuning these facilities and the book made 
a number of concrete recommendations to that 
itizing SSA and, although to a lesser extent, the 
MENAT region. The share of MENAT in total 
aid has increased markedly since the beginning 
of the decade (largely reflecting the refugee 
migration crisis originating in that region) and 
this has mostly been financed by a decline in the 
share of SSA and, to a lesser degree, Asia. It was 
argued that although SSA remains substantially 
overrepresented in aid terms compared with its 
share in migration stocks in the EU, this seems 
broadly appropriate given the strong future 
migration potential of this region and other con-
siderations. But for this strategy to work, the EU 
must restructure its aid mix to SSA, and to devel-
oping countries more generally, along the guide-
lines just mentioned. Otherwise, the very large 
aid flows that the EU is providing to SSA, which 
some have characterized as a new Marshall Plan, 
will encourage rather than discourage migration 
pressures from SSA, while taking away finance 
from other priority regions and countries. The 
book also argued that there is a case, on migration 
grounds, for increasing the share of EU ODA 
directed to Eastern Europe and the Western 
Balkans.
The role of the EU institutions and the new MFF
The book then looked at the particular role being 
played by the EU institutions, noting that their 
aid policies have largely contributed to the trends 
in total EU aid, both in terms of an improved 
targeting on the top displacement countries and 
regarding the geographical allocation of aid. The 
EU budget has been making an important effort 
over the last few decades to increase the share of 
expenditure devoted to international aid, while 
EU countries have been increasing the share of 
GNP they devote to ODA, consistent with the 
SDGs. This has increased the capacity of the 
EU to use external assistance as a policy tool for 
migration policy. The new MFF proposed by the 
Commission for 2021-27 maintains this strategic 
direction by foreseeing an additional (moderate) 
increase in the share of resources dedicated to 
external action (including the EDF), at a time 
when the EU budget will lose the substantial net 
contribution from the UK. The proposed creation 
of the NDICI (which also implies the budgetisa-
tion of the EDF) and the important share of its 
resources devoted to the thematic, rapid response 
and emerging challenges pillars (some of which 
specifically mention migration as a priority) 
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supposed to act by triggering private investment, 
and actual donor contributions have in some 
cases not even reached the targeted amount. 
The EU should consider increasing its contribu-
tions to the GCFF and the EBRD’s Community 
Resilience scheme, which are performing well. 
Indeed, the EU’s limited (symbolic in the case of 
the GCFF) financial contributions to these facili-
ties seem at odds with the priority its attaches to 
migration and refugee issues. At the same time, 
the GCFF should enlarge the geographical scope 
of their activities, which has so far been exces-
sively focused on Jordan and Lebanon despite its 
new global remit. The EBRD, for its part, should 
include Lebanon in its refugee package, now 
that it has become a country of operations, and 
possibly other countries. 
Climate finance and remittances
The book argued that, with climate change 
expected to increasingly contribute to forced 
displacement and (in combination with other 
factors) to economic migration, notably in poor 
and fragile countries, climate finance to develop-
ing countries is becoming of growing relevance 
for migration policy. It was shown that the EU 
and other developed countries have been making 
an impressive effort to increase the share of their 
climate change-relevant development finance, 
consistent with the commitments made at the 
UNFCCC. Indeed, the EU has been leading this 
effort. But climate finance to developing countries 
(including that of the EU) has been excessively 
focused, so far, on mitigation as opposed to ad-
aptation. From a migration management point 
of view (but also more generally), it would be 
important to correct this excessive bias since ad-
aptation increases the resilience of poor countries 
to climate change, thus easing pressures for dis-
placement and economic migration. There is 
also scope for improving the geographical ori-
entation of climate-related development finance, 
which has so far been directed disproportional-
ly to Asia. While this is in part understandable, 
because Asia accounts for a large share of GHC 
emissions as well as of forced displacements 
caused by climate-related natural hazards, some 
reorientation towards the poorest and most vul-
nerably countries (notably towards SSA) seems 
warranted. The excessive focus on mitigation and 
Asia is particularly evident for the climate-related 
development finance provided by MDBs, espe-
effect. Regarding the new trust funds and the 
FRT, while they have been successful in earmark-
ing an important volume of funds toward refugee 
and migration priorities and have helped react 
quickly to the refugee crisis and improve coordi-
nation, contributions from other donors (notably 
from EU countries) have been disappointing, as 
illustrated again by the difficult debate on the 
renewal of the FRT. Also, their temporary nature 
casts a shadow over their future. Moreover, 
some institutions or observers (including the 
European Parliament and the European Court of 
Auditors) have expressed concerns about demo-
cratic scrutiny or possible conflict of interest. One 
option to consider is to return back to normality 
by reincorporating the work of these facilities 
into the ordinary instruments and procedures in 
the context of the new MFF. But the risk is that 
this will harm the mobilisation of funds towards 
their objectives as well as operational flexibility 
and coordination. A reasonable alternative is to 
maintain them as separate facilities while trying 
to attract more contributions from other donors. 
Whatever the option chosen, there is scope for 
making their migration-related interventions 
less defensive and more developmental. Also, the 
conditionality of their programmes to commit-
ments by recipient countries to facilitate access of 
the refugees to their labour markets and public 
services could be strengthened. 
Regarding the EIB’s ERI and the EEIP, it is 
essential that they truly concentrate their invest-
ments on the most vulnerable countries rather 
than on those with most profitable markets and 
large absorption capacity. Also, financiers from 
outside the EU should be given more opportuni-
ties to act as lead managers in the EEIP so as to 
bring in their expertise in migration- and refu-
gee-related projects. Furthermore, EU countries 
should make more substantial financial contribu-
tions to the EEIP, as the Commission had initially 
envisaged. Concerning MFA, the EU should 
consider enlarging its normal geographical scope, 
to allow operations in excluded regions that are 
essential for migration policy, such as SSA.
As for the multilateral facilities, their focus on 
refugees’ self-reliance and host communities is 
appropriate and they benefit from the experience 
and comparative advantage of the participating 
MDBs. But their targeted size remains modest, 
even taking into account that some of them are 
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Statement and the cooperation with Libya fall 
short of what is needed. The book argued that 
these other initiatives have been overly focused 
on “defensive policies” such as cooperation on 
border management, the fight against irregular 
migration and returns, and not sufficiently on the 
creation of livelihood opportunities for potential 
migrants or refugees. Nor have sufficient policy 
and regulatory commitments been obtained on 
the part of partner countries in exchange for 
the EU’s increased aid. The EU should do more 
to target the assistance to these countries on the 
improvement of local public services, governance 
and security, which often act as push factors for 
migration, and to the promotion of the economic 
self-reliance of refugees and potential migrants. 
It should also increase the conditionality of this 
assistance to measures by recipient countries in 
support of refugees’ economic integration. The 
commitments made by some SSA countries in 
the context of the UN’s new CFRR provide an 
excellent terrain for putting in practice this new 
approach, with the Jobs Compact for Ethiopia 
being a case in point.
Concluding remarks
The EU has gone a long way over the last ten years 
to make its external assistance more sensitive to 
migration, including (even if this was not the main 
intention) by markedly expanding the volume of 
resources that it devotes to climate change-related 
projects. And it has strengthened and diversified 
its toolkit of migration-relevant external financial 
instruments, including by supporting new facil-
ities managed by multilateral banks. It has also 
reinforced its cooperation with third countries on 
migration and refugee matters. This is all going 
in the right direction. But aid is unlikely to ease 
migration pressures, and might actually be coun-
terproductive, if it is not properly designed and 
carefully allocated geographically so that it truly 
addresses the root causes and origins of migration 
and elicits the right type of cooperation on the 
part of beneficiary countries. 
Moreover, even if implemented in this way, aid 
should not be expected to be a panacea for solving 
the migration and refugee crisis. The underly-
ing forces driving migration are too engrained 
and complex and there is no silver bullet to deal 
with them. If part of a comprehensive strategy, 
however, aid can make a useful contribution to 
resolving the migration and forced displacement 
cially by the EIB and the EBRD. 
The EU should also step up its efforts to reduce 
the cost of transferring international migrant re-
mittances. Remittances have increased markedly 
over the last few decades and are already four 
times larger than ODA flows. While the evidence 
on the impact of remittances on economic devel-
opment is mixed, remittances tend to play a sta-
bilizing and social safety net role from the point 
of view of recipient countries, which can help 
moderate migration flows. And although in the 
short-term remittances may encourage migration 
in relatively poor countries by easing credit con-
straints and through their powerful network 
effects, they can help potential migrants reach, 
over time, the income threshold beyond which 
the propensity to migrate starts to decline. The 
EU should therefore continue to work with its in-
ternational partners, notably within the G-7 and 
G-20, to meet the SDG targets on the reduction 
of the cost of sending remittances, and the even 
more ambitious targets it agreed for Africa at the 
Valletta Summit. This could include measures to 
increase competition among MTOs and other 
financial intermediaries, support the use of digital 
technology such as smartphones and internet 
transfers among migrants and simplify AML/
CFT regulations for small-value transfers. EU 
countries should also promote the harnessing of 
migrants savings to finance development in their 
home countries, for example by facilitating in-
vestment in diaspora bonds or the repatriation of 
capital to finance productive investments. At the 
same time, they should refrain from taxing remit-
tances. 
Towards a new approach for external financial 
assistance and refugee protection
A main theme of this book is that aid will be more 
effective as a migration policy tool if it is part of 
a wider, more comprehensive strategy entailing 
the cooperation of recipient countries, notably 
in the context of so-called migration or refugee 
compacts. In the case of refugee policy, this is 
exactly the approach advocated by the recent lit-
erature and enshrined in the UN’s CRRF. 
While the EU has enthusiastically and faithful-
ly followed this approach in the context of the 
EU-Jordan Compact (with only partial success so 
far), other bilateral cooperation frameworks such 
as the Partnership Framework, the EU-Turkey 
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challenge Europe and the world are experiencing. 
This comprehensive EU strategy should also 
encompass, in the author’s view, the opening of 
new legal pathways for migration to the EU, so as 
to produce a shift back from irregular to regular 
forms of entry, measures to facilitate migrant and 
refugee integration in the EU and the adoption 
of a new common asylum system, guided by the 
principles of solidarity and effectiveness. While 
the common thread of this book is how external 
financial assistance can be used to ease migration 
and refugee pressures at their root, its recom-
mendations should not be seen as an attempt 
to “keep the migrants away” while building a 
“fortress Europe” for migrants. Nor should they 
be interpreted as reflecting a negative perception 
of the implications of immigration for European 
society. Rather, the proposed approach is aimed 
at easing migration pressures while providing 
real livelihood alternatives to migration for both 
potential migrants and refugees, who often prefer 
to stay at home or close to home, and supporting 
the economic development of their countries of 
origin and first asylum.
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Annexes
Annex 1: Top 20 refugee hosts among low- and medium-income countries
(as of end-2016)
Source:   UNHCR, Global Trends 2016, 2017.
Note: Refugees and people in refugee-like situations as estimated by UNHCR. Includes 5.3 mn of Palestinian 
refugees under UNRWA’s mandate. Excludes China, which hosts, according to UNHCR data, 317,255 refugees, 
most of which are well-integrated Vietnamese citizens receiving protection from the Chinese government.
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Annex 2: Top 20 sources of displacement among low- and medium-income countries
(as of end-2016)
Sources:   For refugee data, UNHCR, Global Trends 2016, 2017. For IDP data, IDMC (2017a).
(1) Refugees and people in refugee-like situations as estimated by UNHCR. Includes 5.3 mn of Palestinian refugees 
under UNRWA’s mandate. 
(2) Includes only people internally displaced due to political confl ict and generalised violence.
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Annex 3: External action heading: 2014-2020 MFF and 2021-2027 MFF compared
(Commitment appropriations - EUR million in current prices)
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